Norman Horsley v. William Wardwell

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 8, 2024
Docket23-35127
StatusUnpublished

This text of Norman Horsley v. William Wardwell (Norman Horsley v. William Wardwell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Norman Horsley v. William Wardwell, (9th Cir. 2024).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 8 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NORMAN HORSLEY, an individual, No. 23-35127

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00217-BLW

v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM WARDWELL, Individually and as Trustee of the Shirley Packer Trust,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 5, 2024** Portland, Oregon

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and BRESS and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Norman Horsley, a beneficiary of the Shirley Packer Trust, appeals the

district court’s order dismissing his suit against William Wardwell, a court-

appointed trustee. Horsley seeks a declaration voiding state court orders relating to

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the administration of the Trust, and he alleges that Wardwell breached fiduciary

duties in his capacities as a trustee and an attorney. The district court dismissed

Horsley’s claims as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 and claim preclusion.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Rooker-Feldman and

under claim preclusion. Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1141

(9th Cir. 2021); Save Bull Trout v. Williams, 51 F.4th 1101, 1105–06 (9th Cir.

2022), as amended. We may affirm “on any ground raised below and fairly

supported by the record.” Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020,

1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

The district court correctly concluded that Horsley’s claim for declaratory

relief was barred by Rooker-Feldman. In his verified complaint, Horsley asks for a

declaration that “all orders and judgments relating to substantive administration

and determination of Trust dispute and issues be declared void and rescinded . . . .”

But “[u]nder Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court is without subject matter

jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state court.” Benavidez, 993

F.3d at 1142 (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Horsley’s challenge to state court orders as legally erroneous—and his pursuit of a

1 The doctrine’s name derives from two cases: Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

2 declaration voiding and rescinding them—is precisely the kind of appeal Rooker-

Feldman prohibits.

Horsley also alleges two breach of fiduciary duty claims: one related to

Wardwell’s actions as trustee, and the other related to Wardwell’s actions as an

attorney. The district court concluded that the trustee-based claim was barred by

Rooker-Feldman, and that the attorney-based claim was barred by claim

preclusion. We conclude that Rooker-Feldman bars our consideration of both

claims.

An October 2019 state court order states that “[a]ll potential claims by

Beneficiaries have been fully arbitrated or released,” and further provides that

Wardwell “shall be fully and finally released and discharged as Trustee” and “shall

be released and discharged from any and all liabilities arising in connection with

the performance of [his] duties.” A January 2020 order issued by the same state

court provides that “Horsley is enjoined and restrained from filing, seeking, or

pursuing (or any person or entity from assisting him) any arbitration against the

Trustee of the Shirley Packer Trust.”

Horsley has now brought in federal court trustee and attorney-based claims

against Wardwell, but he asks that we direct those claims to arbitration after

vacating the state court orders enjoining Horsley from pursuing further arbitration

proceedings. Under these circumstances, Horsley’s request for relief is premised

3 on unwinding the adverse state court decisions. He is therefore effectively asking

us to review and reject the state court decisions precluding him from pursuing

arbitration, contrary to Rooker-Feldman. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16.

Because Horsley challenges those state court decisions as legally erroneous and

seeks to bring claims barred by those decisions, his claims are squarely prohibited

under Rooker-Feldman.

AFFIRMED.

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Related

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.
263 U.S. 413 (Supreme Court, 1924)
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman
460 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung
710 F.3d 1020 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
John Benavidez v. County of San Diego
993 F.3d 1134 (Ninth Circuit, 2021)
Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam
334 F.3d 895 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)

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Norman Horsley v. William Wardwell, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/norman-horsley-v-william-wardwell-ca9-2024.