Noonan v. Chester Park Athletic Club Co.

99 F. 90, 39 C.C.A. 426, 1900 U.S. App. LEXIS 4123
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 2, 1900
DocketNo. 668
StatusPublished
Cited by47 cases

This text of 99 F. 90 (Noonan v. Chester Park Athletic Club Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Noonan v. Chester Park Athletic Club Co., 99 F. 90, 39 C.C.A. 426, 1900 U.S. App. LEXIS 4123 (6th Cir. 1900).

Opinion

BURTON, Circuit Judge,

after malting the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

[91]*911. The evidence by which it is sought to connect the defendants Lilley and Devere with the purchase by complainant of an interest under the Thompson patents involved, for the purpose of estopping them, and through them the corporation of which they are members, is insufficient to in any way affect the disposition of any question involved in the case.

2. Thompson, the inventor and assignor of complainant, is the president of the defendant corporation, and is undoubtedly affected by the estoppel growing out of his assignment. Without deciding, we shall, for the purposes of this case, assume that the corporation is affected hv the estoppel which prevents Thompson from denying the validity of the patents which he has assigned, and apply to it the same principles which would affect him if he were the sole defendant. It seems to be well settled that the assignor of a patent is estopped from saying his patent is void for want of novelty or utility, or because anticipated by prior inventions. But this estoppel, for manifest reasons, does not prevent him from denying infringement. To determine such an issue, it is admissible to show the state of the art involved, that the court may see what the thing was which was assigned, and thus determine the primary or secondary character of the patent assigned, and the extent to which the doctrine of equivalents may be invoked against an infringer. The court will not assume against an assignor, and in favor of his assignee, anything more than that the invention presented a sufficient degree of utility and noveliy to justify the issuance of the patent assigned, and will apply to the patent the same rule of construction, with this limitation, which would be applicable between the patentee and a stranger. Babcock v. Clarkson, 11 C. C. A. 351, 63 Fed. 607; Ball & Socket Fastener Co. v. Ball Glove-Fastening Co., 7 C. C. A. 498, 58 Fed. 818; Cash-Carrier Co. v. Martin, 14 C. C. A. 642, 67 Fed. 786; Chambers v. Crichley, 33 Beav. 374; Construction Co. v. Stormberg (C. C.) 66 Fed. 550; Clark v. Adie, 2 App. Cas. 423, 426. This was the rule applied by the court below, and is the principal ground of objection to the decree finding that the assigned patents, when limited by the previous state of the art. had not been infringed.

3. The defendant Thompson, in 1897, constructed for the complain ant an elevated gravity and cable railway, according to the claims of his patent Xo. 367,252, and assigned to him the exclusive right under that patent, as well as under patent Xo. 332,762, within three counties in the slate of Kentucky and two in the state of Ohio. Subsequently, Thompson, with others, organized the Chester Park Athletic Association, and sought to obtain from the complainant a license to construct and operate a similar railway upon the property of the association which was within tlie territory assigned to complainant. The parties could not agree upon terms, and thereupon a railway of similar general character and uses was constructed under plans devised by the defendant Luke Lilley, who subsequently applied for and obtained a patent for his structure, being patent Xo. 549,700, of March 30, 2897. The contention is that this “Lilley Electric Pleasure Bailway,” as it is styled in the patent to Lilley, infringes the com[92]*92binations covered by the two patents to Thompson so assigned to complainant.

At the time Thompson assigned the patents here involved to the complainant, he was the inventor and patentee under two other patents involving the same general subject-matter, and this fact was known to complainant. These additional patents were No. 310,966, for a roller-coaster structure, and No. 348,796, for a pleasure cable railway. These patents Thompson declined to assign to complainant, though solicited to do so. These two unassigned patents become of material importance when we come to determine the scope of the inventions covered by the two patents which were assigned. The earlier- of the two patents assigned is No. 332,762. The claims said to be infringed by the Lilley patent are Nos. 1 and 2, and are as follows:

“(1) In a gravity switch-back railway, the combination, with the trestle-work so constructed as to form a series of descending and ascending planes, of the longitudinal stringers for the reception of the rails, the guardways or stringers for preventing the cars from jumping the tracks, and the brake-sliding ways or stringers, substantially as and for the purposes described.
“(2) In a gravity switch-back railway, the combination, with the undulating, trestlework having thereon the longitudinal trackways and rails, of the guard-stringers, and brake-slide stringers contiguous thereto, of a ear having brake shoes which engage with said brake stringers through the operation of a lever,, substantially as and for the purposes set forth.”

The first two of the elements in claim No. 1 are the undulating trestle with longitudinal stringers upon which the rails are mounted. These elements constitute the entire subject of the earliest patent to Thompson, being patent No. 310,966, for a roller-coasting structure. Such structures were not new.' Two patents are exhibited covering, the same class -of pleasure railways, — one to T. Alexander, of December 26,1882, for an artificial sliding hill, No. 269,554, and another to J. Pusey, for a coasting course, No. 318,026. The other elements in the first claim cover means for stopping and controlling the cars. These elements are guard stringers inside the track rails for preventing the cars from jumping the track, and “brake-sliding ways or stringers” for the car brakes or shoes to slide upon for aiding in the stoppage of the car. The second claim is identical with the first, except that it includes, as another element, “a car having brake shoes which-engage with said brake stringers through the operation of a lever.”

■ In both patents No. 310,966 and No. 332,762; gravity alone was relied upon for carrying the cars over the undulating track, and the-patents differ from each other only in so far as the later patent pro•viáes a means for stopping and controlling the cars and preventing accidents. Devices for stopping railway cars, and for confining them to the fixed track, were confessedly old. Thompson used stringers laid inside the track-rails, so as to leave just space enough for the flange of the wheel, a pair of brake-sliding ways or stringers each abutting the guard stringers, and a rocking brake shoe which engaged these guard stringers. The undulating structure upon which his rails were laid was old. His devices for guarding against derailment and for stopping his cars were, at most, an adaptation of old devices to a new use, or rather to a new combination for new but [93]*93analogous purposes. The structure resulting from the combination of elements was one which involved little more than ordinary mechanical skill. All he did was to adapt old things for a special purpose so nearly analogous to the former uses of the, same devices as to require little skill in their modification.

His patents must rest upon the novelty of the specific combination of means to carry his idea into practical application. He is not entitled to a monopoly of analogous means found in the old art. Subsequent improvers are equally free to accomplish the same general result by different means, if not purely colorable changes.

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Bluebook (online)
99 F. 90, 39 C.C.A. 426, 1900 U.S. App. LEXIS 4123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/noonan-v-chester-park-athletic-club-co-ca6-1900.