Noffsinger v. Noffsinger

50 F. Supp. 810, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2501
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJuly 20, 1943
DocketNo. 14767
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 50 F. Supp. 810 (Noffsinger v. Noffsinger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 50 F. Supp. 810, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2501 (D.D.C. 1943).

Opinion

LÚHRING, Justice.

This action came on for trial upon the facts without a jury and the Court, having heard the evidence and being sufficiently advised in the premises, now, this 20th day of July, 1943, finds the facts specially and separately states its conclusions of law thereon as follows ;

Findings of Fact.
1. The plaintiff and the defendant were born in the State of Indiana and were duly and lawfully married at Union City, County of Randolph, in said State on the 10th day of June, 1916.
2. That two children were born of said marriage, namely, Earl L. Noffsinger, born on the 12th day of May, 1917, who is now in the United States Military Service, and James Philip Noffsinger, born on the 30th day of May, 1925, who is under the care and custody of his mother, the plaintiff herein.
3. That, at the time of the grievances complained of, the plaintiff and defendant were bona fide residents of the District of Columbia, and had been such bona fide residents since the 1st day of November, 1936.
4. That the said plaintiff and defendant lived and cohabited together as husband and wife in the District of Columbia until the - day of November, 1940, on which day the defendant wilfully abandoned his said wife and minor child, James Philip Noffsinger, and they have not lived or cohabited together as husband and wife since said date.
5. That the defendant is now and ever since the 1st day of November, 1936, has been in the employ of the American Automobile Association in the City of Washington, District of Columbia, as an educational director in its Safety and Traffic Engineering Department. At the outset of his employment, the defendant received a salary of $3,600, which was increased from time to time until, in the year 1942, such salary amounted to $4,685. Beginning January 1st, 1943, the defendant’s salary was increased to $6,000 per annum. The Court further finds that, in addition to the salary received by said defendant, he was at all times allowed his expenses when out of Washington, District of Columbia, on business for said American Automobile Association, and his duties required him to be out of said city the greater part of the time.
[811]*8116. That the said defendant husband has failed and refused to maintain said plaintiff wife and their minor child in her custody, James Philip Noffsinger, and has not contributed to their support and maintenance since the —- day of August, 1941, although able to do so.
7. That on the 9th day of May, 1942, the defendant wras awarded an absolute divorce from the plaintiff on the ground of extreme cruelty by the First Judicial District Court for the State of Nevada, in and for the County of Ormsby. The plaintiff did not appear and contest the action.
8. That the defendant -went to the State of Nevada for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce with no intention of residing in said State permanently or for an indefinite period.
The Court finds as a fact that throughout their married life together the plaintiff was a faithful and devoted wife and mother, and interested in the welfare of her husband and children. The defendant had no ground for divorce either for extreme cruelty or for any other cause. On the contrary, the defendant is solely to blame for the unfortunate situation aud, in instituting an action against the plaintiff for divorce on the ground of cruelty in the State of Indiana and later in th>. State of Nevada, when defeated on jurisdictional grounds in Indiana, acted in bad faith and failed to make full disclosure of the facts.
9. That the defendant was actually, physically and corporeally present in the State of Nevada for a period of only foriy-one (41) days before he brought his suit for divorce on the 23rd day of March, 1942, but represented to the Nevada court that he had resided in Nevada for more than six weeks preceding the commencement of his action for divorce.
10. That in order to maintain aud support herself and the minor child, James Philip Noffsinger, in the manner in which they were accustomed to live, the plaintiff will be required to expend a minimum sum of $200 monthly.

Conclusions of Law.

1. That the decree of the First Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Ormsby in awarding a divorce to the defendant from the plaintiff is invalid iti the State of Nevada for the reason that the said defendant acted in bad faith and went to the State of Nevada solely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce aud with no bona fide intention of remaining in said State permanently or indefinitely and, therefore, said Nevada court lacked jurisdiction to enter said decree. Said judgment of divorce is not entitled to full faith and credit in this jurisdiction pursuant to Article TV, § 1 of the Constitution of the United States, or the Act of Congress of May 26, 1790, c. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. § 687.

2. The law pertaining to divorces, in force in Nevada in the year 1942 provided in part as follows:

“Divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be obtained by complaint, under oath, to the district court of any county * * * if plaintiff shall have resided six weeks in the state before suit be brought [emphasis supplied], for the following causes, or any other cause provided by law:
J]i iji
“Sixth - Extreme cruelty in either party.” Section 9460, Nev.Comp.L.1929, as amended L.1931, p. 161.
Section 6405, Nev.Comp.L.1929, defines legal residence as follows: “The legal residence of a person with reference to his or her * * * right to maintain or defend any suit at law or in equity, or any other right dependent on residence, is that place where he or she shall have been actually, physically and corporeally present within the state or comity, as the case may be, during all of the period for which residence is claimed by him or her;

See, also, Lamb v. Lamb, 57 Nev. 421, particularly at page 431, 65 P.2d 872, where the court approves an instruction stating the requirements of the Nevada divorce law as to the time and the period of physical residence required.

In view of the laws of Nevada and the decision of its Supreme Court, this Court concludes that the decree of divorce awarded to the defendant is invalid in said State of Nevada for the reason that the defendant was not actually, physically and corporeally present in the State of Nevada for six weeks before he brought his suit for divorce from the plaintiff, and, therefore, said District Court in and for the County of Ormsby in the State of Nevada did noi have jurisdiction to hear aud determine said complaint and grant a divorce to the said defendant from the said plaintiff.

[812]*8123. That for the reasons stated in conclusion numbered two the judgment of the Nevada court awarding a divorce to the defendant is not entitled to the full faith and credit contemplated by Article IV, § 1 of the Constitution of the United States, or by the Act of Congress of May 26, 1790, c. 11, 28 U.S.C.A. § 687.

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Bluebook (online)
50 F. Supp. 810, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2501, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/noffsinger-v-noffsinger-dcd-1943.