Noreen Wiscovitch Rentas, Chapter 7 Trustee v. Municipio de Ponce

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Puerto Rico
• Decided: October 23, 2014
• Docket: 12-00137
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 2

4 IN RE: CASE NO. 09-02048 5 Chapter 7 PMC MARKETING CORP 6 Adversary No. 12-00137 7

8 Debtor(s)

9 NOREEN WISCOVITCH RENTAS 10 CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE 11 Plaintiff 12 vs. 13 14 MUNICIPIO DE PONCE 15 Defendant(s) FILED & ENTERED ON 10/23/2014 16

18 OPINION AND ORDER 19 20 Before this Court is Plaintiff’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 16, 21 2014 [Dkt. No. 23]. This Motion was unopposed by the Defendant despite receiving notice.1 For the 22 reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 23 24 Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 25 as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). "A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party. A fact is material if it has the potential of determining

1 The court refers Defendant to PR LBR 5005-4(g). 1 the outcome of the litigation." Patco Constr. Co. v. People’s United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 206-07 (1st 2 Cir. 2012). 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does not embrace default judgment principles.2 Even 4 5 when a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, the court is not relieved of its duty to decide 6 whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Likewise, the court must still assess 7 whether the moving party has fulfilled its burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of 8 9 material fact. In an unopposed motion for summary judgment, the court is still obliged to consider 10 the motion on its merits, in light of the record as constituted, in order to determine whether judgment 11 would be legally appropriate. Aguiar-Carrasquillo v. Agosto-Alicea, 445 F.3d 19 (1st Cir.2006). 12 13 Entry of a summary judgment motion as unopposed does not automatically give rise to a grant of 14 summary judgment. Instead, “the district court [is] still obliged to consider the motion on its merits, 15 in light of the record as constituted, in order to determine whether judgment would be legally 16 17 appropriate.” Mullen v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 446, 452 (1st Cir.1992). “Even 18 when faced with an unopposed motion for summary judgment, a court still has the obligation to test 19 the undisputed facts in the crucible of the applicable law in order to ascertain whether judgment is 20 21 warranted.” Mendez v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 900 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir.1990); Fed.R.Civ.P. 22

23 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 is the basic procedure to be followed when there is a default in the course of litigation. It tracks the ancient common law axiom that a default is an admission of all well-pleaded 24 allegations against the defaulting party. See generally B. Finberg, Annotation, Necessity of Taking Proof as to 25 Liability Against Defaulting Defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 1070 (1966). Other default provisions embrace that same philosophy. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(a) (failure to appear and defend in response to a summons "will result in a judgment by default against the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint"); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f) (failure to attend pretrial conference); Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C) (failure to obey discovery orders). Motions for summary judgment, however, lack these ancient common law roots. See generally John A. Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure: An Essay Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of Keating's Act, 31 Ind. L.J. 329 (1956). They are governed by Rule 56 under which the failure to respond to the motion does not alone discharge the burdens imposed on a moving party. Vermont Teddy Bear Company, Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Company, 373 F.3d 241 (2nd Cir.2004). 1 || 56(e)); Pico Vidal v. Ruiz Alvarado, 377 B.R. 788 (D.P.R., 2007). It is well-settled that “before granting an unopposed summary judgment motion, the cou

4 || must inquire whether the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate undisputed facts entitling i > || to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Lopez v. Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2 1510, 1517 Uist Cir.1991). Accordingly, we emphasize that courts "in considering a motion fo

g Summary judgment, must review the motion, even if unopposed, and determine from what it ha > |! before it whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir.1993). 12 After reviewing the Plaintiff's arguments, and the relevant law, this Court determines tha 13 || there is no triable issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law. The court concludes after a review of the documents provided by Plaintiff that she ha: 16 || met her burden in terms of producing adequate affirmative evidence. There is no controversy in th 17 case - the payment was to a creditor, on account of an antecedent debt, during the preference period while the Debtor was insolvent and the payments would allow the creditor to receive more tha 20 |}under a Chapter 7. Therefore, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547, Defendant, Municipio de Ponce 21 received preferential transfers in the amount of $9,389.51. Clerk to enter Judgment. SO ORDERED 24 San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 23rd day of October, 2014. 25

. ea Hike Brian K. Tester U.S. Bankruptcy Judge