ACCEPTED 01-14-00848-CR FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 9/30/2015 9:06:21 AM CHRISTOPHER PRINE No. 01-14-00848-CR CLERK
In the Court of Appeals For the FILED IN First District of Texas 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS At Houston 9/30/2015 9:06:21 AM ♦ CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE No. 1870305 Clerk In the County Criminal Court at Law No. 4 Of Harris County, Texas ♦ NOMATHEMBA Y. SITAWISHA Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee ♦ STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF ♦
DEVON ANDERSON District Attorney Harris County, Texas
ERIC KUGLER Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas TBC No. 796910 kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net
CASEY LITTLE Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002 Tel: (713) 755-5826 FAX: (713) 755-5809
Counsel for Appellee
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ONLY IF GRANTED TO APPELLANT STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 39, the State requests oral argument only if oral
argument is granted to the appellant.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
Counsel for the State:
Devon Anderson District Attorney of Harris County
Eric Kugler Assistant District Attorney on appeal
Casey Little Assistant District Attorney at trial
Appellant or criminal defendant:
Nomathemba Y. Sitawisha
Counsel for Appellant:
Cheri Duncan Assistant Public Defender on appeal
Nomathemba Y. Sitawisha Pro se at trial
Trial Judge:
Hon. John Clinton Presiding Judge
i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................i
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ....................................................................i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 1
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR ......................................... 2 A. The appellant knowingly and intelligently chose to represent herself with a full understanding of her right to counsel after receiving judicial admonishments on the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. ......................................3 B. Because the evidence of guilt was strong and the testifying toxicologist was subject to cross-examination, the appellant was not harmed by the lack of any admonishments on her alleged right to a taxpayer-funded toxicologist. .............10 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE ........................................... 13
ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) .............................................................................................6, 8 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) .................................................................................................9 Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971) ...............................................................................................6 Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) .............................................................10 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) ...............................................................................................7 Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ...............................................................4 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) ...............................................................................................4 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) ...............................................................................................3 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) ...............................................................................................3 Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) ...............................................................................................4 Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) .............................................................10 Kane v. Garcia-Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2006) ...................................................................................................7 King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) .............................................................10 Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987) ................................................................................6
iii Missouri v. Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d 99 (Mo. 1999) ................................................................................ 5, 6, 9 Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ...............................................................3 Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ...............................................................11 Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ...............................................................11 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) ...............................................................................................6 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) .................................................................................................9 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) ...............................................................................................9 United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982) ................................................................................7 Uresti v. State, 98 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) ..........................................................................4 Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980) ................................................................................8
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ..............................................................................................3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ...........................................................................................3
STATUTES
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051 (West 2010) ........................................................3 TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.01 (West 2010).....................................................................8
iv RULES
TEX. R. APP. P. 39....................................................................................................... i TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) .............................................................................................10
v TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with DWI committed on December 29, 2012 (CR
– 7). She pled “not guilty” to the charge, and the case was tried to a jury (CR –
64). The jury found her guilty and assessed punishment at 105 days in jail on
October 1, 2014 (CR – 64). The appellant filed notice of appeal that same day, but
the trial court has not yet certified her right to appeal (CR – 67, 71).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the night of December 29, 2012, Natasha Wilson and her husband
were on their way home when they saw a red sports car driven by the appellant
coming at full speed toward them (RR. IV – 13-14, 24, 29, 41-42). Wilson’s
husband reversed their vehicle to avoid a collision (RR. IV – 16). The appellant’s
sports car jumped the curb and crashed into a pole (RR. IV – 16-17, 36) (RR. V –
17). The appellant then nearly hit the Wilson’s vehicle a second time when she
tried to back out of the crash scene and leave the area (RR. IV – 17). Natasha
called 911 (RR. IV – 17).
Jared Taylor with the Jersey Village Police Department was in the middle of
a traffic stop with another vehicle when someone pulled up to him and said, “Hey, there was some lady back here who jumped the curve and hit a pole; and she
almost hit us….She’s parked back here.” (RR. IV – 35-36). Taylor drove over to
the appellant’s location with his emergency lights activated (RR. IV – 36). He saw
that the appellant’s vehicle had a damaged front windshield and some flat tires that
were consistent with running over a curb and hitting a pole (RR. IV – 38-39) (RR.
V – 12-13, 17). The appellant was still sitting in the driver’s seat, and the vehicle
was still running (RR. IV – 39) (RR. V – 12, 15).
The appellant was lethargic, with half-opened eyes (RR. IV – 39). She was
belligerent, yelling, using profanity, and unsteady on her feet (RR. IV – 40) (RR. V
– 13-15). She also reeked of alcohol (RR. IV – 40) (RR. V – 13). She refused to
cooperate or perform any field sobriety tests, so the officers obtained a search
warrant for and a sample of her blood (RR. V – 67-80). She was arrested around
2:45 a.m.; the blood was drawn at 5:03 a.m., and it showed an alcohol level of
0.21, which was more than twice the legal limit (RR. V – 108-109, 171-172) (St.
Ex. 12).
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR
In her sole point of error, the appellant complains that the trial court erred by
failing to advise her that she had the right to request funds for an expert witness.
(App’nt Brf. 3). This claim lacks merit because the appellant has failed to show
2 that the Constitution requires state funding for a toxicologist in a routine DWI trial,
that the Constitution requires such funding where a defendant chooses to represent
herself, or that a trial court errs in failing to admonish a pro se litigant of the right
to receive such funding. Furthermore, the appellant was not harmed by the lack of
any such admonishments because the evidence of guilt was strong and the
testifying toxicologist was subject to cross-examination.
A. The appellant knowingly and intelligently chose to represent herself with a full understanding of her right to counsel after receiving judicial admonishments on the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court may dispense
with counsel and make her own defense. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818–
20 (1975); Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also
U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. Such a decision, to be constitutionally effective,
must be made: (1) competently, (2) knowingly and intelligently, and (3)
voluntarily. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400–01 (1993); Faretta, 422 U.S. at
834–36; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051 (West 2010). The decision to
waive counsel and proceed pro se is made “knowingly and intelligently” if it is
made with a full understanding of the right to counsel, which is being abandoned,
as well as the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Moore, 999
3 S.W.2d at 409 n.5 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834–36). The decision is made
“voluntarily” if it is uncoerced. Id. (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12).
The standard of competency to waive counsel is the same as that required to
stand trial or to plead guilty: whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to
consult with her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has
a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against her. See
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 395 (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960)). In addition, judges are permitted to “take realistic account of the
particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks
to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.” Indiana v.
Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008).
Whether a party is competent to proceed pro se is a mixed question of law
and fact turning on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor; thus, this Court must
review the trial court’s ruling on the issue for an abuse of discretion. See Chadwick
v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). This Court must also
afford almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings when the resolution of the
issue turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and view the evidence in
the light most favorable to those rulings. Id. And this Court must imply any
findings of fact supported by the evidence and necessary to support the ruling
when the trial court fails to make explicit findings. Id..
4 In the present case, the trial court conducted a Faretta hearing prior to
allowing the appellant to represent herself (RR. II – 4-6). The appellant
acknowledged that she had a high school education with some additional college
classes and that she understood the dangers of being self-represented (RR. II – 4).
She also stated that she knew she was charged with a class A DWI that had a
penalty range “from probation to a dollar fine up to a year in jail and a 4,000-dollar
fine.” (RR. II – 4-5). She affirmed that she had to follow the rules of evidence and
procedure, that she would not be given special consideration, that she would not
obstruct the orderly procedure of the case, and that she had no right to standby
counsel (RR. II – 5). The appellant also signed written Faretta warnings, which
acknowledged her right to free legal counsel and repeated the oral warnings (CR –
46-47). Thus, the appellant was properly admonished, and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the appellant to represent herself.
The appellant claims that the trial court should also have admonished the
appellant that she had the right to the appointment of an expert witness on the issue
of intoxication. (App’nt Brf. 9-11). In Missouri v. Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d 99, 105
(Mo. 1999), the Missouri Supreme Court addressed a similar argument. It first
recognized that Faretta guarantees the accused in a criminal prosecution the right
to self-representation in lieu of the right to assistance of counsel. Id. It also noted
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses “the basic tools for an
5 adequate defense,” that must “be provided to those defendants who cannot afford
to pay for them.” Id. (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985)). And it
stated that the State may not require a defendant to relinquish one of two
procedural rights in order to obtain the protection of the other. Armentrout, 8
S.W.3d at 105 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968)). But it
then concluded:
In this case, it is clear that the appellant had the right to represent himself under Faretta. But it is not at all clear that Ake requires state funding for a toxicologist in a routine DWI trial, or that Ake, which involved a defendant represented by counsel, requires any funding whatsoever where a defendant chooses to represent himself.
Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d at 105; see also Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243
(8th Cir. 1987) (“While the state need not provide the indigent with all the tools the
wealthy may buy, it must provide the defendant with the ‘basic tools of an
adequate defense.’”) (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).
Whether something is a basic tool of an adequate defense that the State must
provide to an indigent defendant depends on the circumstances. In Ake, the
Supreme Court specifically decided that the Constitution requires a state to provide
an indigent defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist on the issue of the
defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense “when [the] defendant has made a
preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a
significant factor at trial.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 74. Importantly, the Court noted that
6 “the indigent defendant [does not] ha[ve] a constitutional right...to receive funds to
hire his own” psychiatrist, and left “to the State the decision on how to implement
this right.” Id., 470 U.S. at 83.
In Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), the Supreme Court
suggested that Ake should not be read expansively:
Petitioner also raises a challenge to his conviction, arguing that there was constitutional infirmity in the trial court’s refusal to appoint various experts and investigators to assist him.... [P]etitioner also requested appointment of a criminal investigator, a fingerprint expert, and a ballistics expert, and those requests were denied. The State Supreme Court affirmed the denials because the requests were accompanied by no showing as to their reasonableness..... Given that petitioner offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial, we find no deprivation of due process in the trial judge’s decision. Cf. Ake [] (discussing showing that would entitle defendant to psychiatric assistance as matter of federal constitutional law). We therefore have no need to determine as a matter of federal constitutional law what if any showing would have entitled a defendant to assistance of the type here sought.
Id., 472 U.S. at 323 n.1.
In United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth
Circuit found that the right to self-representation did not include “further rights to
materials, facilities, or investigative or educational resources that might aid self-
representation.” And the Supreme Court adopted this view in Kane v. Garcia-
Espitia, 546 U.S. 9 (2006), stating, “Faretta says nothing about any specific legal
aid that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant…The…court below therefore
7 erred in holding, based on Faretta, that a violation of a law library access right is a
basis for federal habeas relief.” Id., 546 U.S. at 10. Thus, without a clearly stated
intent from the Supreme Court to extend Faretta, this Court should not expand the
requirement of State-provided toxicologists in every DWI trial.
The appellant attempts to limit the provision of taxpayer-funded
toxicologists to only DWI trials where the State has alleged a blood-alcohol level
of 0.15 or higher. (App’nt Brf. 6). But there is no principled reason for doing so.
Whether the 0.15 level is a substantive element of the offense is irrelevant on this
issue because intoxication is nevertheless defined in part as “having an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.01 (West 2010). Thus, the
appellant’s rule would require “state funding for a toxicologist in a routine DWI
trial,” when such a requirement is not at all clear. Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d at 105.
Indeed, the circumstances under which the Constitution requires provision of such
experts remain few. See Ake, 470 U.S. 68 (requiring a psychiatrist to assist in
preparation and presentation of defense once defendant demonstrates that sanity is
likely to be significant issue at trial; however that right does not guarantee the
psychiatrist of defendant’s choice); Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir.
1980) (holding pathologist required where a substantial question regarding the
cause of death required expert testimony). The appellant had failed to cite any
cases that have extended Ake to toxicologists in routine DWI cases.
8 The appellant cites United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), for the
proposition that evidence is “material, within the meaning of Ake, if its omission
would create ‘a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist’.” (App’nt Brf. 7).
But Agurs did not address Ake at all; Agurs dealt with the production of evidence
by the State to the defendant under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Furthermore, the holding in Agurs has since been modified by United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Under Bagley, evidence is material if its suppression
“undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id., 473 U.S. at 678. Thus,
Agurs has nothing relevant to say about the appellant’s argument.
The appellant has failed to show that Ake requires state funding for a
toxicologist in a routine DWI trial, or that Ake, which involved a defendant
represented by counsel, requires any funding whatsoever where a defendant
chooses to represent himself. See Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d at 105. She has also failed
to show that, even if such funding were required, a trial court errs in failing to
admonish a pro se litigant of the right to receive such funding. Therefore, the
appellant’s sole point of error lacks merit and should be overruled. The conviction
should be affirmed.
9 B. Because the evidence of guilt was strong and the testifying toxicologist was subject to cross-examination, the appellant was not harmed by the lack of any admonishments on her alleged right to a taxpayer-funded toxicologist. The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that, “except for certain federal
constitutional errors labeled by the Supreme Court as ‘structural,’ no error, whether
it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory
requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis.” Cain v. State,
947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Therefore, this Court must apply
Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and determine whether the
lack of additional admonishment has affected the appellant’s substantial rights.
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) .
Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that any
non-constitutional “error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect
substantial rights must be disregarded.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right
is affected when an error has a substantial, injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997). If, on the record as a whole, it appears the error “did not influence the
jury, or had but a slight effect,” this Court must consider the error harmless and
allow the conviction to stand. Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998).
10 The weight of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is a relevant factor in
conducting a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b). Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352,
360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000)). And the evidence supporting the appellant’s guilt was strong.
She was found by a police officer in the driver’s seat with her sports car still
running (RR. IV – 39) (RR. V – 12, 15). She was lethargic, acted belligerent, used
profanity, was unsteady on her feet, reeked of alcohol, and refused to cooperate or
perform any field sobriety tests (RR. IV – 39-40) (RR. V – 13-15, 67-80). Her
condition and the condition of the vehicle corroborated the credible testimony of
the citizens who were almost her victims. Finally, more than two hours after the
crash, her blood alcohol level was still in the stratosphere (RR. V – 108-109, 171-
172) (St. Ex. 12).
Another relevant factor in a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b) is “the
character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with
other evidence in the case.” Id., 78 S.W.3d at 359 (quoting Morales v. State, 32
S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). In the present case, the appellant had
ample opportunity to cross-examine the toxicologist who testified at trial, and she
did so over the course of more than thirty pages of the reporter’s record and
through two recrosses (RR. V – 172-199, 203-206, 207-208). Furthermore, while
the appellant claims that her case is unique because she was accused of having a
11 blood alcohol level of over 0.15, the judgment reflects that the appellant was found
guilty of the class B misdemeanor of “DWI 1st Offender BAC .08.” (CR – 64).
Thus, the lack of admonishments on her alleged right to a taxpayer-funded
toxicologist could not have had more than a slight effect on the verdict. The
appellant was not harmed, and her sole point of error should be overruled
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that all things are regular and the conviction
/s/ Eric Kugler ERIC KUGLER Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002-1923 (713) 755-5826 kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net TBC No. 796910
12 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE This is to certify that: (a) the word count function of the computer program used to prepare this document reports that there are 3,562 words in it; and (b) a copy of the foregoing instrument will be served by efile.txcourts.gov to:
Cheri Duncan Assistant Public Defender Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, 13th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Cheri.duncan@pdo.hctx.net
/s/ Eric Kugler ERIC KUGLER Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002-1923 (713) 755-5826 TBC No. 796910 Date: September 30, 2015