STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
24-287
NOEL W. YATES
VERSUS
LISA J. YATES
**********
APPEAL FROM THE THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 98,623 HONORABLE C. ANTHONY EAVES, DISTRICT JUDGE
CANDYCE G. PERRET JUDGE
Court composed of Candyce G. Perret, Jonathan W. Perry, and Sharon Darville Wilson, Judges.
REVERSED, IN PART; AFFIRMED, IN PART; AND RENDERED. E. Grey Burnes Talley Post Office Box 3187 Pineville, LA 71360 (318) 442-5231 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: Lisa J. Yates
Elvin Clemence Fontenot, Jr. 110 East Texas Street Leesville, LA 71446 (337) 239-2684 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE: Noel W. Yates PERRET, Judge.
This community property partition returns to this court following the trial
court’s judgment post-remand. On appeal, Appellant, Lisa J. Yates, asserts the
judgment contains numerous errors and fails to follow the directive from this court.
After review, we agree.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
This court’s prior opinion, Yates v. Yates, 22-741 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/23), 375
So.3d 548, sets forth the facts and procedural background of this case in more detail.
However, we will briefly reiterate several facts. Appellant, Lisa J. Yates, (“Lisa”)
and Appellee, Noel W. Yates, (“Noel”) married in June 1989. The parties separated
in July 2019, and filed for divorce on February 27, 2020, pursuant to La.Civ.Code
art. 102. Noel sought to have their property separated on February 24, 2021. A
judgment of divorce was granted on June 23, 2021, terminating the community
property retroactive to February 27, 2020. Noel then filed a petition to partition
community property. The hearing on the partition was held on May 24, 2022, and
an oral ruling was provided at a hearing on June 1, 2022. A judgment of partition
was signed on July 13, 2022.
Lisa appealed, assigning twelve assignments of error, most regarding specific
reimbursement claims awarded to Noel. After a thorough review, this court affirmed
as amended, reversed in part, and remanded the suit for proceedings consistent with
the opinion as follows:
We affirm the trial court’s rulings relating to Lisa’s MidAmerica retirement plan; the home appraisal value of $590,000.00; the reimbursement award to Lisa for insurance premium payments in the amount of $9,224.26; the reimbursement award to Lisa for the Montana tractor in the amount of $4,500.00; the award of $77.00 in reimbursement to Noel for transcript costs; the award of $250.00 in reimbursement for the appraisal fee; the reimbursement award of $12,920.08 to Noel for health, vision, and dental insurance payments; the reimbursement award to Noel for $7,795.00 [sic][1] in mortgage payments; and the reimbursement to Noel of $41,400.00 for rental reimbursement.
We find the trial court manifestly erred in the following awards and amend as follows: the reimbursement award to Lisa for car loan payments is amended to $17,550.62; for credit card payments to $8,376.00; the award to Noel for property taxes is amended to $429.67; the award to Noel for “deposits into joint account” to $27,000.00.
We find no manifest error in the trial court’s ruling relating to the Schamerhorn debt but order the trial court to amend the judgment to reflect same.
We amend the trial court’s ruling to reflect that Lisa is entitled to one half of the community funds existing in the former joint accounts at the time of termination, in the amount of $2,442.63.
We reverse the reimbursement award of $2,030.02 for payments on children’s “insurance premiums,” and the award for “Yates estate” in the amount of $39,262.38. This case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are assessed equally between the parties, Noel W. Yates and Lisa J. Yates.
Yates, 375 So.3d at 585. Despite this court’s efforts to reconcile the math between
the judgment and the partition hearing, a remand was ultimately necessary. This
court specified that the parties were to “recalculate assets, liabilities, and
reimbursements with attention given to halving as required by law, taking into
consideration the findings above and with the input of both Lisa and Noel’s counsel.”
Id.2
1 The mortgage reimbursement award provided by the trial court was $7,975.00. This amount was affirmed on appeal, but incorrectly stated in the court’s conclusion. In its review, this court stated: “[W]e find the trial court did not manifestly err in awarding Noel $7,975.00 in reimbursement for mortgage payments. Noel is entitled to one-half of the payments of $7,795.00.” Yates, 375 So.3d at 572. After confirming the evidence and prior judgment, we use $7,975.00 in the calculations herein. 2 Lisa had asserted, at the time, that the judgment was prepared without her input by Noel’s counsel.
2 Following this court’s remand, Lisa filed a Motion for Amended Judgment on
Remand, requesting a contradictory hearing to address the matter. A hearing was set
for February 22, 2024, wherein the parties requested time to prepare a judgment
incorporating the changes by the third circuit.
Both parties submitted a judgment to the trial court. Lisa’s was denied on
March 12, 2024, with a notation that it failed to “comply with [the] Ruling of Court
and Third Circuit Ruling. Court wants to only deal with issues remanded by Third
Circuit Ruling. All other matters are final unless taken by Appeal or Writ to Supreme
Court.” Noel’s Judgment on Remand, on the other hand, was accepted and signed
by the trial court on March 20, 2024. Thereafter, Lisa appealed both the denial of
her Partition Judgment on Remand and the signed Judgment on Remand.
On appeal Lisa asserts eight assignments of error as follows:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 1 and 2:
It was error for the Trial Court to change allocations in a judgment over which it has no such jurisdiction. It was legal error for the Trial Court to leave the matrimonial domicile undivided.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 3:
It was error for the Trial Court to sign a judgment with internal inconsistencies and factual and math errors.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 4 and 5:
It was error for the Trial Court to change assignment of a community debt in a judgment over which it has no such jurisdiction. It was error for the Trial Court to assign a community debt equally to the parties.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 6:
It was error for the Trial Court to award some of the reimbursements at full, rather than one-half the value of the costs paid.
3 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 7:
It was error for the Trial Court to sign the judgment on remand which deals with some matters only, leaving condition about ownership and obligations.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 8:
It was error for the Trial Court to not provide security for a huge equalizing payment.
DISCUSSION:
As previously noted in Yates, 375 So.3d at 557 (alterations in original):
Appellate review of a trial court’s factual determinations relating to the partition of community property is as follows:
The trial court’s findings of fact are subject to the manifest error/clearly wrong standard of review. David [v. David, 12-1051, (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/10/13)], 117 So.3d 148, [writ denied, 13–1541 (La. 10/4/13), 122 So.3d 1023]. However, the trial court is accorded broad discretion in resolving community property disputes. Williams v. Williams, 07-541 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 968 So.2d 1234.
Keenan v. Keenan, 15-828 p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/3/16), 186 So.3d 289, 295–96, writ denied, 16-418 (La. 4/15/16), 191 So.3d 590. Legal errors are always reviewed de novo. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989).
In partitioning community property, the trial court is governed by La.R.S.
9:2801. The portion reproduced below guides the court in partitioning the
community assets and liabilities:
(a) The court shall value the assets as of the time of trial on the merits, determine the liabilities, and adjudicate the claims of the parties.
(b) The court shall divide the community assets and liabilities so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value.
(c) The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses all of the community assets and liabilities. In allocating assets and liabilities, the court may divide a particular asset or liability equally or unequally or may allocate it in its entirety to one of the spouses. The court shall consider the nature and source of the asset or liability, the
4 economic condition of each spouse, and any other circumstances that the court deems relevant. As between the spouses, the allocation of a liability to a spouse obligates that spouse to extinguish that liability. The allocation in no way affects the rights of creditors.
(d) In the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of money, either cash or deferred, secured or unsecured, upon such terms and conditions as the court shall direct. The court may order the execution of notes, mortgages, or other documents as it deems necessary, or may impose a mortgage or lien on either community or separate property, movable or immovable, as security.
(e) In the event that the allocation of an asset, in whole or in part, would be inequitable to a party, the court may order the parties to draw lots for the asset or may order the private sale of the asset on such terms and conditions as the court deems proper, including the minimum price, the terms of sale, the execution of realtor listing agreements, and the period of time during which the asset shall be offered for private sale.
(f) Only in the event that an asset cannot be allocated to a party, assigned by the drawing of lots, or sold at private sale, shall the court order a partition thereof by licitation. The court may fix the minimum bids and other terms and conditions upon which the property is offered at public sale. In the event of a partition by licitation, the court shall expressly state the reasons why the asset cannot be allocated, assigned by the drawing of lots, or sold at private sale.
La.R.S. 9:2801(4) (emphasis added). The parties are also permitted to seek
reimbursement during the partition pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 2365 (emphasis
added):
If separate property of a spouse has been used either during the existence of the community property regime or thereafter to satisfy a community obligation, that spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one- half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was used.
If the community obligation was incurred to acquire ownership or use of a community corporeal movable required by law to be registered, and separate property of a spouse has been used after termination to satisfy that obligation, the reimbursement claim shall be reduced in proportion to the value of the claimant’s use after termination of the community property regime. The value of that use and the amount of the claim for reimbursement accrued during the use are presumed to be equal.
5 The liability of a spouse who owes reimbursement is limited to the value of his share of all community property after deduction of all community obligations. Nevertheless, if the community obligation was incurred for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage, or for the support, maintenance, or education of children of either spouse in keeping with the economic condition of the spouses, the spouse is entitled to reimbursement from the other spouse regardless of the value of that spouse’s share of all community property.
The trial court’s original factual determinations regarding the assets,
liabilities, and reimbursements due to the parties were reviewed by this court in
Yates, 375 So.3d 548. The trial court was instructed to amend several numbers,
delete some reimbursements awarded, recalculate the reimbursements owed, and,
ultimately, recalculate the equalizing payment awarded. Upon reviewing this court’s
prior opinion and the judgment now on appeal, it is clear this court’s directive was
not followed on remand. Multiple errors in the Judgment on Remand are apparent
and are assigned as errors by Lisa.
Assignment of the matrimonial domicile and mortgage:
Lisa’s assignments of error numbers one, two, four, and five allege that it was
error for the trial court to change the original allocation of the matrimonial domicile
and associated mortgage in the Judgment on Remand.
The assignment of the matrimonial domicile, an asset, to Noel, was not altered
on appeal. Instead, the $590,000.00 value was affirmed. The corresponding
$198,203.00 mortgage, a community debt, was also assigned to Noel and not altered
on appeal. Specifically, the July 13, 2022 Judgment stated:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that NOEL W. YATES shall be awarded ownership of the matrimonial domicile and all structures on property of the property located at 212 Hwy. 121, Leesville, Louisiana, valued at $590,000.00, to be refinanced or the current mortgage modified to remove LISA J. YATES’ name from the debt thereon and NOEL W. YATES shall be solely responsible for the debt thereon, valued at $198,203.00, leaving equity in the amount of $391,797.00, and in exchange, LISA J. YATES shall sign any
6 documents necessary to transfer her interest in the home to NOEL W. YATES.
However, the Judgment on Remand awards both parties this asset and this
debt:
LISA J. Yates was awarded the total of $295,000.00 in immovable assets . . . less one half of the mortgage balance in the amount of $99,101.50. . . . Noel W. Yates was awarded the total of $295,000.00 in immovable assets . . . less one half of the mortgage balance in the amount of $99,101.50[.]
The change of awarding this asset and this liability from Noel to both parties will
affect the calculation of the final equalizing payment. See La.R.S. 9:2801(4)(d) (“In
the event that the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net
distribution, the court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of money, either
cash or deferred, secured or unsecured”). As these allocations were not amended on
appeal, we find the trial court erred in changing the allocation of both the
matrimonial domicile and associated mortgage in the Judgment on Remand. We
reverse this portion of the judgment to reflect the language as stated in the July 13,
2022 Judgment.
Internal inconsistencies and factual errors:
We note two inconsistencies in the Judgment on Remand that must be
corrected. First, on the first page of the Judgment on Remand Noel is ordered to
receive $105,551.75 as reimbursements, but on the second page of the judgment
Noel’s reimbursements are input as $127,659.13. However, this amount will be
amended as further described in this opinion as it is apparent the Judgment on
Remand does not give attention to halving according to law.
Second, item 16 under Lisa’s reimbursements is input as $17,560.52, but the
opinion from this court amended that number to $17,550.62.
7 Lisa also asserts in her third assignment of error that the Judgment on Remand
differs in its calculation of moveables assigned to both parties from the record. We
note that those numbers that appear in the Judgment on Remand were the same as
those in the July 13, 2022 Judgment reviewed by this court. The items listed in these
categories in the July 13, 2022 Judgment were not altered by the court on appeal.
The only items this court appears to have examined on appeal were the Barksdale
checking and savings accounts, which were determined to have community property
funds. This court stated: “[T]he existing community funds prior to the two
inheritance deposits were community funds that were not properly allocated between
the parties under community assets. Thus, Lisa is entitled to reimbursement for one-
half of the community funds existing at the time which amounts to $2,442.63.”
Yates, 375 So.3d at 559 (footnote omitted). This court later stated: “We amend the
trial court’s ruling to reflect that Lisa is entitled to one half of the community funds
existing in the former joint accounts at the time of termination, in the amount of
$2,442.63.” Id. at 585. The Judgment on Remand does not include this amount as
an asset to Lisa, but does include this amount as a reimbursement owed to Lisa
pursuant to this court’s prior opinion. While this court did order the trial court to
recalculate the assets, liabilities, and reimbursements, it did not amend or alter the
value assessed to the remaining moveables from the July 13, 2022 Judgment.
Therefore, we find no error in the total moveables allocated to each party in the
Judgment on Remand and the reimbursement awarded to Lisa for the Barksdale
community funds.
Improper calculation of reimbursements:
In her sixth assignment of error, Lisa asserts that some reimbursements were
not properly halved during the trial court’s final calculation on remand. In this
8 court’s prior opinion, the court ordered the trial court to calculate the reimbursements
on remand “with attention given to halving as required by law[.]” Yates, 375 So.3d
at 585. The concern that existed in the prior appeal still exists following the
Judgment on Remand. This court previously noted one problem in trying to
reconcile the math was “that Noel requested $65,800.00 in reimbursement but was
awarded $158,298.82. . . . Of notable concern is the possibility that the
reimbursement claims were not properly halved.” Id. Despite this court amending
some reimbursements to lower amounts, and deleting several claims altogether,
Noel’s total reimbursements amount to $105,551.75 in the Judgment on Remand
despite Noel only requesting $65,800.00 in reimbursements. The problem is
particularly evident in Noel’s reimbursements where some of the items are halved,
such as Items 5 and 6, but the remainder appear to be the full amounts. Additionally,
Item 1 under Lisa’s reimbursements is halved, but the remainder appear to be left
whole. Lisa also asserts that three of her reimbursement items, Items 3, 5, and 6,
should not be halved, citing La.Civ.Code arts. 2363 and 2367.3. Thus, it is apparent
there still exist issues with halving both Lisa and Noel’s reimbursement claims, and
the trial court erred in determining the parties’ reimbursement claims.
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2365 provides that a spouse who uses separate
funds to satisfy community obligations is entitled to a reimbursement of one-half of
the amount. However, “if a spouse uses separate property during the existence of
the community property regime to satisfy the separate obligation of the other spouse,
the spouse whose property was used is entitled to reimbursement for the amount or
value the property had at the time it was used.” La.Civ.Code art. 2367.3.
In determining the reimbursement amount each party is entitled to, we will
half each amount according to law, if applicable, and then add those amounts to
9 reach a total. We also reiterate this court’s prior note that “numerous items of
reimbursement were discussed very little at trial and/or little or no documentary
evidence was provided[.]” Yates, 375 So.3d at 567.
Noel’s reimbursement claims:
We will address Noel’s reimbursement requests first, as most were touched
on previously by this court. The Judgment on Remand awards Noel $105,551.75 in
reimbursement claims, but, as previously noted, is incorrectly transcribed on the
second page of the judgment as $127,659.13.
The trial court awarded Noel $15,500.00 for attorney fees. “An obligation
incurred before the date of a judgment of divorce for attorney fees and costs in an
action for divorce and in incidental actions is deemed to be a community obligation.”
La.Civ.Code art. 2362.1. 3 Thus, Noel is entitled to half that amount as a
reimbursement, $7,750.00 for his payment of attorney fees.
We note that Noel’s attorney fees are not a document contained in evidence in our record. 3
However, this court previously stated:
Lisa appealed all of the reimbursement awards except for the $15,500.00 award for attorney fees. . . . However, all of Noel’s claims, save the children’s insurance premiums, were listed in his Detailed Descriptive List. Regardless of whether documentary or testimonial evidence was presented at trial, Lisa had the opportunity to cross-examine Noel regarding any of the claims he listed in his Detailed Descriptive List, but did not do so. Lisa cannot now claim there was absolutely no proof of certain reimbursement claims when she did not avail herself of the opportunity to cross-examine Noel as to items specifically listed on his Detailed Descriptive List.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801(A)(1)(a) specifically provides that a party’s sworn detailed descriptive list is a judicial determination of the community assets and liabilities when one spouse fails to file their own detailed descriptive list. While that is not the case here since Lisa did file her own and a traversal, the same principle holds true when a party fails to produce any contrary evidence at trial of the spouse’s valuation of reimbursement claims.
Yates, 375 So.3d at 567. As previously noted, our review of the record indicates that the trial court only halved items 5 and 6 of Noel’s reimbursement items and failed to halve the others. Thus, our review indicates that the attorney fees of $15,000.00 should be halved.
10 Noel put in evidence of $7,975.00 in payments to Rocket Mortgage. This
amount was reviewed by the court on appeal, wherein it stated: “[W]e find the trial
court did not manifestly err in awarding Noel $7,975.00 in reimbursement for
mortgage payments. Noel is entitled to one-half of the payments of $7,795.00 [sic].”
Id. at 572 (emphasis added). The Judgment on Remand lists the reimbursement in
the amount of $7,975.00. Thus, in calculating Noel’s reimbursement, he is entitled
to $3,987.50 for his payments to Rocket Mortgage.
The trial court awarded Noel reimbursement for his payment of “transcripts”
in the amount of $77.00. This court previously reviewed this item and stated, “We
are unable to determine from the record how the trial court arrived at $77.00
reimbursement for a transcript. Nevertheless, Noel’s Detailed Descriptive List
asserts far more than $77.00 in transcript costs.” Id. at 570–71. As there is no
indication of whether this number has been halved, and evidence submitted by Noel
is not reflective of $77.00, we take this number as the pre-halved number, as seemed
to be the manner in which the July 13, 2022 Judgment listed reimbursement items.
Thus, Noel is entitled to $38.50 in reimbursement for transcripts.
Noel’s Item 4, the Judgment on Remand lists the rental reimbursement in the
amount of $41,400.00 due to Noel. However, this court stated: “Noel is entitled to
reimbursement for one half of the value of rental reimbursement of $41,400.00.” Id.
at 574 (emphasis added). Thus, one half of the rental reimbursement equates to
$20,700.00.
The Judgment on Remand awards Noel $429.67 for the payment of property
taxes. We find no error in that calculation. That amount is one-half of the total
property taxes Noel paid, as amended by this court. On appeal, this court found the
trial court erred in awarding Noel $2,607.34 for the payment of property taxes in the
11 July 13, 2022 Judgment. That award was amended to $859.34. This court then
stated: “Noel is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of $859.34 which equals
$429.67.” Yates, 375 So.3d at 575. The halved number, $429.67, properly appears
as Item 5 in the Judgment on Remand.
Regarding the appraisal, the Judgment on Remand awards Noel $250.00.
According to our prior opinion, this is the halved amount: “The trial court obviously
concluded that Noel paid the $500.00 appraisal fee and was due reimbursement for
half. . . . [W]e find no manifest error in the trial court’s award of $250.00
reimbursement to Noel for the payment of the appraisal fee.” Id. at 571.
For his payment of health and vision insurance premiums, the Judgment on
Remand awards Noel $12,920.08. However, this amount has not been halved
pursuant to our prior opinion. On appeal, this court stated: “Noel is entitled to one-
half of $12,920.08.” Id. at 571. Thus, the judgment should award Noel $6,460.04
in reimbursement for the health and vision insurance premiums.
Finally, the Judgment on Remand also fails to halve the mortgage payments
paid by Noel for which he is due reimbursement. While the Judgment on Remand
correctly uses the amended total as ordered by this court ($27,000.00), this court
further explained: “Noel is therefore entitled to one-half of that amount in
reimbursement, $13,500.00.” Id. at 584. Thus, Noel is awarded $13,500.00 for his
payments towards the parties’ mortgage.
Therefore, our calculation indicates that Noel is entitled to a total of
$53,115.71 in reimbursements. The trial court erred in its award of $105,551.75 in
reimbursement claims to Noel.
12 Lisa’s reimbursement claims:
As with Noel’s reimbursement claims, the Judgment on Remand does not
indicate whether Lisa’s reimbursements have been halved prior to calculation. The
Judgment on Remand awards Lisa $127,659.13 in reimbursement claims. Most of
Lisa’s reimbursement claims were not reviewed in the prior appeal, but we will make
particular note of those that were. Lisa also admits that her reimbursement claims
have not been halved in the Judgment on Remand, the exceptions being her claim
for the Montana tractor and the reimbursement for funds existing in the former joint
accounts, Item 17.
The Montana tractor, an asset allocated to Noel, was established to have a
value of $9,000.00, and the July 13, 2022 Judgment awarded Lisa a $4,500.00
reimbursement claim for the tractor. This court affirmed that award on appeal.
Therefore, this award is already halved.
Item 17, $2,442.63 for reimbursement for funds existing in the former joint
accounts, already appears halved in the Judgment on Remand and requires no further
determination. On appeal, Lisa asserts that this is an asset rather than a
reimbursement. However, we note that our prior opinion specifically indicates that
Lisa is due a “reimbursement for one-half of the community funds existing at that
time which amounts to $2,442.63.” Id. at 559.
Lisa also asserts that her reimbursement for Items 3, 5, and 6, should be left
whole because she is entitled to full reimbursement for the insurance premiums she
paid. To this end, she asserts that the policies insure their son, Marshall, and name
Noel as the beneficiary (Item 3), or insure Noel and do not name Lisa as the
beneficiary (Items 5 and 6). The supreme court in Fowler v. Fowler, 03-590, p. 8
(La. 12/12/03), 861 So.2d 181, 186, did not determine any reimbursement claims
13 owed, but concluded that life insurance proceeds “are the separate property of the
named beneficiary spouse.” In Fowler, three life insurance policies on the parties’
son were issued during the parties’ marriage. The wife was listed as the primary
beneficiary of all three policies. The son died during the marriage and the proceeds
were paid to the wife, who then deposited same into accounts in her name. Eight
years later, the parties divorced, and the community was partitioned via written
stipulation. However, the parties reserved for the court the question of whether the
insurance proceeds were community or the wife’s separate property. The Fowler
court stated that “the right to life insurance proceeds are sui generis and not governed
by the codal principles. Accordingly, life insurance proceeds go to the named
beneficiary in accordance with the provisions of the life insurance contract, without
regard to community claims[.]” Id.
Applying the same to the current case, we agree that Items 5 and 6 are the
separate obligation of Noel and do not benefit Lisa; thus, as she expended her
separate property to pay the premiums on Noel’s separate obligations, she is entitled
to reimbursement for the amount she paid at the time it was used. La.Civ.Code art.
2367.3. Therefore, Lisa is entitled to $62.00 reimbursement for the Protective Life
Insurance premiums and $440.00 for the West Coast Life Insurance premiums she
paid.
As for the Boston Mutual Life Insurance payments for Marshall’s life
insurance premiums, the trial court awarded Lisa $156.00 in reimbursement. The
insurance contract is on Marshall’s life and allegedly names Noel as the beneficiary.
While those proceeds are the separate property of Noel if they are paid out as in
Fowler, that is not the current scenario in this case. However, Noel has not appealed
the reimbursement award. Thus, based on the record before us and because it is
14 unclear whether this amount was halved in the trial court’s calculations, we find Lisa
is entitled to the full $156.00 reimbursement for the Boston Mutual Life Insurance
payments.
Considering the above, the reimbursements due to Lisa, with attention paid to
the laws of halving, are as follows:
1. Montana tractor $4,500.00 2. 2020 property taxes $218.00 3. Boston Mutual Life Insurance $156.00 premiums (Marshall) 4. State Farm insurance premiums $4,612.13 5. Protective Life insurance (Noel) $62.00 6. West Coast life insurance (Noel) $440.00 7. Aaron Guinn $2873.00 8. Aaron Guinn $190.00 9. Aaron Guinn $1458.50 10.Aaron Guinn $50.00 11.Garage window repair $295.00 12.Home repairs $400.00 13.Attorney fees $18,163.75 14.Pre-divorce litigation $688.61 15.Barksdale Federal Credit Union $4,188.00 credit card payments, act 0509 16.Bayou Federal Credit Union BMW $8,775.31 payments 17.Funds existing in the former joint $2,442.63 account 18.Rocket Mortgage payments $16,083.50 19.TD Auto Finance for Lincoln MKZ $2,028.50 TOTAL: $67,624.93
Our calculation indicates that Lisa is entitled to a total of $67,468.93 in
reimbursements. The trial court erred in its award of $127,659.13 in reimbursement
claims to Lisa.
Considering the reasons set forth above and the trial court’s failure to follow
this court’s directive on remand, including the mathematical errors, failure to apply
the proper statutes regarding reimbursement claims, and exceeding the scope of the
15 remand by assigning the matrimonial domicile and mortgage to both parties, the
Judgment on Remand is reversed in part and affirmed in part. We then render
judgment as follows.
CONCLUSION:
With the record before us, we now render judgment as follows, resulting in
the following calculations and a final equalizing payment:
First, we note that the following portions of the July 13, 2022 Judgment were
previously unaltered on appeal and so remain:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that LISA J. YATES shall be responsible for the payment of [the] following community debts, to-wit:
1. Barksdale Federal Credit Union credit card, account ending 0509; and 2. Bayou Federal Credit Union loan for BMW, account ending 860 [valued as a $15,431.00 at trial.]
....
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the retirement/pension account of NOEL W. YATES with Schlumberger shall be divided by Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the retirement/pension account of NOEL W. YATES with Vernon Parish Sheriff’s Office shall be divided by Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
Furthermore, we find no error in the total moveables allocated to each party
in the Judgment on Remand, and this court previously affirmed the trial court’s
ruling relating to Lisa’s MidAmerica retirement plan. Thus, the list of assigned
assets allocated to LISA J. YATES (Items 1-86) in the July 13, 2022 Judgment
totaling $83,432.28 is affirmed. The list of assigned assets allocated to NOEL W.
YATES (Items 1-93) in the July 13, 2022 Judgment totaling $30,665.00 is affirmed.
16 Now, considering our findings above, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that NOEL W. YATES shall be awarded ownership of the matrimonial
domicile and all structures on the property located at 212 Hwy. 121, Leesville,
Louisiana, valued at $590,000.00, to be refinanced or the current mortgage modified
to remove LISA J. YATES’ name from the debt thereon and NOEL W. YATES shall
be solely responsible for the debt thereon, valued at $198,203.00, leaving equity in
the amount of $391,797.00, and in exchange, LISA J. Yates shall sign any
documents necessary to transfer her interest in the home to NOEL W. YATES.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that NOEL W.
YATES shall be responsible for the Schamerhorn community debt in the amount of
$2,000.00.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that LISA J.
YATES shall receive the total of $67,624.93 in reimbursements, as specified above.
YATES shall receive the total of $53,115.71 in reimbursements, as specified above.
YATES shall make an equalizing payment to LISA J. YATES in the amount of
$190,739.58.4
4 Pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2801(4), the court must determine and allocate the assets and liabilities of the parties and, in the event that an unequal net distribution occurs, the court shall order an equalizing sum of money.
In determining the assets, this court calculates a total of $704,097.28 in moveable and immovable assets (moveables allocated to each party and the marital home). Regarding liabilities, this court calculates a total of $215,634.00 (comprised of the mortgage, Schamerhorn debt, and BMW loan). Thus, the net value of the community is $488,463.28. In a perfect world, each party would have received $244,231.64 in assets.
17 Costs of this appeal are assessed equally between the parties, Noel W. Yates
and Lisa J. Yates.
REVERSED, IN PART; AFFIRMED, IN PART; AND RENDERED.
In this case, Noel received a net of $420,462.00, and Lisa received a net of $68,001.28. Therefore, Lisa is entitled to $176,230.36 more to equalize the assets. But we will factor in reimbursement claims before determining a final equalizing payment.
In reimbursements, this court calculated that Noel is entitled to $53,115.71, while Lisa is entitled to $67,624.93. Therefore, Noel would owe Lisa the difference in reimbursements, which is $14,509.22.
Considering these figures, the final equalizing payment owed by Noel to Lisa is $190,739.58 ($176,230.36 + $14,509.22).