Norman Pomeroy v. Department of Energy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedMarch 5, 2024
DocketDC-0752-18-0526-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Norman Pomeroy v. Department of Energy (Norman Pomeroy v. Department of Energy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Norman Pomeroy v. Department of Energy, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

NORMAN POMEROY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-0752-18-0526-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, DATE: March 5, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Andrew Kim , Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

Pamela Simmonds , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND The essential undisputed facts as set forth in the initial decision are as follows. The appellant was formerly employed by the agency as an Intelligence Research Specialist with the agency’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (IN). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. As a condition of his employment, he was required to maintain a top secret security clearance with access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI). ID at 2. On November 17, 2014, the agency issued the appellant a notice of intent to revoke his SCI access. ID at 6. The agency afforded the appellant various internal appeals before the IN Director ultimately notified the appellant of his decision to revoke the appellant’s SCI access on June 6, 2017. ID at 6-10. On November 8, 2017, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal based on a charge of failure to maintain SCI access as required by his position. ID at 10. After affording the appellant an opportunity to respond to the proposal notice, on April 4, 2018, the agency issued a decision removing the appellant from service. ID at 10-11. The appellant filed a Board appeal in which he raised an affirmative defense of harmful procedural error based on the agency’s alleged failure to follow its internal policies when revoking his SCI access. IAF, Tab 1. After the 3

appellant withdrew his request for a hearing, IAF, Tab 10, the administrative judge issued an initial decision based on the written record, finding that the agency proved its charge and the appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense of harmful procedural error, ID at 11-16. She further found that the appellant’s removal promoted the efficiency of the service. ID at 16-17. The appellant has filed a petition for review in which he disputes the administrative judge’s finding that he failed to prove his affirmative defense of harmful procedural error. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has opposed the appellant’s petition. PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW In an appeal of an adverse action under 5 U.S.C. § 7513 based on the denial, revocation, or suspension of a security clearance, the Board does not have authority to review the substance of the underlying security clearance determination, but may review the following: (1) whether the employee’s position required a security clearance; (2) whether the security clearance was denied, revoked, or suspended; and (3) whether the agency followed the procedures set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-31 (1988); Cheney v. Department of Justice, 479 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Hesse v. Department of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000). On review, the appellant does not dispute the administrative judge’s findings that these conditions are satisfied here, and we discern no error in the administrative judge’s analysis. ID at 12. Rather, on review the appellant reiterates his argument that the agency committed harmful procedural error in the security clearance revocation process. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-15. He correctly observes that in some cases the Board has the authority to review such a claim. Id. at 11-12; see Romero v. Department of Defense, 527 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the Board may review whether an agency has complied with its procedures for revoking a 4

security clearance, even though it may not review the substance of the revocation decision). However, in this case, the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant’s harmful procedural error claims exceed the Board’s review authority. ID at 15. The appellant’s chief argument is that the agency failed to follow its Standard Operating Procedures for the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (SOP) to determine whether his conduct amounted to a “security infraction” or a “security violation,” which he contends was required to decide the appropriate disciplinary action to be imposed. 2 PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-13. The appellant also claims that the agency improperly applied a Work Force Discipline policy dated May 14, 2015, issued after the conduct at issue occurred, which recommends more severe discipline for a single offense of improper storage of classified materials as compared with the prior version in effect. Id. at 10-11. In essence, these arguments amount to the appellant’s disagreement with the agency’s decision that revocation of his security clearance, instead of a lesser penalty, was warranted under the circumstances. Such an issue, however, goes to the substance of the agency’s clearance determination, which lies outside of our review authority. Hence, as the administrative judge explained, this case is distinguishable from Romero, in which the procedural review did not overstep the boundaries set by Egan. See Romero, 527 F.3d at 1329-30; ID at 15.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Department of the Navy v. Egan
484 U.S. 518 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Romero v. Department of Defense
527 F.3d 1324 (Federal Circuit, 2008)
Cheney v. Department of Justice
479 F.3d 1343 (Federal Circuit, 2007)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Norman Pomeroy v. Department of Energy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/norman-pomeroy-v-department-of-energy-mspb-2024.