F IL E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit U N IT E D ST A T E S C O U R T O F A PP E A L S September 26, 2006 FO R T H E T E N T H C IR C U IT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court
M ARY A. NORR IS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-7113 (D.C. No. 03-CV-514-W ) JO A NN E B. BA RN HA RT, ( E.D. Okla.) Com m issioner of the Social Security Adm inistration,
Defendant-Appellee.
O R D E R A N D JU D G M E N T *
Before O ’B R IE N , H O L LO W A Y , and B A L D O C K , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determ ined
unanim ously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argum ent. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered subm itted without oral argum ent.
Claim ant M ary A. Norris appeals the district court’s affirm ance of the
Com m issioner’s decision denying her Supplem ental Security Incom e benefits
* This order and judgm ent is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgm ents; nevertheless, an order and judgm ent m ay be cited under the term s and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. W e have jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.
This appeal is taken from the denial of N orris’s second application for SSI.
On June 27, 2000, the Social Security A dm inistration (SSA) denied her first
application, which had a protective filing date of A pril 12, 2000, and Norris
pursued the claim no further. Aplt. App. at 12. In her second application, which
has a protective filing date of February 18, 2002, Norris alleged disability based
on problems with her feet and back, holes in her stom ach, num bness in her hands
and arm s, allergies, hearing problem s, surgeries, and depression. Id. at 94. The
SSA denied her second application initially and upon reconsideration. At step
five of the five-step sequential evaluation process, see Williams v. Bowen,
844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (explaining five-step sequential process for
evaluating claim s for disability benefits), an administrative law judge (ALJ)
determined that she retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a
limited range of sedentary work that existed in significant numbers in the regional
and national economies and denied benefits. The Appeals Council denied review ,
m aking the ALJ’s decision the Com m issioner’s final decision. O’Dell v. Shalala,
44 F.3d 855, 858 (10th Cir. 1994).
This court reviews “the Com m issioner’s decision to determ ine whether the
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether
-2- the correct legal standards were applied.” W atkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297,
1299 (10th Cir. 2003). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hamlin v.
Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
On appeal, Norris contends that the ALJ erred when he (1) formulated an
RFC that did not include all of her physical and mental limitations, and (2) failed
to explain the manner in which the vocational expert (VE) deviated from the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles 1 when identifying other jobs that Norris could
perform.
I. E rror in R FC Form ulation
The ALJ found that Norris retained the following RFC:
[S]edentary work: except for work requiring sitting longer than 45 m inutes at a tim e or m ore than occasional stooping, or requiring kneeling or squatting. The claim ant can perform sim ple, routine tasks and maintain attention within custom ary tolerances, interact appropriately with co-workers and supervisors on a superficial level, and adapt to changes in the work setting.
Aplt. App. at 14. Norris contends that this RFC failed to account for all of her
physical and m ental lim itations.
A . Physical lim itations.
1 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Em ploym ent & Training Adm in., Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th ed. 1991).
-3- Norris argues that the RFC assessm ent does not properly account for her
bending and stooping lim itations. She first asserts that the ALJ did not state what
weight, if any, he assigned to the opinion of Dr. Kilgore, a state agency
consultative exam iner, concerning back pain and drainage from an old incisional
hernia repair. She argues that this violates Social Security Ruling (SSR ) 96-6p,
which states that an ALJ “may not ignore” the opinions of state agency medical
and psychological consultants and “must explain the weight given to the opinions
in their decisions.” SSR 96-6p, 1996 W L 374180 at *2. She also contends that
the ALJ should have discussed the effect of bending and stooping on the
incisional drainage, particularly in view of her testim ony that this m ade the
drainage worse. She argues that the ALJ erred by not giving the opinion of her
treating physician, Dr. Hillis, either substantial weight, as required by Frey v.
Bowen, 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1987), or controlling weight, as required by
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). 2 Dr. H illis treated her for a ventral hernia in 1997-98.
Aplt. App. at 219-227.
W e disagree that the ALJ ignored Dr. Kilgore’s opinion. It is apparent that
he relied on it because he reviewed it as part of the medical evidence that
supported his RFC determ ination. Id. at 14. W e also disagree that the ALJ was
2 Although Norris cites to the identical 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) on this point, w e note that the regulations applicable to her claim for SSI under Title X V I of the Social Security Act are set forth in 20 C.F.R. Ch. III, part 416. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.101.
-4- required to state the weight attributed to the opinions of Dr. Kilgore and
Dr. Hillis. An ALJ is required to “review all of the evidence relevant to [a]
claim” and “make findings about what the evidence shows.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.927(c). “If all of the evidence we receive, including all m edical opinion(s),
is consistent, and there is sufficient evidence for us to decide w hether you are
disabled, we will m ake our determ ination or decision based on that evidence.” Id.
§ 416.927(c)(1). “If any of the evidence in your case record, including any
m edical opinion(s), is inconsistent with other evidence or is internally
inconsistent, we will weigh all of the evidence and see whether we can decide
whether you are disabled based on the evidence we have.” Id. § 416.927(c)(2).
It is clear from the foregoing regulations that, if all of the medical evidence
is consistent, the ALJ is not required to state the weight attributed to each
opinion, and SSR 96-6p’s requirement to state the weight given to the opinions of
state agency consultants is inapplicable. Sim ilarly, the ALJ need not determ ine
whether a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to either controlling or
substantial weight, or w eigh it against other consistent, supportive evidence.
Here, the ALJ determ ined Norris’s RFC, then stated that the “medical
evidence provides ample support for this conclusion.” Aplt. App. at 14. He went
on to describe the medical records of her physical im pairm ents in detail, all of
which are consistent in that they identify only m inimal problem s associated with
-5- her ongoing complaints of incisional drainage. 3 For example, Dr. Hillis observed
prior to her 1997 hernia operation that she “has a draining sinus tract.” Id. at 220.
After the operation, he observed that she “has a sm all area of skin which is not
healing. She indicates that she has had pain and drainage since her repair. . . .
The wound is w ell healed other than a 1-2 cm area centrally where there is
superficial denuding. . . . [N]o draining sinus tract can be identified.” Id. at 219.
In 2002, Dr. Kilgore observed that Norris had “a m inim al amount of drainage
from a sm all incision” in her abdom en. Id. at 121. The ALJ’s failure to state the
specific weight he gave to the opinions of Dr. Kilgore or Dr. Hillis, therefore, was
not error. Nothing in these opinions suggests that the ALJ should have
formulated a more restrictive RFC. 4
W e also find no error in the ALJ’s failure to m ention Norris’s testim ony
that bending increases the pain and drainage from her incisional wound. An ALJ
3 Even Norris states that “there is clearly no contradictory m edical evidence which would justify rejecting or ignoring the opinions of doctors who had treated Norris in emergency room s and hospitals.” Aplt. Br. at 16. 4 Norris’s self-reported history of chronic back pain m ade worse by bending and stooping is contained in the “History of Present Illness” section of Dr. Kilgore’s report. Aplt. App. at 119. Therefore, this is not an opinion that the ALJ was required to address. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2) (“M edical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgm ents about the nature and severity of your im pairm ent(s), including your sym ptom s, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite im pairm ent(s), and your physical or m ental restrictions.”). Contrary to the Com m issioner’s position, Dr. Hillis’s records do contain “medical opinions” because he m akes statem ents that reflect judgm ents about Norris’s sym ptom s. See id.
-6- is not required to address every piece of evidence. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d
1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996). “W hen the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh
evidence unfavorably in order to determ ine a claim ant’s RFC, the need for
express analysis is weakened.” Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir.
2004). Here, Norris testified that “the more I m ove the more this [pointing to her
wound] gets sore . . . [i]t starts oozing m ore and more, and it will start having red
streaks shoot out of it.” Aplt. App. at 43. She also testified that in 1997-98 her
doctors told her “not to be lifting or straining anything to aggravate it.” Id. at 37.
This testim ony does not describe disabling pain or any specific lim itations
on m ovement or functioning that would require a more restrictive hypothetical
than the one the ALJ posed to the vocational expert, which limited her to
sedentary work and only occasional forw ard stooping or bending, id. at 51. The
ALJ based the physical lim itations portion of his RFC determ ination on the
reports of Dr. Kilgore and Dr. Hillis, each of whom identified only m inim al
problems with drainage from her incisional hernia repair and no functional
lim itations. Norris has pointed to no other evidence that suggests a m ore
restrictive RFC. Therefore, the ALJ did not need to reject her testim ony or weigh
it unfavorably in order to determ ine her RFC or find her not disabled at step five
of the sequential evaluation process, and his failure to m ention it is not error.
Norris contends that the ALJ erred by failing to address m edical records
from the W adley Regional M edical Center. W e disagree. Those records, id. at
-7- 222-27, contain inform ation about her ventral hernia operation in 1997. The ALJ
addressed this operation in his discussion of the records of Dr. Hillis, who
perform ed the procedure. The additional records m erely recite the details of her
procedure and do not underm ine the accuracy of the ALJ’s RFC finding.
Likewise, we find no error in the ALJ’s failure to discuss certain records
from M cCurtain M em orial Hospital to which Norris directs our attention: a
diagnosis of acute m yofascial strain and acute lower back pain, id. at 165, and an
x-ray report indicating m ild narrowing of the L5-S1 intervertebral disc space, id.
at 168. Those records, which contain m inimal inform ation, are consistent with
Dr. Kilgore’s opinion that, among other severe im pairm ents, she has chronic low
back pain, which the A LJ considered. Therefore, the A LJ did not need to discuss
them . See Howard, 379 F.3d at 947. Nothing in the M cCurtain records
contradicts the RFC found by the A LJ.
B . M ental lim itations.
Norris asserts that the ALJ failed to indicate the weight he attributed to the
opinion of examining state agency consultant Dr. Otero, failed to mention two
evaluations perform ed by Dr. Sm allwood, Ph.D, a non-examining state agency
consultant, and failed to account in his RFC determ ination for all the lim itations
Dr. Otero and Dr. Sm allwood found. Although w e find that the A LJ did address
Dr. Sm allwood’s evaluations, we agree that he failed to account for them fully in
his RFC determ ination.
-8- Dr. Otero opined that Norris could m aintain socially appropriate behavior,
apparently despite his diagnosis of panic disorder w ith agoraphobia. Id. at 140.
The ALJ noted this opinion twice in his decision, id. at 15, 16-17, and it is
evident that he relied on it in determ ining Norris’s RFC. Dr. Sm allwood
concluded that Norris w as not significantly limited in her ability to m aintain
socially appropriate behavior, but that she was m oderately 5 limited in her ability
to interact appropriately with the general public. Id. at 144.
The abilities to interact appropriately with the general public and to
m aintain socially appropriate behavior are listed on the M ental Residual
Functional Capacity Assessm ent form com pleted by Dr. Sm allwood as separate
com ponents of social interaction, id. at 144, and thus describe two separate
m easurements of m ental functioning. The ALJ, therefore, did not need to weigh
the opinions of D r. O tero and Dr. Sm allw ood because they are not inconsistent.
However, he erred by failing to address Dr. Sm allwood’s public-interaction
lim itation in his hypothetical to the VE and in his RFC determ ination. See
Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1010 (“[I]n addition to discussing the evidence supporting his
decision, the ALJ also m ust discuss the uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to
rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence he rejects.”). This failure is
5 W e note that, in his decision, the ALJ m isstated this lim itation as m arked rather than m oderate. Aplt. App. at 15. Although it does not affect our analysis, it renders the ALJ’s om ission of this lim itation from the RFC even more puzzling.
-9- significant because som e, if not all, of the jobs identified by the VE appear to
require interaction with the general public. Those jobs m ight have been excluded
if the public interaction lim itation had been included in Norris’s RFC, which
m ight have affected the ALJ’s determ ination at step five of the five-step
sequential evaluation process.
II. D eviation from the D ictionary of O ccupational Titles
Norris argues that the ALJ erred when he failed to explain the manner in
which the VE deviated from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) when
identifying jobs that she could perform based on her sedentary RFC. W e agree.
W e have held that an “ALJ m ust investigate and elicit a reasonable
explanation for any conflict between the [DOT] and expert testim ony before the
ALJ m ay rely on the expert’s testim ony as substantial evidence to support a
determ ination of nondisability.” Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1091
(10th Cir. 1999). In Haddock, we provided two examples of a “reasonable” or
“valid” explanation for the conflict between VE testim ony and the DOT: (1) “the
job the VE is testifying about is not included in the [DOT], but is docum ented in
som e other acceptable source”; and (2) “a specified num ber or percentage of a
particular job is perform ed at a lower RFC level than the [DOT] shows the job
generally to require.” Id. at 1091-92.
In response to our holding in Haddock, the SSA issued SSR 00-4p. See
Rescission of Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 00-3(10), 65 Fed. Reg. 75758,
-10- 75758 (D ec. 4, 2000) (discussing the relationship of SSR 00-4p, issued that sam e
day, to Haddock). SSR 00-4p requires an ALJ to resolve conflicts between the
D O T and a V E’s testimony “by determining if the explanation given by the VE
. . . is reasonable and provides a basis for relying on the VE . . . testim ony rather
than on the D O T inform ation.” SSR 00-4p, 2000 W L 1898704, at *2.
Here, the VE stated that the DOT listed cashier II in the light exertional
category, whereas the “Bureau of Labor Statistics in the 2000 census identifies
this job with these numbers existing at the sedentary level as well as the light
exertion level.” Aplt. App. at 53. This explanation is sim ilar to the second
explanation we noted in Haddock. See Haddock, 196 F.3d at 1091-92. After
confirm ing that the number of cashier II jobs the VE identified was only at the
sedentary level, the ALJ admitted that he did not “know enough about the Bureau
of Labor Statistics to ask a follow-up question.” Aplt. App. at 53. This comm ent
indicates that he accepted the V E’s explanation without determining if there was a
basis for relying on it, as required by SSR 00-4p. 6 Therefore, the explanation was
6 Because it appears that the VE’s source may have been a publication of som e sort, the explanation m ay have been rendered reasonable if the ALJ determ ined that the source was a reliable publication. See SSR 00-4p, 2000 W L 1898704, at *2 (stating that reasonable explanations include those based on inform ation in reliable publications other than the DOT). W e do not suggest that a reasonable explanation m ust identify a specific source or be based on a reliable publication, only that, in this case, the ALJ’s lack of familiarity with the source on which the VE based his explanation prevented him from m aking the required reliability determ ination.
-11- not reasonable, and the ALJ was not entitled to rely on it as substantial evidence
in support of his determ ination of nondisability, see Haddock, 196 F.3d at 1091. 7
The district court determ ined that the ALJ’s failure to elicit a reasonable
explanation from the V E w as not reversible error because the ALJ identified tw o
other jobs, surveillance system m onitor (700 to 1000 jobs regionally and 65,000
to 85,000 nationally) and food and beverage order taker (600 jobs regionally and
125,000 nationally), that exist in significant num bers. Aplt. A pp. at 279-80.
Based on our conclusion that the ALJ did not address Dr. Sm allwood’s opinion
properly, we decline to affirm the A LJ’s decision on this basis. The A LJ’s
treatment of Dr. Sm allwood’s opinion m ay affect Norris’s RFC, which in turn
m ay affect her ability to perform one or both of those jobs. Additionally, it is
unclear from the decision whether he found that the num bers of each of those
jobs, standing alone, constituted a significant num ber within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A ). Given the fairly sm all num ber of those two jobs, it
m ay be necessary for the ALJ to give consideration to the factors that should
direct an ALJ’s resolution of the significant num ber inquiry. See Trimiar v.
Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1992). Consideration of these factors
7 W e note that, in his decision, the ALJ erroneously stated that there was no deviation between the VE’s testim ony and the DOT. Aplt. App. at 18. Because we conclude that the ALJ failed to elicit a reasonable explanation from the VE at the hearing, we need not reach his additional failure to “explain in the determ ination or decision how he . . . resolved the conflict.” SSR 00-4p, 2000 W L 1898704, at *4.
-12- m ay be particularly important in view of the ALJ’s finding that Norris cannot sit
for m ore than forty-five minutes at a tim e, which may preclude her from driving
long distances to work.
C onclusion
In sum m ary, we conclude that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards
in determ ining the physical lim itations on Norris’s RFC, and those lim itations
were supported by substantial evidence. However, he applied the incorrect legal
standards in determ ining the mental lim itations on Norris’s RFC and in relying on
the V E’s testim ony concerning the cashier II job. On remand, the A LJ must
address Dr. Sm allwood’s opinion concerning the limitations on Norris’s ability to
interact with the general public. The ALJ also m ust elicit a reasonable
explanation for the conflict between the VE’s testim ony and the DOT concerning
the exertional level of the cashier II jobs, unless Dr. Sm allwood’s opinion alters
the RFC and the VE’s testim ony concerning whether N orris can perform that job.
He also should explain in his decision how he resolved that conflict.
The judgm ent of the district court is R E V E R S E D , and the case is
R E M A N D E D to the district court with directions to remand the case to the
agency for further proceedings consistent with this O rder and Judgm ent.
Entered for the Court
W illiam J. Holloway Circuit Judge
-13-