UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
RAKEESH NOLDEN,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action 2:23-cv-3434 Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Rakeesh Nolden, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings this action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a, et seq. (“FCRA”), against Defendants Equifax Information Services, LLC, Experian Information Services, and TransUnion, LLC. (Compl., ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiff has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on his FCRA claims under §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i. It is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s FCRA claim under § 1681s-2(b) for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In
doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part: (2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that— * * * (B) the action or appeal— (i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up). Instead, in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). II. ANALYSIS Plaintiff alleges that in June 2023, Plaintiff obtained copies of his consumer reports as published by each of the Defendants and noticed several inaccuracies, including inaccurate names, addresses, employers, and account information. In June and July 2023, Plaintiff submitted written disputes to each of the Defendants concerning the inaccurate information. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to establish or follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information on his credit reports and failed to conduct a reasonable investigation as to the disputed information as required by the FCRA. Plaintiff asserts claims that Defendants negligently and willfully violated the FCRA at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681i, and 1681s-2(b). Plaintiff seeks actual, statutory, and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive relief. (Compl., ECF No.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION
RAKEESH NOLDEN,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action 2:23-cv-3434 Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Rakeesh Nolden, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings this action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a, et seq. (“FCRA”), against Defendants Equifax Information Services, LLC, Experian Information Services, and TransUnion, LLC. (Compl., ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiff has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on his FCRA claims under §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i. It is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s FCRA claim under § 1681s-2(b) for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In
doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part: (2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that— * * * (B) the action or appeal— (i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up). Instead, in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). II. ANALYSIS Plaintiff alleges that in June 2023, Plaintiff obtained copies of his consumer reports as published by each of the Defendants and noticed several inaccuracies, including inaccurate names, addresses, employers, and account information. In June and July 2023, Plaintiff submitted written disputes to each of the Defendants concerning the inaccurate information. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to establish or follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information on his credit reports and failed to conduct a reasonable investigation as to the disputed information as required by the FCRA. Plaintiff asserts claims that Defendants negligently and willfully violated the FCRA at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681i, and 1681s-2(b). Plaintiff seeks actual, statutory, and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive relief. (Compl., ECF No. 1-2.) The undersigned concludes that Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on his claims under §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i, but RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims under § 1681s-2(b) be dismissed. Defendants Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion are “consumer reporting agencies” or “CRAs” under the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (“The term ‘consumer reporting agency’ means any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of
preparing or furnishing consumer reports.”). Plaintiff expressly alleges that Defendants are CRAs for the purpose of the FCRA in his claims under §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i. (See Compl. ¶¶ 19, 24, 29, 32, 38, 44, ECF No. 1-2.) Section 1681s-2, however, imposes obligations only on “furnishers of information” to CRAs. See Boggio v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 696 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012) (outlining duties of “furnishers of information” under § 1681s-2 to provide CRAs with accurate information and any relevant information regarding a notice of dispute a CRA has received from a consumer); Downs v. Clayton Homes, Inc., 88 F. App’x 851, 853–54 (6th Cir. 2004) (to succeed on a claim under § 1681s-2(b), “the plaintiff must show that the furnisher received notice from a consumer reporting agency, not the plaintiff, that the credit information is disputed”). Because Defendants are themselves CRAs, and not furnishers of information to CRAs, § 1681s-2 does not govern Defendants’ conduct. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted under § 1681s-2(b). III. DISPOSITION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
(ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. It is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff has submitted service of process by U.S. Marshal forms (Form USM-285) for each Defendant (ECF No. 2); however, Plaintiff has submitted only a single summons form (Form AO-440) purporting to encompass all three Defendants. Plaintiff is advised that he must submit a separate summons form for each Defendant. If Plaintiff submits appropriate summons forms, the Clerk is DIRECTED to issue the summonses and the United States Marshal is DIRECTED to serve by certified mail upon each Defendant the issued summons, a copy of the Complaint (ECF No. 1-2), and a copy of this Order.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura CHELSEY M. VASCURA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE