Norman v. Willis

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJune 5, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00073
StatusUnknown

This text of Norman v. Willis (Norman v. Willis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Norman v. Willis, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ TORRANCE T. NORMAN,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 25-cv-73-pp

OFFICER M. WILLIS and OFFICER WILBORN,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Torrance T. Norman, who is incarcerated at the Milwaukee County Jail and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On January 21, 2025, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $22.57. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on January 28, 2025. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee

over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720

(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that on December 5, 2024, around 10:00 to 11:30 p.m., a toilet containing urine and feces overflowed on Pod 6B. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. The plaintiff states that filthy water flowed throughout the day room. Id. The plaintiff alleges that because contaminated water spread close to his cell, defendant Officer M. Willis told the plaintiff to exit the cell. Id. The plaintiff

states that he did not know where the flood water was located, and Willis did not warn him that flood water was outside his cell door. Id. The plaintiff says that when he exited his cell, he slipped and flew into the air which caused him to fracture his back. Id. Paramedics allegedly rushed the plaintiff to the hospital. Id. The plaintiff states that the fall caused unbearable, excruciating back pain and headaches, and that he currently is recovering in therapy from his injury. Id. The plaintiff alleges that he was covered in urine and feces due to his fall.

Id. He states that when he returned to the jail from the hospital on December 6, 2024, around 2:30 to 3:00 a.m., he still was in the same clothes, soaked in urine and feces, and was itching uncontrollably. Id. The plaintiff allegedly asked defendant Officer Wilborn if he could take a shower but Wilborn responded, “he doesn’t have nothing to do with that, no[.]” Id. The plaintiff states that Wilborn then locked the plaintiff in his room and forced him to sleep overnight, soaked in urine and feces. Id. The plaintiff states that he woke up with huge rashes on his back and his groin area for which he still receives

medication. Id. He allegedly contracted ringworms in his groin area. Id. at 4. The plaintiff states that “sergeants and lieutenants” later told him that Wilborn should have let him shower when he returned from the hospital. Id. The plaintiff claims that Willis jeopardized his safety by ordering him to exit his cell and not warning him that the contaminated flood water had reached his cell. Id. He claims that Wilborn punished him by refusing to let him shower and locking him in his cell in his clothes that were soaked in urine

and feces. Id. For relief, the plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 5. C.

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Norman v. Willis, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/norman-v-willis-wied-2025.