Norris v. Comm Social Security

Third Circuit

Norris v. Comm Social Security

82 F. App'x 285

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit

DecidedDecember 9, 2003

Docket03-2309

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 82 F. App'x 285 (Norris v. Comm Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Norris v. Comm Social Security, 82 F. App'x 285 (3d Cir. 2003).

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Norris challenges the Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability benefits. Norris claims that his assorted disabilities leave him unable to work at any job available in the national economy. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Commissioner. We affirm because we find that the ALJ’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)(defining “substantial evidence.”) As we write only for the parties, we will not restate the full facts of the case.

In his opinion, the ALJ found that Norris suffered from fibromyalgia, chronic sinusitis/rhinitis, and a depressive disorder, none of which were severe enough to meet a listed disability under 20 C.F.R. 404 supt. P., app 1. The ALJ, relying upon the testimony of a vocational expert, found that a man with Norris’s characteristics and disabilities could engage in several jobs available in the economy, such as dishwashing, clerking, or janitorial work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (2000).

Norris’s major contention is that the ALJ improperly discredited his testimony and the opinions of his two treating physicians, all of which the ALJ found to be *286 inconsistent with objective medical evidence, Norris’s own testimony, and the opinions of two other physicians. While Norris is correct that the opinion of treating physicians is typically afforded greater weight than other medical evidence, see Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 47 (3d Cir.1994), the physicians’s explanations as to the extent of Norris’s disabilities were unclear, see Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir.1999), and were contradictory to almost all the other medical and opinion evidence in the case (e.g., Norris’s x-rays, hospitalization record, physical examinations results, his own testimony about his daily activities, and the reports and opinions of Doctors Tam and Mahon). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 286 (3d Cir.1985). As such, the ALJ was well within his discretion to partially discount Norris’s testimony and the opinions of his treating physicians. See Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir.1983)

Without those opinions, there is substantial evidence showing that Norris’s disabilities do not preclude him from holding the various jobs identified by the ALJ. The various medical evidence cited above shows that Norris is both physically and mentally able to work at numerous low-stress jobs.

Affirmed.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Norris challenges the Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability benefits. Norris claims that his assorted disabilities leave him unable to work at any job available in the national economy. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Commissioner. We affirm because we find that the ALJ’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)(defining “substantial evidence.”) As we write only for the parties, we will not restate the full facts of the case.

In his opinion, the ALJ found that Norris suffered from fibromyalgia, chronic sinusitis/rhinitis, and a depressive disorder, none of which were severe enough to meet a listed disability under 20 C.F.R. 404 supt. P., app 1. The ALJ, relying upon the testimony of a vocational expert, found that a man with Norris’s characteristics and disabilities could engage in several jobs available in the economy, such as dishwashing, clerking, or janitorial work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (2000).

Norris’s major contention is that the ALJ improperly discredited his testimony and the opinions of his two treating physicians, all of which the ALJ found to be *286 inconsistent with objective medical evidence, Norris’s own testimony, and the opinions of two other physicians. While Norris is correct that the opinion of treating physicians is typically afforded greater weight than other medical evidence, see Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 47 (3d Cir.1994), the physicians’s explanations as to the extent of Norris’s disabilities were unclear, see Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir.1999), and were contradictory to almost all the other medical and opinion evidence in the case (e.g., Norris’s x-rays, hospitalization record, physical examinations results, his own testimony about his daily activities, and the reports and opinions of Doctors Tam and Mahon). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 286 (3d Cir.1985). As such, the ALJ was well within his discretion to partially discount Norris’s testimony and the opinions of his treating physicians. See Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir.1983)

Without those opinions, there is substantial evidence showing that Norris’s disabilities do not preclude him from holding the various jobs identified by the ALJ. The various medical evidence cited above shows that Norris is both physically and mentally able to work at numerous low-stress jobs.

Affirmed.

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