Norman L. Scott, Sr. v. The Cooper Health System

• Court: District Court, D. New Jersey
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: 1:22-cv-04123
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE

Plaintiff, v. | Civil Action THE COOPER HEALTH SYSTEM, | No. 22-4123 (RMW-SAK) Defendant. ! MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff Norman L. Scott, Sr.’s Plaintiff’) Motion for Recusal (Dkt, No, 118); the Opposition thereto filed by Defendant The Cooper Health System (“Defendant”) (Dkt. No, 119); and a Reply filed by Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 123); and WHEREAS, Plaintiff asks this Court to enter an Order recusing Magistrate Judge Sharon A. King pursuant to 28 U.S.C, §§ 144, 455(a), and 455(b){1), (see Dkt. No. 118 at 1, 4); and WHEREAS, under 28 U.S.C, § 144, a judge must recuse herself if a party files a “timely and sufficient affidavit” establishing that the judge has a “personal bias or prejudice against the party seeking recusal, or in favor of the adverse party.” 28 U.S.C, § 144; and WHEREAS, the Third Circuit has long held that “[t]he mere filing of an affidavit under this section does not automatically disqualify a judge.” United States v. Townsend, 478 F.2d 1072, 1073 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing Behr v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 233 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S, 942 (1956), “Disqualification results only from the filing ofa timely and sufficient affidavit.” /d, (emphasis added) (citing Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen y. Bangor and Aroostook RX. Co., 380 F.2d 570, cert, denied per curiam, 389 U.S. 327 (1967)). “It is

the duty of the judge against whom a section 144 affidavit is filed to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged.” Jd. (citing Simmons v. United States, 302 F.2d 71 Gd Cir, 1962); and WHEREAS, under 28 U.S.C, § 455(a), a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” See United States v. Jacobs, 311 F. App’x 535, 537 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Because [Section] 455(a) is intended to promote not only fairness to the litigants but also public confidence in the judiciary, a party seeking recusal need not demonstrate that the judge is actually biased, but rather that he would appear to be biased to a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); and WHEREAS, in order to succeed on the recusal motion, the movant must make a three- fold showing: (1) the facts must be material and stated with particularity; (2) the facts must be such that, if true they would convince a reasonable person that a bias exists; (3) the facts must show the bias is personal, as opposed to judicial, in nature. United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973); see also Jacobs, 311 F. App’x at 537 (“A recusal motion must be based on ‘objective facts,’ not mere ‘possibilities’ and ‘unsubstantiated allegations.”); and WHEREAS, “a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal,” Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v, Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir, 2000), To the contrary, “the source of bias [must] be extrajudicial, that is stemming from a scurce outside of the proceeding, ot of such an intensity as to make a fair trial impossible.” Jacobsen v. Citi Morte. No. 17-1555, 2017 WL 3877850, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2017) “[T]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. In and of themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding comments of accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); and

WHEREAS, here, Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence to suggest that he requested Judge King recuse herself in the first instance, see 28 U.S.C. § 144; and WHEREAS, Judge King has not determined that Plaintiff has “ma[de] and file[d] a timely and sufficient affidavit [she] has a personal bias or prejudice either against [Plaintiff] or m favor of any adverse party” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, see Townsend, 478 F.2d at 1073; CONSEQUENTLY, for all the foregoing reasons, and for good cause shown; IT IS this" aay of December, 2025 hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal (Dkt. No. 118) is DENIED; and further ORDERED that Plaintiff may refile his motion, addressed to Judge King, within fourteen (14) days of this Order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, however, Plaintiff must rely on the affidavit filed in support of his Motion (see Dkt. No. 118) and may not further amend his allegations set forth therein. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (“A party may file only one such affidavit in any case,”).

I aN M. WILLIAMS NITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE