Nolen v. Cunningham

553 S.W.3d 437
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 10, 2018
DocketNo. ED 101591-01
StatusPublished

This text of 553 S.W.3d 437 (Nolen v. Cunningham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nolen v. Cunningham, 553 S.W.3d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., Judge

Christopher Nolen ("Plaintiff") and his wife appeal from the summary judgment entered in favor of his co-employees, Gary Bess, Derrick Eaves and Kasey Guss (collectively "Defendants"), on claims for personal injuries Plaintiff sustained at work. We affirm.

Plaintiff was employed as a janitor for Southeast Missouri State University, working at the university arena. On May 18, 2007, he was mopping bleachers when he fell off the end of a row and sustained injuries. Plaintiff and his wife filed a negligence action against his co-employees Bess, Eaves and Guss. The petition alleged that Defendants each had a personal duty to refrain from acts that caused an undue risk of injury to Plaintiff above and beyond ordinary workplace risks. It alleged that Defendants breached that personal duty by affirmatively instructing or permitting Plaintiff to mop the bleachers without first installing guardrails, after he had specifically asked for them to be installed for fall protection.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the alleged duty was part of the employer's nondelegable duty to provide Plaintiff with a safe workplace and, therefore, Plaintiff could not pursue a claim against them as co-employees. The following facts established in the summary judgment record are undisputed. On the date of the injury, the janitorial crew believed they needed to mop quickly and they were all mopping faster than normal that day. When Plaintiff asked if the guardrails were going to be installed, he was told that there was not time.1 It was the ordinary procedure to mop without guardrails when there were *439time constraints.2 Plaintiff had cleaned the bleachers at the arena hundreds of times, and usually the guardrails were installed. But Plaintiff had also cleaned the bleachers 15 to 20 times without the guardrails in place.

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment because the undisputed facts showed that Defendants owed Plaintiff no independent duty, separate and distinct from the employer's duty, and therefore the claims against them failed as a matter of law. This appeal follows.3 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. ITT Commercial Finance Corporation v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corporation , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate in favor of the defending party, as in this case, when the undisputed facts negate any one of the necessary elements of the plaintiff's claims. Id. Here, the element in question is whether these co-employees had a duty to Plaintiff, which is a question of law. See McComb v. Norfus , 541 S.W.3d 550, 555 (Mo. banc 2018).

Plaintiff's workplace injury occurred in 2007 and was within a window of time-2005 to 2012-during which the workers compensation statute permitted a plaintiff to pursue a negligence action against a co-employee for an injury sustained at work under certain circumstances.4 In Conner v. Ogletree , and the companion cases handed down that same day, the Supreme Court re-examined this issue and endeavored to clarify the murky jurisprudence of co-employee liability during this limited time frame:

A co-employee can only be liable for such injuries if the employer (prior to workers compensation) would not have been liable because the co-employee either [1] breached a duty unrelated to the master-servant relationship or [2] committed a breach of workplace safety that was so unforeseeable to the employer as to take it outside the employer's nondelegable duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace.

542 S.W.3d 315, 324 (Mo. banc 2018) (emphasis in original); see also McComb, supra and Fogerty v. Armstrong , 541 S.W.3d 544, 546 (Mo. banc 2018). The first category is "rare and easy to spot" and is not at issue here. Conner , 542 S.W.3d at 324, n 4. The allegations of duty in this case seek, but fail, to come within the second category.

The Supreme Court recognized that an employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace is broad and has been applied in myriad factual scenarios with a variety of outcomes. Id. at 322. The Court found a common thread in those applications: "like most common law duties, the employer's nondelegable duty was limited to those risks that were reasonably foreseeable to the employer." Id. The Court concluded that even in those cases where the scope of that duty, and whether the co-employee's actions fell within it, was discussed in terms of "transitory risks" or the "something more" test, *440the analyses were always rooted in whether the risk was reasonably foreseeable to the employer. See id. at 324-26 (discussing Peters v. Wady Industries, Inc. , 489 S.W.3d 784 (Mo. banc 2016) ). A "transitory risk" is one created by the employee's negligence where none existed before and, therefore, is a risk that was not reasonably foreseeable to the employer. Id. at 325 ; see also McComb , 541 S.W.3d at 556. The "something more" cases, while inaccurately stating the common law, nevertheless properly involve discernment as to whether the risk at issue was reasonably foreseeable to the employer. See Conner ,

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Bluebook (online)
553 S.W.3d 437, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nolen-v-cunningham-moctapp-2018.