HART, J.,
(after stating the facts). On the 14th day of February, 1891, John B. Driver as commissioner of the chancery court conveyed the lands involved in this suit to F. P. Poston and D. T. Schoolfield as trustees for the estate of Louis Hanauer and the firm of Schoolfield, Hanauer & Company for the sum of $45,000. Said Poston and Schoolfield as trustees purchased the property first, for the estate of Louis Hanauer which held a lien on said lands for the balance of the purchase money for the sum of $21,114.60; and then for the joint benefit of the estate of Louis Hanauer in the sum of $17,766.03 and the firm of Schoolfield, Hanauer & Company in the sum of $18,529.05. This deed created an active trust in favor of these parties within the meaning of the rule in Randolph v. Read, 129 Ark. 485, as contended for by counsel for the plaintiff. H. Gr. Miller was a member of the firm of Schoolfield, Hanauer & Company and owned an undivided one-third interest therein. He was also guardian of Susie T. Thomas, a minor, and became indebted to her as such guardian in a large sum of money. On the 24th day of November, 1897, after Susie T. Thomas became of legal age, Miller conveyed to her by deed his undivided interest in the lands in this suit for the sum of $6,000, and she succeeded to the rights and interest of Miller in said lands. That she is entitled to an undivided 1242/7279 interest in said lands. In January, 1898, Susie T. Thomas married M. B. Norfleet and is the plaintiff in this action.
But the defendants invoke the equitable doctrine of laches as a bar to the relief sought by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in her complaint prayed for a recovery of her undivided interest in the lands, for an accounting of the rents and profits, and for partition of the lands. The chancery court sustained a general demurrer to her complaint and dismissed it for want of equity. Laches was not specifically pleaded, but this was not necessary. The defense of laches goes to the equity of the bill. That is to say, assuming the facts stated in the bill to be true, the bill is not maintainable as a matter of law because of laches. Tate v. Logan, 88 Ark. 333, and Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385.
The doctrine of laches is founded on the equitable maxims of “he who seeks equity must do equity” and ‘ ‘ equity aids the vigilant. ’ ’ Hence while there is a great variety of cases in which the equitable doctrine is invoked, each case must depend upon its own particular circumstances and courts of equity have always discouraged laches and delay without cause. Of course, delay without neglect, or which does not operate to the prejudice of the rights of the opposite party is not sufficient to constitute laches. It is well settled, however, that he, who, without adequate excuse delays asserting his rights until the proofs respecting the transaction out of which he claims his rights arose are so uncertain and obscure that it is difficult for the court to determine the matter, has no right to relief. So where on account of delay the adverse party has good reason to believe that his alleged rights are worthless or abandoned, where because of the change in condition or relations of the property and parties during the period of delay it would be an injustice to allow the complainant to assert his rights, or in case of intervening equities, it is generally held that laches is a bar to the relief is sought. Casey v. Trout, 114 Ark. 359; Finley v. Finley, 103 Ark. 58; Tatum v. Arhansas Lumber Co., 103 Ark. 251; Davis v. Harrell, 101 Ark. 230; Rhodes v. Cissell, 82 Ark. 367; Williams v. Bennett, 75 Ark. 312; Thomas v. Sypert, 61 Ark. 575, and Gibson v. Derriot, 55 Ark. 85. Many other cases illustrating the court’s adherence to the doctrine might be cited; but it is so well settled and has been applied in such a great variety of cases that further citation is unnecessary.
Judge Brewer, who afterwards became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, said while on the circuit, “No doctrine is so wholesome, when wisely administered, as that' of laches. It prevents the resurrection of stale titles, and forbids the spying out from the records of ancient and abandoned rights. It requires of every owner that he take care of his property, and of every claimant, that he make known his claims. It gives to the actual and larger possessor security, and induces and justifies him in all efforts to improve and make valuable the property he holds. It is a doctrine received with favor because its proper application works out justice and equity and often bars the holder of a mere technical right, which he has abandoned for years, from enforcing it when its enforcement will work large injury to many.” Naddo v. Bardon, 51 Fed. 493, 2 C. C. A. 335.
This brings us to a consideration of what the conditions are which combine to render the claim of the plaintiff stale in equity. The case was disposed of on the complaint and demurrer. As said by Mr. Justice Grier in Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 87, a person seeking to avoid laches “should set forth in his bill specifically what were the impediments to an earlier prosecution of his claim; how he came to be so long ignorant of his rights, and means used by the respondent to fraudulently keep him in ignorance and how and when he first came to a knowledge of the matters alleged in the bill; otherwise the chancellor may justly refuse to consider his case on his own showing, without inquiring whether there is a demurrer or formal plea of the statute of limitations contained in the answer.” This was quoted with approval in Gibson v Herriot, 55 Ark. 85.
The complaint in this case was filed and summons issued on the 26th day of August, 1916. H. G. Miller conveyed to the plaintiff by deed his interest in the lands described in the complaint on the 24th day of November, 1897. At that time she was of legal age, and the deed recites that she was a resident of Little Eock, Arkansas. Her complaint recites that she was married in January, 1898, and that she is a resident of Forrest City, St. Francis County, Arkansas; that_the defendants are residents of Mississippi County, Arkansas, and that D. T. School-field, trustee, is a citizen and resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. The lands are situated in Mississippi County, Arkansas. In fact, the complaint and the various deeds exhibited with it show that all the interested parties except Susie T. Norfleet were and are residents of Mississippi County, Arkansas, or Memphis, in Shelby County, Tennessee. She resided in Little Rock, Arkansas, prior to her marriage and then at Forrest City, St. Francis County, Arkansas, a county near to the county in which the lands involved in this suit are situated. The plaintiff acquired her interest in the lands on the 24th day of November, 1897, by a deed from H. G-. Miller, one of the members of the firm of Schoolfield, Hanauer & Company. Louis Hanauer died before 1891, and by the terms of his will, made certain specific bequests and left the remainder of his estate to his niece, Mary Hampson, and to her children.
On the 9th day of January, 1897, W. W. Schoolfield, as executor of the estate of Louis Hanauer, deceased, and F. P. Poston and D. T. Schoolfield as trustees, and the remaining heirs and legatees of Louis Hanauer, deceased, conveyed the lands involved in this suit to Mary Gr. Hampson and her children. The deed was absolute in its terms. The deed, also, contained a covenant that the grantees would take care of the indebtedness due to W. W. Schoolfield and H. Gr.
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HART, J.,
(after stating the facts). On the 14th day of February, 1891, John B. Driver as commissioner of the chancery court conveyed the lands involved in this suit to F. P. Poston and D. T. Schoolfield as trustees for the estate of Louis Hanauer and the firm of Schoolfield, Hanauer & Company for the sum of $45,000. Said Poston and Schoolfield as trustees purchased the property first, for the estate of Louis Hanauer which held a lien on said lands for the balance of the purchase money for the sum of $21,114.60; and then for the joint benefit of the estate of Louis Hanauer in the sum of $17,766.03 and the firm of Schoolfield, Hanauer & Company in the sum of $18,529.05. This deed created an active trust in favor of these parties within the meaning of the rule in Randolph v. Read, 129 Ark. 485, as contended for by counsel for the plaintiff. H. Gr. Miller was a member of the firm of Schoolfield, Hanauer & Company and owned an undivided one-third interest therein. He was also guardian of Susie T. Thomas, a minor, and became indebted to her as such guardian in a large sum of money. On the 24th day of November, 1897, after Susie T. Thomas became of legal age, Miller conveyed to her by deed his undivided interest in the lands in this suit for the sum of $6,000, and she succeeded to the rights and interest of Miller in said lands. That she is entitled to an undivided 1242/7279 interest in said lands. In January, 1898, Susie T. Thomas married M. B. Norfleet and is the plaintiff in this action.
But the defendants invoke the equitable doctrine of laches as a bar to the relief sought by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in her complaint prayed for a recovery of her undivided interest in the lands, for an accounting of the rents and profits, and for partition of the lands. The chancery court sustained a general demurrer to her complaint and dismissed it for want of equity. Laches was not specifically pleaded, but this was not necessary. The defense of laches goes to the equity of the bill. That is to say, assuming the facts stated in the bill to be true, the bill is not maintainable as a matter of law because of laches. Tate v. Logan, 88 Ark. 333, and Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385.
The doctrine of laches is founded on the equitable maxims of “he who seeks equity must do equity” and ‘ ‘ equity aids the vigilant. ’ ’ Hence while there is a great variety of cases in which the equitable doctrine is invoked, each case must depend upon its own particular circumstances and courts of equity have always discouraged laches and delay without cause. Of course, delay without neglect, or which does not operate to the prejudice of the rights of the opposite party is not sufficient to constitute laches. It is well settled, however, that he, who, without adequate excuse delays asserting his rights until the proofs respecting the transaction out of which he claims his rights arose are so uncertain and obscure that it is difficult for the court to determine the matter, has no right to relief. So where on account of delay the adverse party has good reason to believe that his alleged rights are worthless or abandoned, where because of the change in condition or relations of the property and parties during the period of delay it would be an injustice to allow the complainant to assert his rights, or in case of intervening equities, it is generally held that laches is a bar to the relief is sought. Casey v. Trout, 114 Ark. 359; Finley v. Finley, 103 Ark. 58; Tatum v. Arhansas Lumber Co., 103 Ark. 251; Davis v. Harrell, 101 Ark. 230; Rhodes v. Cissell, 82 Ark. 367; Williams v. Bennett, 75 Ark. 312; Thomas v. Sypert, 61 Ark. 575, and Gibson v. Derriot, 55 Ark. 85. Many other cases illustrating the court’s adherence to the doctrine might be cited; but it is so well settled and has been applied in such a great variety of cases that further citation is unnecessary.
Judge Brewer, who afterwards became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, said while on the circuit, “No doctrine is so wholesome, when wisely administered, as that' of laches. It prevents the resurrection of stale titles, and forbids the spying out from the records of ancient and abandoned rights. It requires of every owner that he take care of his property, and of every claimant, that he make known his claims. It gives to the actual and larger possessor security, and induces and justifies him in all efforts to improve and make valuable the property he holds. It is a doctrine received with favor because its proper application works out justice and equity and often bars the holder of a mere technical right, which he has abandoned for years, from enforcing it when its enforcement will work large injury to many.” Naddo v. Bardon, 51 Fed. 493, 2 C. C. A. 335.
This brings us to a consideration of what the conditions are which combine to render the claim of the plaintiff stale in equity. The case was disposed of on the complaint and demurrer. As said by Mr. Justice Grier in Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 87, a person seeking to avoid laches “should set forth in his bill specifically what were the impediments to an earlier prosecution of his claim; how he came to be so long ignorant of his rights, and means used by the respondent to fraudulently keep him in ignorance and how and when he first came to a knowledge of the matters alleged in the bill; otherwise the chancellor may justly refuse to consider his case on his own showing, without inquiring whether there is a demurrer or formal plea of the statute of limitations contained in the answer.” This was quoted with approval in Gibson v Herriot, 55 Ark. 85.
The complaint in this case was filed and summons issued on the 26th day of August, 1916. H. G. Miller conveyed to the plaintiff by deed his interest in the lands described in the complaint on the 24th day of November, 1897. At that time she was of legal age, and the deed recites that she was a resident of Little Eock, Arkansas. Her complaint recites that she was married in January, 1898, and that she is a resident of Forrest City, St. Francis County, Arkansas; that_the defendants are residents of Mississippi County, Arkansas, and that D. T. School-field, trustee, is a citizen and resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. The lands are situated in Mississippi County, Arkansas. In fact, the complaint and the various deeds exhibited with it show that all the interested parties except Susie T. Norfleet were and are residents of Mississippi County, Arkansas, or Memphis, in Shelby County, Tennessee. She resided in Little Rock, Arkansas, prior to her marriage and then at Forrest City, St. Francis County, Arkansas, a county near to the county in which the lands involved in this suit are situated. The plaintiff acquired her interest in the lands on the 24th day of November, 1897, by a deed from H. G-. Miller, one of the members of the firm of Schoolfield, Hanauer & Company. Louis Hanauer died before 1891, and by the terms of his will, made certain specific bequests and left the remainder of his estate to his niece, Mary Hampson, and to her children.
On the 9th day of January, 1897, W. W. Schoolfield, as executor of the estate of Louis Hanauer, deceased, and F. P. Poston and D. T. Schoolfield as trustees, and the remaining heirs and legatees of Louis Hanauer, deceased, conveyed the lands involved in this suit to Mary Gr. Hampson and her children. The deed was absolute in its terms. The deed, also, contained a covenant that the grantees would take care of the indebtedness due to W. W. Schoolfield and H. Gr. Miller, the remaining members of the firm of Schoolfield, Hanauer & Company, and would release and relieve the grantors from all obligations on account thereof. Mrs. Mary Hampson went into possession of the lands for the sole and exclusive use and benefit of herself and children, immediately after the execution of the deed and so continued until her death, and since then her children, the defendants, have been in the exclusive possession of the lands. Mrs. Hampson and her husband died several years before the complaint was filed, the exact date of their death not being mentioned in the complaint. The complaint also alleges that F. P. Poston, one of the above trustees and W. W. Schoolfield both died several years before the suit was filed. It is also alleged that between 2,000 and 2,500 acres of the land are in cultivation. That from 1897 to 1903, the fair rental value was $8,000 per annum. Since that time the fair rental value was from $12,000 to $15,000 per annum. That the lands are now worth more than $200,000. That Mrs. Hampson has never paid plaintiff anything or accounted to her for the rents and profits, except that between the years 1899 and 1903, Mrs. Hampson made her two payments respectively of $500 and $1,500 out of the proceeds of the sale of timber. That Mrs. Hampson and her children have been in the exclusive and visible possession of these lands from the 9th day of January, 1897, to the present time. It is well settled from the authorities above cited that when the trust is repudiated and knowledge of the repudiation is brought home to the cestui que trust, the case is brought within the ordinary rules of laches. It has also been frequently stated by this court that notice of facts and circumstances which would put a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry is equivalent to knowledge of all the facts a reasonably diligent inquiry would disclose. Reasonable diligence is required of the plaintiff in asserting his right after he obtains knowledge of it, or facts which should lead to knowledge. The reason is that with lapse of time, ability to prove the truth regarding the transaction is lessened and delay ripens into conclusive evidence of acquiescence or abandonment. The plaintiff did not attempt to explain her delay in bringing the suit. More than 19 years have elapsed from the time that Mrs. Hampson and her children went into the exclusive and visible possession of the lands .until the plaintiff commenced this suit. During all this time, the plaintiff lived in the vicinity of the lands. She knew that it was a valuable plantation and that its rental value was constantly increasing. The court will take judicial notice that the St. Francis Levee District was organized and the levees constructed during this time. That the construction of this system of levees completely changed conditions within the boundaries of the district and that the lands in it have greatly enhanced in value. During all this time, the doors of the chancery court were open to her; and the recitation of the facts and circumstances above referred to, all of which are alleged in her bill, show that she - must have known that Mrs. Hampson was in possession of the land and of the changes going on around her. At least the circumstances were of such a character as to have reasonably imposed upon her the duty of inquiry, and inquiry would have led to knowledge of the facts. Mrs. Hampson, F. P. Poston, one of the trustees, and W. W. Schoolfield, the executor of the will of . Louis Hanauer, deceased, have been dead for several years, and cannot give their version of the transaction. An accounting is asked of the rents and profits. This would be a difficult matter on account of the death of Mrs. Hampson. It is insisted that the fact that Mrs. Hampson paid plaintiff $500 at one time and $1,500 at another on the sales of timber, shows that the former recognized the rights of the latter. An accounting of the rents and profits would necessitate an examination of the affairs of the partnership of School-field, Hanauer & Company, and an accounting of the same. Then, too, if Mrs. Hampson, were alive, she might be able to explain this transaction. The conditions have been completely changed by the death of some of the principal actors, and the consequent loss of their testimony. It cannot be known how much the rental value was due to the management of Mrs. Hampson, or to the financial risks she incurred in managing the lands.
Under the facts and circumstances alleged in the bill, the long unexplained delay of the plaintiff in asserting her claim is fatal to her right to recover, as said by the learned chancellor, whose opinion was adopted by the court in Cunningham v. Brumback, 23 Ark. 336, “the law wisely holds that there shall come a time when even the wrongful possessor shall have peace; and that it is better that ancient wrongs should go unredressed than that ancient strife should be renewed.”
It follows that the decree must be affirmed.