Nora Estrada v. Legacy Home Health Agency, Inc., Legacy Home Care Services, Inc. D/B/A All Seasons Home Care, and Restorative Health Services, LLC D/B/A Coastal Homehealth Care

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 16, 2025
• Docket: 04-23-01055-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-23-01055-CV

Nora ESTRADA, Appellant

v.

LEGACY HOME HEALTH AGENCY, INC., Legacy Home Care Services, Inc. D/B/A All Seasons Home Care, and Restorative Health Services, LLC d/b/a Coastal Homehealth Care, Appellees

From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020-CI-09053 Honorable Monique Diaz, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

Sitting: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 16, 2025

AFFIRMED; MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED

Appellant Nora Estrada brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order denying

her amended “Motion to Transfer Venue and Subject Thereto Defendant’s Motion to Sever.” We

affirm. 1

1 It is not lost on the court that this decision is being rendered in an interlocutory appeal a full fifteen months after the notice of appeal was filed. The notice of appeal was filed in December 2023. In March of 2024, after identifying an issue relating to the record, the matter was abated and remanded to the trial court. In late May 2024, a supplemental 04-23-01055-CV

BACKGROUND

Appellees—Legacy Home Health Agency, Inc., Legacy Home Care Services, Inc. D/B/A

All Seasons Home Care, and Restorative Health Services, LLC d/b/a Coastal Homehealth Care—

provide home healthcare services. In 2020, appellees brought suit in Bexar County against a

competitor, American Medical, and four former employees who left to join American Medical,

including appellant’s husband Rene Estrada. Appellees alleged the former employees

misappropriated appellees’ trade secrets to compete against appellees and to solicit appellees’

clients. After learning Rene Estrada’s wife, Nora Estrada, had launched a competing home

healthcare company named Liberty, appellees amended their claims against Rene Estrada and

added claims against Nora Estrada and Liberty, alleging inter alia Nora Estrada leveraged trade

secrets her husband obtained from appellees to compete against them. Appellees then further

amended their petition, adding claims against all defendants for defamation and business

disparagement. Nora Estrada and Liberty each separately responded by filing an answer and an

amended “Motion to Transfer Venue and Subject Thereto Defendant’s Motion to Sever,” which

the trial court denied after a hearing. Liberty did not appeal. Nora Estrada appeals from the denial

of her motion.

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction

Venue rulings are not generally subject to interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 15.064(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(6); Fortenberry v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 664 S.W.3d

807, 811 (Tex. 2023). But the Legislature has provided that in a suit involving more than one

clerk’s record was filed and the abatement was lifted. At that point, briefing commenced, with appellant’s reply brief filed on September 16, 2024. The matter was then submitted to a panel in October 2024. The matter was later re- submitted to a new panel, that being the three Justices named here, on January 7, 2025.

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plaintiff, such as this case, we have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to review a trial court’s

determination of whether “[each] plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue.”

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(a), (b)(1); Thomas v. Hoelke, No. 04-09-00771-CV, 2010

WL 2403725, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 16, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[I]n a multi-

plaintiff suit, appellate courts have jurisdiction to determine in an interlocutory appeal whether

each plaintiff has established venue independently of any other plaintiff”) (citing section

15.003(b)); Sustainable Tex. Oyster Res. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Hannah Reef, Inc., 491 S.W.3d 96, 106

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d

233, 238–39 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. dism’d); Shamoun & Norman, LLP v. Yarto Int’l Grp.,

LP, 398 S.W.3d 272, 285–87, 286 n.18 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2012, pet. dism’d)

(holding specific language of section 15.003 trumps more general language of section 15.064 and

“interlocutory appeals are available for venue determinations in any case involving multiple

plaintiffs”). 2

Therefore, if the trial court here determined whether each plaintiff-appellee established

venue, we have jurisdiction to review that determination. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 15.003(a), (b)(1); Hoelke, 2010 WL 2403725, at *2. The trial court’s order does not state the

basis for its denial of Nora Estrada’s motion. However, her motion specifically argued that the

plaintiff-appellees failed to independently establish venue under section 15.003, the parties argued

at length at the hearing about whether each plaintiff-appellee had independently established venue,

and the trial court’s statements during the hearing indicated it understood ruling on the motion

would necessitate determining whether each plaintiff-appellee had independently established

2 Cf. Basic Energy Services GP, LLC v. Gomez, 398 S.W.3d 734, 736 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.) (per curiam) (abating cause and ordering trial court to enter revised order under different factual circumstances where court applied statutory predecessor language no longer applicable).

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venue. 3 On this record, we can infer the trial court made the determination required by section

15.003(b)(1) that each plaintiff-appellee independently established venue when it denied Nora

Estrada’s motion. See Jackson v. Jackson, No. 02-15-00102-CV, 2016 WL 5220069, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Sept. 22, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding court had interlocutory

jurisdiction, explaining “[i]n a multiple-plaintiff case, every order on a motion to transfer venue

will necessarily determine whether each plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper

venue.”); Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d 233 at 238 (concluding court had interlocutory jurisdiction because

“in a multiple-plaintiff case, every venue ruling is necessarily a determination that a plaintiff did

or did not independently establish proper venue.”). We therefore have interlocutory appellate

jurisdiction under section 15.003 to review this venue determination. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 15.003; Hoelke, 2010 WL 2403725, at *2. 4 Accordingly, we deny appellees’ motion to

dismiss the appeal.

However, “[s]tatutes authorizing interlocutory appeals ‘are a narrow exception to the

general rule’ that ‘appellate courts generally only have jurisdiction over final judgments.’”

Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex.

3 At the hearing, the trial court stated plaintiff-appellees should attempt to make their prima facie case that they have established venue before any live testimony could be heard regarding section 15.003’s joinder provision, which applies only “if a plaintiff cannot independently establish proper venue.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(a)(1)–(4). After hearing counsels’ arguments regarding whether each plaintiff-appellee independently established venue, the trial court denied Nora Estrada’s motion without permitting live testimony. See id.; San Jacinto River Auth. v. Guajardo, No. 01-20-00662-CV, 2021 WL 1878377, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 11, 2021, no pet.) (the four elements in section 15.003’s joinder provision allow for a broader range of proofs) (citing Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 602 (Tex. 1999)); Renzenberger, Inc. v. O’Bryant, No. 13-05-00090-CV, 2005 WL 1361620, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 9, 2005, no pet.) (same). 4 Appellees assert that the motion was in fact an unappealable motion to sever rather than a motion to transfer venue, because Nora Estrada’s counsel clarified at the hearing on the motion that Nora Estrada seeks severance of the claims against her and transfer of those claims to a different county, rather than a venue transfer for the entire case. But under section 15.003, the existence or absence of appellate jurisdiction turns solely on whether the trial court made a determination as to whether “[each] plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(a), (b)(1). Because the record shows the trial court determined that each plaintiff-appellee had independently established venue, we have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order regardless of how the motion might be characterized. See id.; Hoelke, 2010 WL 2403725, at *2.

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2020) (quoting CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011). Nora Estrada has not

cited, and we have not found, any statutory authority establishing our jurisdiction over the

numerous issues she raises in this interlocutory appeal that are outside the bounds of the

jurisdiction section 15.003 creates. This includes her request of a venue transfer for convenience,

which is not reviewable on appeal. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.002(b), (c) (“A court’s

ruling or decision to grant or deny a transfer [for convenience] under Subsection (b) is not grounds

for appeal”). It also includes the issues raised for the first time on appeal and not otherwise

preserved, such as her assertion that she is a non-party to the case. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)

(complaint must be raised to trial court “with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of

the complaint”); see In re J.S., 670 S.W.3d 591, 605 (Tex. 2023) (unpreserved complaints cannot

be presented for appellate review). Finally, we cannot consider those additional documents

attached to Nora Estrada’s appellate briefs that do not appear in the appellate record. See K-Six TV

v. Santiago, 75 S.W.3d 91, 97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (“we cannot consider the

exhibits [] which were not on file with the trial court and are not contained in our clerk’s record.”).

In summary, our jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal is limited to a review of the trial

court’s determination that each plaintiff-appellee independently established venue. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(a), (b)(1).

II. Standard of Review

When reviewing an interlocutory appeal under section 15.003, the court of appeals shall

“determine whether the trial court’s order is proper based on an independent determination from

the record and not under either an abuse of discretion or substantial evidence standard.” TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(c)(1). Thus, our review of a venue determination in an interlocutory

appeal under section 15.003 is de novo. Hannah Reef, Inc., 491 S.W.3d at 105–07; see also

Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex. 1999).

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III. Applicable Law

Venue may be proper in more than one county under general, mandatory, or permissive

venue rules. See Fortenberry, 664 S.W.3d at 811. Because venue may be proper in a variety of

counties under the venue rules, a plaintiff has the first opportunity to fix venue in a proper county

by filing suit in that county. See id.

A defendant may challenge the venue selection, and a court “shall transfer an action to

another county of proper venue if . . . the county in which the action is pending is not a proper

county.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.063(1); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 87; Fortenberry, 664

S.W.3d at 811. In its motion to transfer venue, a defendant must specifically deny the venue facts

in the plaintiff’s petition; if not, they are taken as true. TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); see In re Red Dot

Bldg. Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. 2016). “A specific denial of a pleaded venue fact is

one that denies the fact itself.” Devon Energy Corp. v. Iona Energy, L.P., No. 02-19-00343-CV,

2020 WL 98138, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 9, 2020, pet. denied).

If a defendant has specifically denied a plaintiff’s venue facts, then the plaintiff is required

to make prima facie proof of its venue facts. TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); see Devon Energy, 2020 WL

98138, at *5. However, “no party shall ever be required for venue purposes to support by prima

facie proof the existence of a cause of action or part thereof, and at the hearing the pleadings of

the parties shall be taken as conclusive on the issues of existence of a cause of action.” TEX. R.

CIV. P. 87(3)(a). Rule 87 further provides: “It shall not be necessary for a claimant to prove the

merits of a cause of action, but the existence of a cause of action, when pleaded properly, shall be

taken as established as alleged by the pleadings.” Id. R. 87(2)(b). “In all venue hearings, no factual

proof concerning the merits of the case shall be required to establish venue.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 15.064(a); see In re Jennings, 203 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006,

no pet.) (“For venue purposes, the trial court was required to consider [plaintiff’s] pleadings at

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face value.”). “The court shall determine the motion to transfer venue on the basis of the pleadings,

any stipulations made by and between the parties and such affidavits and attachments as may be

filed by the parties” in accordance with the applicable rules. TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(b).

If a plaintiff properly joins two or more claims “arising from the same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,” and one of the claims is governed by a

mandatory venue provision, the entire lawsuit “shall be brought in the county required by the

mandatory venue provision.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.004. “In a suit in which the

plaintiff has established proper venue against a defendant, the court also has venue of all the

defendants in all claims or actions arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of

transactions or occurrences.” Id. § 15.005. “Mandatory venue rules may . . . designate multiple

counties as proper.” Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Capital Partners, Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 110, 130

(Tex. 2018). In that event, a plaintiff may choose from among the counties. See id.; In re Fisher,

433 S.W.3d 523, 533 (Tex. 2014).

IV. Application

A. Each Appellee Independently Established Venue Under Section 15.017

In their live pleading filed prior to the hearing on Nora Estrada’s motion to transfer,

appellees brought claims against all defendants, including Nora Estrada, for defamation and

business disparagement. Section 15.017 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides:

A suit for damages for libel, slander, or invasion of privacy shall be brought and can only be maintained in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, or in the county in which the defendant resided at the time of filing suit, or in the county of the residence of the defendants, or any of them, or in the domicile of any corporate defendant, at the election of the plaintiff.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.017; see also Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 253 n.1,

261 n.6 (Tex. 2014) (noting venue established under section 15.017 in suit for defamation and

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business disparagement). “Section 15.017 is a mandatory venue statute.” Jennings, 203 S.W.3d at

35 (citing Marshall v. Mahaffey, 974 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. denied)).

Under section 15.017, venue is mandatory in the county where appellees or defendants resided at

the time of the accrual of these causes of action. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.017.

Appellees alleged in their live pleading that all plaintiffs and several other defendants resided in

Bexar County at the time the causes of action accrued, attaching a sworn declaration of their

custodian of records stating each appellee maintains its principal office in Bexar County. 5 Nora

Estrada’s general denial in her answer did not constitute a specific denial of these venue facts. See

TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); Devon Energy, 2020 WL 98138, at *4; Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enter.

Prod. Co., 833 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (“[W]hen a

plaintiff pleads that ‘Defendant X is a foreign corporation with a registered agent in Harris

County,’ Defendant X, to ‘specifically deny’ that venue fact, must make a point of denying that it

is a foreign corporation with a registered agent in Harris County.”). Nora Estrada also did not

specifically deny these venue facts elsewhere in her pleadings or at the hearing on her motion to

transfer venue.

On appeal, Nora Estrada denies that she committed any acts of defamation or business

disparagement, but this is not a specific denial that all appellees and several defendants resided in

Bexar County when the alleged causes of action accrued. See Devon Energy, 2020 WL 98138, at

*4 (“A specific denial of a pleaded venue fact is one that denies the fact itself.”). Appellees were

not required to present proof of the existence or merits of the causes of action for venue purposes.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(2)(b); id. R. 87(3)(a). Appellees fixed venue under section 15.017 by properly

5 Nora Estrada resides in Cameron County, but she need not reside in Bexar County for venue to be fixed there under section 15.017. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 15.004, 15.005, 15.017. In her motion to transfer, Nora Estrada conceded that other defendants reside in Bexar County.

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pleading claims for defamation and business disparagement against all defendants and alleging

that all appellees and several defendants resided in Bexar County when the alleged causes of action

accrued. See Jennings, 203 S.W.3d at 35–37 (holding plaintiff established venue under section

15.017 by properly pleading defamation claim, notwithstanding defendant’s denial that defamation

occurred). Because Nora Estrada does not specifically deny that all appellees and several

defendants resided in Bexar County at the time the causes of action allegedly accrued, we must

take these venue facts from appellees’ petition as true. TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); Red Dot Bldg.

Sys., 504 S.W.3d at 323.

Therefore, under section 15.017, each appellee independently established venue to bring

their claims of defamation and business disparagement against all defendants in Bexar County.

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.017; Perryman, 546 S.W.3d at 130 (plaintiffs may choose

from among counties permitted by mandatory venue provision).

B. The Trial Court Correctly Determined Each Appellee Independently Established Venue for All Claims Against All Defendants

Because all appellees’ claims for defamation and business disparagement are governed by

a mandatory venue provision, if the other claims “aris[e] from the same transaction, occurrence,

or series of transactions or occurrences” then the entire suit “shall be brought in the county required

by the mandatory venue provision.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.004. Also, if all appellees

have established proper venue against any individual defendant, “the court also has venue of all

the defendants in all claims or actions arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of

transactions or occurrences.” Id. § 15.005. Nora Estrada alleges the claims against her do not arise

out of the same transactions or occurrences as the claims against the other defendants. We disagree.

Considering appellees’ claims at “at face value” for venue purposes, Jennings, 203 S.W.3d

at 36, we find all appellees properly pleaded claims that arise out of the same series of occurrences

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involving competitor home healthcare companies American Medical and Liberty, four former

employees of appellees including Rene Estrada, and Rene’s wife Nora Estrada. All of appellees’

claims involve allegations that relate to the departure of the four employees of appellees. Appellees

allege that the four departing employees left to join American Medical, where they breached two

non-disclosure agreements and a non-compete agreement, misappropriated appellees’ trade secrets

and confidential information, tortiously interfered with appellees’ client and business

relationships, breached their fiduciary duties, engaged in fraud, defamed and disparaged appellees,

engaged in unfair competition, and gained unjust enrichment. Appellees further allege Rene

Estrada, one of the departing employees, provided appellees’ confidential information and trade

secrets to his wife Nora Estrada, who leveraged that information for her benefit and the benefit of

Liberty, the competitor she founded even though she allegedly has little to no prior experience in

the home healthcare industry. Appellees allege that Nora Estrada filed a certificate of formation

for Liberty less than five months before her husband Rene Estrada suddenly ended his employment

with appellees, and registered Liberty to the home address she shares with her husband.

Appellees’ claims against Nora Estrada, and appellees’ defamation and business

disparagement claims against all defendants, arise from the same series of occurrences underlying

all of appellees’ other claims, with numerous overlapping facts and issues. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE §§ 15.004, 15.005. These overlapping facts and issues include the nature of the trade

secrets and confidential information Rene Estrada possessed, which appellees allege were

misappropriated by and for the benefit of defendants Nora Estrada, Liberty, and American

Medical. Appellees also allege that Rene Estrada breached his fiduciary duty to appellees by

competing through both Liberty and American Medical, and that Nora Estrada tortiously interfered

with the non-disclosure and non-compete agreements Rene Estrada allegedly breached. Likewise,

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appellees’ claims against Liberty and American Medical contain numerous overlapping facts and

issues with the claims against Nora Estrada—the founder and owner of Liberty—and her husband

Rene Estrada—who left employment with appellees to work for American Medical. Because

appellees properly pleaded all of these interrelated claims, for venue purposes, appellees were not

required to present proof of the existence or merits of them. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(2)(b); id. R.

87(3)(a); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.064(a); Jennings, 203 S.W.3d at 36–37.

Because all of appellees’ claims against all defendants arise from the same series of

occurrences, they were properly joined and venue should be maintained in a single county to avoid

a multiplicity of suits. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 15.004, 15.005; see also, e.g.,

Mahaffey, 974 S.W.2d at 950–51 (affirming trial court’s denial of motion to transfer venue based

on section 15.005 since one venue for all claims arising from same series of transactions or

occurrences avoids multiplicity of suits); Lindsey v. Sec. Sav. Ass’n, 556 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1977, no writ) (“If venue as to one cause of action is proper in the county in which suit was

brought, then all properly joined causes of action against the defendant should be maintained in

that county to avoid a multiplicity of suits.”).

In summary, because each appellee independently established proper venue under the

mandatory venue statute in section 15.017, and appellees’ claims against Nora Estrada and their

defamation and business disparagement claims against all defendants arise out of the same set of

occurrences as appellees’ other claims, appellees properly fixed venue for the entire suit in Bexar

County. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 15.017, 15.004, & 15.005. 6

6 Since the trial court’s venue determination was proper under a mandatory venue statute, we need not consider the parties’ arguments regarding whether venue is proper under section 15.002, the general venue statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 15.002, 15.017; In re Fox River Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. 2020) (mandatory venue provision trumps general venue provision) (citing sections 15.001(b) and 15.002(a)).

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CONCLUSION

Because the trial court correctly determined each appellee independently established venue

when it denied Nora Estrada’s motion, we affirm the trial court’s order. 7 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 15.003(c)(1).

Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

7 We deny appellees’ February 20, 2024 motion to dismiss this appeal.

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