Opinion
RICHARDSON, J.
Does the voluntary termination of one’s employment in order to follow a nonmarital “loved one” to another location constitute “good cause” for purposes of determining eligibility to receive unemployment compensation benefits? (See Unemp. Ins. Code, § 1256; further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.) Concluding that it does not, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment which sets aside a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board) denying unemployment compensation benefits.
[4]*4Section 1256 provides in relevant part: “An individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause . . . .” We apply this standard to the record before us.
On January 4, 1979, plaintiff commenced her employment with Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. in California. In July 1979, plaintiff’s boyfriend, with whom she had been living, found employment in the State of Washington. Plaintiff thereupon gave notice to her employer that she intended to quit her job as of September 7, 1979, in order to move to Washington to join him.
Plaintiff inquired about work in Washington before leaving California but was told that no positions were available. She nonetheless felt that she could obtain employment and moved as she had intended. After her further job search was unsuccessful she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits with the California Employment Development Department (Department). On October 4, 1979, she was informed by Department that she was ineligible to receive benefits because “There was no compelling reason for the move,” and therefore there was no “good cause” for leaving her work with Mohawk.
During the hearing of her administrative appeal, plaintiff acknowledged that she had no definite job prospects in Washington and had left her position “Because my fiance was moving to Washington and I moved up here with my fiance.” In her words, the “sole reason” she quit work was to join her fiance and “it kind of put me on the spot, either come up here and live with him up here in Washington or to break up.” Plaintiff further testified that in January 1979 she and her fiance decided to marry in June 1980. She did not, however, represent that her marriage was imminent, that her presence in Washington was required to prepare for the wedding, or, indeed, that she had any definite or fixed marital plans.
The administrative law judge found that plaintiff’s reasons for leaving her employment did not constitute “good cause.” On appeal, the Board affirmed. Plaintiff then petitioned for a writ of mandate in the superior court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) While adopting the findings of fact of the administrative law judge, the trial court held that plaintiff had voluntarily quit with good cause, and that the absence of any marital relationship did not, as a matter of law, preclude an award of unemployment compensation benefits. The Board and the Department appeal.
In section 100, the Legislature described its policy underlying the creation of an unemployment insurance system as “providing benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to a minimum.” It has been said that in deter[5]*5mining whether an employee has “left work voluntarily” within the meaning of section 1256, “the cases have not given that phrase its literal meaning. An employee need not actually choose to be unemployed; it is enough that his unemployment is the result of his own fault—a willful act causing or instigating his unemployment. [Citations.]” (Evenson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1016 [133 Cal.Rptr. 488].) However, a voluntary departure does not disqualify an employee from benefits so long as “good cause” is shown which we have defined very generally as “an adequate cause, a cause that comports with the purposes of the [California] Unemployment Insurance Code and with other laws.” (Syrek v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1960) 54 Cal.2d 519, 529 [7 Cal.Rptr. 97, 354 P.2d 625]; Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 55, 70 [141 Cal.Rptr. 146, 569 P.2d 740].) One court has suggested that “Good cause may exist for personal reasons but those reasons must be so imperative and compelling as to make the voluntary leaving ‘involuntary.’ [Citation.]” (Evenson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016.)
Former section 1264, repealed in 1976, had provided that an employee who left “employment to be married or to accompany his or her spouse to join her or him at a place from which it [was] impractical to commute” was deemed Ineligible for benefits unless the individual at the time of his or her voluntary departure and filing of the claim was “the sole or major support of his or her family.” The repeal of this section followed the decision of the Court of Appeal in Boren v. Department of Employment Dev. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 250 [130 Cal.Rptr. 683], Boren held that the effect of section 1264 was to disqualify improperly a group of claimants from certain benefits without any demonstration by the state of a compelling governmental interest justifying the discriminatory statutory classification.
Under former law, even the marriage state and respect for the obligations deriving therefrom did not, standing alone, constitute good cause for termination from work. Thus, in Douglas v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 110 [133 Cal.Rptr. 604], unemployment insurance benefits were denied when, knowing that she had no guarantee of reemployment, a wife left her former employment in order to accompany her husband who had been assigned to the State of Washington for three months. (See also, In re Kerekes, Cal. Unemp. Ins. App. Bd. Precedent Benefit Dec. No. P-B-26 (1968). [Decision pursuant to § 409 which permits the board to designate certain decisions as precedents thereafter controlling as to referees and the director.] Wife was denied benefits where evidence established (1) she intended to leave area before her marriage, (2) marriage occurred soon before wife left employment, and (3) wife wanted to move and did not move simply to accompany husband.)
[6]*6Whether or not there is “good cause” is an issue of law. (Perales v. Department of Human Resources Dev. (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 332, 336 [108 Cal. Rptr. 167].) In this connection, plaintiff relies heavily upon Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 [134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106], and the appellate decision in Department of Industrial Relations v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 72 [156 Cal.Rptr. 183], in arguing that her nonmarital relationship is the equivalent of a marriage for purposes of determining “good cause.” We conclude otherwise.
In Marvin, we emphasized the property rights of nonmarital partners when their relationship terminated, holding that “adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights. ...
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Opinion
RICHARDSON, J.
Does the voluntary termination of one’s employment in order to follow a nonmarital “loved one” to another location constitute “good cause” for purposes of determining eligibility to receive unemployment compensation benefits? (See Unemp. Ins. Code, § 1256; further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.) Concluding that it does not, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment which sets aside a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board) denying unemployment compensation benefits.
[4]*4Section 1256 provides in relevant part: “An individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause . . . .” We apply this standard to the record before us.
On January 4, 1979, plaintiff commenced her employment with Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. in California. In July 1979, plaintiff’s boyfriend, with whom she had been living, found employment in the State of Washington. Plaintiff thereupon gave notice to her employer that she intended to quit her job as of September 7, 1979, in order to move to Washington to join him.
Plaintiff inquired about work in Washington before leaving California but was told that no positions were available. She nonetheless felt that she could obtain employment and moved as she had intended. After her further job search was unsuccessful she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits with the California Employment Development Department (Department). On October 4, 1979, she was informed by Department that she was ineligible to receive benefits because “There was no compelling reason for the move,” and therefore there was no “good cause” for leaving her work with Mohawk.
During the hearing of her administrative appeal, plaintiff acknowledged that she had no definite job prospects in Washington and had left her position “Because my fiance was moving to Washington and I moved up here with my fiance.” In her words, the “sole reason” she quit work was to join her fiance and “it kind of put me on the spot, either come up here and live with him up here in Washington or to break up.” Plaintiff further testified that in January 1979 she and her fiance decided to marry in June 1980. She did not, however, represent that her marriage was imminent, that her presence in Washington was required to prepare for the wedding, or, indeed, that she had any definite or fixed marital plans.
The administrative law judge found that plaintiff’s reasons for leaving her employment did not constitute “good cause.” On appeal, the Board affirmed. Plaintiff then petitioned for a writ of mandate in the superior court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) While adopting the findings of fact of the administrative law judge, the trial court held that plaintiff had voluntarily quit with good cause, and that the absence of any marital relationship did not, as a matter of law, preclude an award of unemployment compensation benefits. The Board and the Department appeal.
In section 100, the Legislature described its policy underlying the creation of an unemployment insurance system as “providing benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to a minimum.” It has been said that in deter[5]*5mining whether an employee has “left work voluntarily” within the meaning of section 1256, “the cases have not given that phrase its literal meaning. An employee need not actually choose to be unemployed; it is enough that his unemployment is the result of his own fault—a willful act causing or instigating his unemployment. [Citations.]” (Evenson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1016 [133 Cal.Rptr. 488].) However, a voluntary departure does not disqualify an employee from benefits so long as “good cause” is shown which we have defined very generally as “an adequate cause, a cause that comports with the purposes of the [California] Unemployment Insurance Code and with other laws.” (Syrek v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1960) 54 Cal.2d 519, 529 [7 Cal.Rptr. 97, 354 P.2d 625]; Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 55, 70 [141 Cal.Rptr. 146, 569 P.2d 740].) One court has suggested that “Good cause may exist for personal reasons but those reasons must be so imperative and compelling as to make the voluntary leaving ‘involuntary.’ [Citation.]” (Evenson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016.)
Former section 1264, repealed in 1976, had provided that an employee who left “employment to be married or to accompany his or her spouse to join her or him at a place from which it [was] impractical to commute” was deemed Ineligible for benefits unless the individual at the time of his or her voluntary departure and filing of the claim was “the sole or major support of his or her family.” The repeal of this section followed the decision of the Court of Appeal in Boren v. Department of Employment Dev. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 250 [130 Cal.Rptr. 683], Boren held that the effect of section 1264 was to disqualify improperly a group of claimants from certain benefits without any demonstration by the state of a compelling governmental interest justifying the discriminatory statutory classification.
Under former law, even the marriage state and respect for the obligations deriving therefrom did not, standing alone, constitute good cause for termination from work. Thus, in Douglas v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 110 [133 Cal.Rptr. 604], unemployment insurance benefits were denied when, knowing that she had no guarantee of reemployment, a wife left her former employment in order to accompany her husband who had been assigned to the State of Washington for three months. (See also, In re Kerekes, Cal. Unemp. Ins. App. Bd. Precedent Benefit Dec. No. P-B-26 (1968). [Decision pursuant to § 409 which permits the board to designate certain decisions as precedents thereafter controlling as to referees and the director.] Wife was denied benefits where evidence established (1) she intended to leave area before her marriage, (2) marriage occurred soon before wife left employment, and (3) wife wanted to move and did not move simply to accompany husband.)
[6]*6Whether or not there is “good cause” is an issue of law. (Perales v. Department of Human Resources Dev. (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 332, 336 [108 Cal. Rptr. 167].) In this connection, plaintiff relies heavily upon Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 [134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106], and the appellate decision in Department of Industrial Relations v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 72 [156 Cal.Rptr. 183], in arguing that her nonmarital relationship is the equivalent of a marriage for purposes of determining “good cause.” We conclude otherwise.
In Marvin, we emphasized the property rights of nonmarital partners when their relationship terminated, holding that “adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights. ... So long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may order their economic affairs as they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from enforcing such agreements.” (18 Cal.3d at p. 674, italics added.) As to the marital relationship, however, we carefully emphasized that “the structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution of marriage, and nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken to derogate from that institution.” (P. 684.) The essence of Marvin thus was that nonmarital partners were not barred by virtue of their relationship from asserting those contractual rights and remedies which are available to other persons.
Similarly, in Department of Industrial Relations v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 94 Cal.App.3d 72, the issue was a nonmarital partner’s entitlement to death benefits. Labor Code section 3503 provides “No person is a dependent of any deceased employee unless in good faith a member of the family or household of the employee . . . .” There was substantial evidence that the claimant had been a member of the decedent’s household and at least a partial dependent. After reviewing Marvin, and the implications flowing from the repeal of former Penal Code section 269a, which had made living “in a state of cohabitation and adultery” a criminal offense, the appellate court held that the nonmarital partner was a “good faith” member of the deceased employee’s household and dependent upon the employee. The survivor’s unmarried relationship with the decedent did not bar her from benefits to which she was otherwise entitled under the statute.
Recent appellate opinions have recognized the limitations of Marvin and have declined to equate a nonmarital relationship with marriage. Thus, in People v. Delph (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 411 [156 Cal.Rptr. 422, 4 A.L.R.4th 416], the court was examining the term “spouse” within the “marital communications” privilege. (Evid. Code, §§ 970, 980.) In declining to extend this privilege to nonmarital partners, the court accurately characterized Marvin as providing: “. . . a method for equitable resolution of property disputes in situations where [7]*7the parties not only carried on a relationship that, except for the formal ceremony, was marriage-like, but where they also entered into an implied contract or agreement as to ownership of property, thus protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties. This in no way signals a general elevation of meretricious relationships themselves to the level of marriages for any and all purposes. It is for the Legislature to determine whether such relationships, because of their commonness in today’s society or for other policy reasons, deserve the statutory protection afforded the sanctity of the marriage union.” (P. 416, fn. omitted.)
Similarly, in Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc. (1981) 118 Cal. App.3d 155 [173 Cal.Rptr. 68], and in Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co. (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 890 [184 Cal.Rptr. 390], judgments were affirmed which barred a surviving nonmarital partner from asserting a cause of action for wrongful death under section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Subdivision (b) of this section defines “heirs” who may bring such actions as including heirs at law or those who would take in intestate succession, putative spouses, children of putative spouses, step-children, parents, and minors living in decedent’s household. The Garcia court noted that, in response to our holding that step-children could not bring such actions (Steed v. Imperial Airlines (1974) 12 Cal.3d 115 [115 Cal.Rptr. 329, 524 P.2d 801, 68 A.L.R.3d 1204]), the Legislature had amended the statute specifically to include such persons. The court stressed that “The Legislature has manifested its intent, notwithstanding Marvin, not to expand the classification of persons entitled to recover to include meretricious spouses,” because no similar amendment on their behalf had been enacted. (Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 894.)
Both the Harrod and Garcia courts examined and rejected claims that section 377 denied equal protection and due process of law, the Harrod court holding: “The Legislature could reasonably conclude a relationship which the parties have chosen not to formalize by marriage lacks the necessary permanence to allow the survivor to recover damages for wrongful death—damages which look to the future and are intended to compensate for future loss. In addition, an action based on a meretricious relationship presents greater problems of proof and dangers of fraudulent claims than an action by a spouse or putative spouse. Finally, the exclusion of meretricious spouses is reasonably related to the state’s legitimate interest in promoting marriage. [Citation.]” (Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., supra, 118 Cal.App.3d at p. 158; Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 895.)
This last concern was echoed by us most recently in In re Cummings (1982) 30 Cal.3d 870 [180 Cal.Rptr. 826, 640 P.2d 1101], wherein we sustained the validity of prison regulations which limited overnight visitation privileges to members of an inmate’s “immediate family.” We found that such restrictions [8]*8were neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, emphasizing that: “The prolonged personal and intimate contact afforded prisoners is limited to those persons with whom the prisoner has a readily provable, legally cognizable, traditional family relationship. ... To recognize other ‘alternative’ relationships as justifying ‘family’ visitation is an invitation into semantic quicksand. Moreover, it would encourage subterfuge.” (P. 873.) We specifically noted the difficulty, in the absence of a recognized formal tie, of assessing the truth of an inmate’s assertion regarding his family status (p. 874), a concern equally applicable here.
Nothing in plaintiff’s unmarried state precludes her from receiving benefits to which she would otherwise be entitled. The Legislature’s decision to give weight to marital relationships in the determination of “good cause” supports public policy encouraging marriage and is a reasonable method of alleviating otherwise difficult problems of proof.
Finally, our review of recent legislative and administrative amendments which touch on marital relationships and their effect on a “good cause” determination contributes additional support to our conclusion that the legislative scheme is not intended to accord the same weight to nonmarital arrangements.
The Legislature’s recent amendments to sections 1030 and 1032 indicate that the Board’s treatment of nonmarital relationships conforms to legislative intent. In not charging an employer’s reserve account when an employee leaves for maritally related reasons, the Legislature thus has singled out such non-work-related terminations as special cases but has declined to extend similar protection to the employer in nonmarital situations.
Moreover, regulations which were promulgated in 1980, while not binding in this case, are instructive in our interpretation of legislative intent. Ordinarily, we give great weight to the interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency empowered to promulgate regulations to advance its purpose unless the interpretation is clearly erroneous. (See, e.g., Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658, 668 [150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564]; Rivera v. City of Fresno (1971) 6 Cal.3d 132, 140 [98 Cal.Rptr. 281, 490 P.2d 793].)
In the new regulations (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 1256-1 et seq.), section 1256-9 describes the general factors to be considered in terminations of employment for domestic reasons. Such circumstances are considered “good cause” if “the claimant’s obligation is of a real, substantial and compelling nature . . . and the claimant’s reason for leaving work is due to a legal or moral obligation” related to, inter alia, “the existing or prospective marital status of the claimant.” The comment to this regulation stresses that among the requirements are an “obligation due to domestic circumstances” in conjunction [9]*9with a “compelling reason” for terminating employment. (Italics added.) Domestic obligations which are deemed to provide “good cause” extend to circumstances involving named family members as well as spouses.
Section 1256-12 recites instances in which marriage or imminent marriage may constitute “good cause.” In the event of relocation due to an imminent marriage, among the factors to be considered are the time of the departure from employment as related to the need for packing and other relocation or marriage related duties. The comment further recites that “This section reflects this state’s policy in favor of the establishment and maintenance of the marital relationship.”
Plaintiff here did not demonstrate the “imminency of her marriage” or any need for termination of employment at the time that she left work because of marriage related obligations. Plaintiff’s decision to move to Washington came 10 months before her marriage was anticipated. It may be of some interest that, indeed, at oral argument more than two years later, we were informed that no marriage had as yet occurred. More significantly, nothing in her notification of termination to her employer or in her request for unemployment compensation benefits indicated that her presence in Washington was necessary because of concrete marriage plans which required “on-the-spot” arrangements.
We reaffirm our recognition of a strong public policy favoring marriage. (Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 684.) No similar policy favors the maintenance of nonmarital relationships. We therefore conclude that plaintiff did not, as a matter of law, establish “good cause” for her voluntary departure from her employment within the meaning of section 1256. In the absence of legislation which grants to members of a nonmarital relationship the same benefits as those granted to spouses, no basis exists in this context for extending to nonmarital relations the preferential status afforded to marital relations.
Plaintiff also asserts a constitutional claim, arguing that to deny her the benefits accorded to those who are married violates her right of privacy and freedom of association, citing City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123 [164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436, 12 A.L.R.4th 219]. In essence, plaintiff’s argument is that nonmarried persons must be afforded all the rights and benefits extended to married persons. We do not agree. Underlying the unemployment compensation scheme is the state’s legitimate interest in promoting marriage. Unlike the plaintiffs in City of Santa Barbara, plaintiff herein has not been denied the right to live with the person of her choice, nor has she been denied benefits which she might otherwise enjoy but for her unmarried state.
[10]*10Recognizing and favoring those with established marital and familial ties not only furthers the state’s interest in promoting such relationships but assures a more readily verifiable method of proof. Plaintiff here has demonstrated no compelling obligations requiring termination of her employment; she was neither following a spouse nor moving because of imminent plans to marry. As in Cummings, numerous problems of standards and difficulties of proof would arise if we imposed upon an administrative agency the function of deciding which relationships merited treatment equivalent to the treatment afforded those with formal marriages. The inevitable questions would include issues such as the factors deemed relevant, the length of the relationship, the parties’ eventual plans as to marriage, and the sincerity of their beliefs as to whether they should ever marry. The potential for administrative intrusions into rights of privacy and association would be severe if agencies bore the burden of ferreting out the “true depth” and intimacy of a relationship in order to determine whether the existence and nature of the relationship was the equivalent of marriage.
Nothing, of course, would prevent claimants in such situations from establishing “good cause” based on compelling circumstances which make the voluntary leaving akin to an involuntary departure. (See Evenson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016.) Thus, for example, where there are children of a nonformalized relationship, and an employee leaves his or her position to be with a nonmarital loved one and their children, good cause might be shown. However, neither the statutes nor our decisions beginning with Marvin require that we extend to partners in nonmarital relationships such as plaintiff, the evidentiary benefits extended to marital partners.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to deny the writ.
Mosk, J., Kaus, J., and Reynoso, J., concurred.