Nolasco-Ochoa v. Kollanethu

2020 NY Slip Op 1625, 181 A.D.3d 689, 117 N.Y.S.3d 865
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 11, 2020
Docket2018-11979
StatusPublished

This text of 2020 NY Slip Op 1625 (Nolasco-Ochoa v. Kollanethu) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nolasco-Ochoa v. Kollanethu, 2020 NY Slip Op 1625, 181 A.D.3d 689, 117 N.Y.S.3d 865 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2020).

Opinion

Nolasco-Ochoa v Kollanethu (2020 NY Slip Op 01625)
Nolasco-Ochoa v Kollanethu
2020 NY Slip Op 01625
Decided on March 11, 2020
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.


Decided on March 11, 2020 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P.
LEONARD B. AUSTIN
HECTOR D. LASALLE
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.

2018-11979
(Index No. 607803/16)

[*1]Rosario Nolasco-Ochoa, appellant,

v

Jacob Kollanethu, et al., respondents.


Mallilo & Grossman, Flushing, NY (Joanna J. Lambridis of counsel), for appellant.

Sette & Apoznanski (Russo & Tambasco, Melville, NY [Yamile Al-Sullami], of counsel), for respondents.



DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Jerome C. Murphy, J.), entered October 4, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident is denied.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on July 5, 2016. The defendants moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendants' motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219).

Moreover, as the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, a lack of causation (see Straussberg v Marghub, 108 AD3d 694, 695; Kearney v Garrett, 92 AD3d 725, 726), the burden did [*2]not shift to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact regarding causation or to explain any gap in treatment (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 572; Torres v Rettaliata, 171 AD3d 829, 829-830; Lambropoulos v Gomez, 166 AD3d 952).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, LASALLE and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court



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Related

Toure v. Avis Rent a Car Systems, Inc.
774 N.E.2d 1197 (New York Court of Appeals, 2002)
Pommells v. Perez
830 N.E.2d 278 (New York Court of Appeals, 2005)
Perl v. Meher
960 N.E.2d 424 (New York Court of Appeals, 2011)
Gaddy v. Eyler
591 N.E.2d 1176 (New York Court of Appeals, 1992)
Staff v. Mair Yshua
59 A.D.3d 614 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2009)
Kearney v. Garrett
92 A.D.3d 725 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2012)
Straussberg v. Marghub
108 A.D.3d 694 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2020 NY Slip Op 1625, 181 A.D.3d 689, 117 N.Y.S.3d 865, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nolasco-ochoa-v-kollanethu-nyappdiv-2020.