Noel M. Quinn v. City of Scottsdale

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 10, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02894
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8

Noel M . Quinn, ) No. CV-25-02894-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) City of Scottsdale, ) 12 ) 13 Defendant. ) ) 14 )

15 Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended 16 Complaint (Doc. 14), Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 15), and Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 18). 17 Having considered the parties’ briefing, the Court now rules as follows.1 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 This action arises from Plaintiff’s employment with the Defendant. In July 2022, 20 Defendant hired Plaintiff as a firefighter recruit. (Doc. 13 at 2, ¶ 12). Shortly thereafter, 21 Plaintiff suffered a neck injury and was placed on medical leave until January 2023. (Id. at 22 ¶¶ 13–15). After returning from medical leave, Defendant allegedly refused Plaintiff’s 23 requests for disability accommodations and treated her less favorably than other 24 employees. (Id. at 5–7, 10–11, 13, ¶¶ 39–40, 56–58, 64, 73, 108, 110, 115, 127). From 25 February 2023 to August 2023, Plaintiff alleges Defendant and Defendant’s employees 26 27 1 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the pending motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f); Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 1 discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff for her medical limitations and participation 2 in a sexual assault investigation. (Id. at 3–4, 7, 11, ¶¶ 21–22, 28–29, 71, 115–16, 122). On 3 August 2, 2023, Plaintiff resigned from her position as “she was unwilling to further risk 4 her personal safety.” (Id. at 12, ¶ 131). 5 On March 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a civil rights intake questionnaire (the “Intake”) 6 with the Arizona Civil Rights Division (“ACRD”). (Id. at 13, ¶ 135; see also Doc. 13-1 at 7 2–92). Plaintiff later filed a charge of discrimination (the “Charge”) with the ACRD.3 (Doc. 8 13 at 13, ¶ 139; see also Doc. 13-1 at 11). The ACRD issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter 9 on February 26, 2025, (Doc. 13 at 13–14, ¶ 141; see also Doc. 13-1 at 11), and the Equal 10 Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter on 11 May 15, 2025, (Doc. 13 at 14, ¶ 142; see also Doc. 13-1 at 13–14). 12 On August 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant for disability 13 discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 14 and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). (Doc. 15 1). Before Defendant filed its answer, Plaintiff filed a Stipulated Motion for Leave to 16 Amend Complaint (Doc. 11), which the Court granted, (Doc. 12). On November 6, 2025, 17 Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 13). Defendant subsequently 18 filed the present Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief. (Doc. 14). 19 20 21

22 2 The Court may consider the exhibits attached to the Amended Complaint without 23 converting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Parks 24 Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 3 Plaintiff alleges the Charge was filed on March 1, 2024, despite the ACRD stating the Charge was filed on June 17, 2024. (Doc. 13 at 13, ¶ 139; see Doc. 13-1 at 11). Because 26 this factual allegation is contradicted by Exhibit 1, the Court need not accept this allegation 27 as true. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The court need not, however, accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject 28 to judicial notice or by exhibit.”). 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must 3 meet the requirements of Rule 8.” Jones v. Mohave County, No. CV 11-8093-PCT-JAT, 4 2012 WL 79882, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2012); see also Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt., 5 L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 203 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Rule 12(b)(6) 6 provides the one and only method for testing whether” pleading standards set by Rule 8 7 and 9 have been met); Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 598–99 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Rule 8 12(b)(6) does not stand alone,” but implicates Rules 8 and 9). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a 9 pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 10 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to 11 state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or 12 (2) insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. In re Sorrento Therapeutics, 13 Inc. Sec. Litig., 97 F.4th 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2024). A claim is facially plausible when it 14 contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that the 15 moving party is liable. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Factual allegations in 16 the complaint should be assumed true, and a court should then “determine whether they 17 plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. Facts should be viewed “in the 18 light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 19 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). “Nonetheless, the Court does not have to accept as true a legal 20 conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Jones, 2012 WL 79882, at *1 (citing Papasan 21 v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 A. The March 1, 2024 Intake Questionnaire is Not a Charge 24 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff did not 25 file the Charge with the ACRD or the EEOC “within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory 26 act.” (Doc. 14 at 1). More specifically, Defendant contends the Intake is not a formal charge 27 of discrimination because the Intake did not make a request for remedial action, and 28 Plaintiff did not attach a supplemental affidavit to the Intake to satisfy the “request to act” 1 requirement. (Id. at 4–6). Plaintiff disagrees,4 arguing the Intake form “does [not] state that 2 completing the Intake Questionnaire will not effectuate the filing of a charge,” (Doc. 15 at 3 11), and her sworn declaration at the end of the Intake “implies a request for the agency to 4 act,” (Id. at 10). 5 To bring a Title VII or ADA5 claim in district court, a plaintiff must first exhaust 6 her administrative remedies. Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 707–08 (9th Cir. 7 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)). Exhaustion of administrative remedies requires the 8 plaintiff to file a timely charge with the EEOC. Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 9 (9th Cir. 2002). In Arizona, a Title VII or ADA claim must be filed within 300 days of the 10 alleged unlawful employment practice in order to be timely. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 11 Hernandez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. CV-21-00742-PHX-DJH, 2022 WL 12 103528, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2022) (“[T]he correct time limit for filing a Title VII claim 13 in Arizona is 300 days.”); Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 823 n.12 14 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Day v. LSI Corp., 174 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1163 (D. Ariz. 2016), 15 aff’d, 705 F. App’x 539 (9th Cir. 2017). 16 An EEOC intake questionnaire may qualify as a charge for exhaustion purposes if 17 certain criteria are met. In the context of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 18 (“ADEA”), the filing of an intake questionnaire with the EEOC counts as a charge if the 19

20 4 To the extent Plaintiff argues the Motion should be denied because the attachments 21 to the Intake are not before the Court, (see Doc. 15 at 7), the Court notes that it is Plaintiff’s 22 burden to attach the relevant documents to the FAC. See Scott v. Arviso, No. 1:18-cv-0023- LJO-GSA-PC, 2018 WL 1505487, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2018) (“If Plaintiff chooses to 23 submit exhibits or to refer to exhibits in the complaint, he must attach the exhibits to the complaint for the court’s review.”). 24 25 5 Title I of the ADA incorporates the procedural requirements of Title VII, including the time limits for filing an administrative charge with the relevant agency. See 42 U.S.C. 26 § 12117(a) (“The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e- 27 5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides . . . to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability 28 . . . .”); Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Just., 170 F.3d 1169, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 1999). 1 questionnaire provides the information required by federal regulations and can “be 2 reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action . . . or otherwise 3 settle a dispute between the employer and the employee.” Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 4 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (“Holowecki”). District courts within the Ninth Circuit have 5 subsequently applied this analysis to Title VII and ADA cases. See, e.g., Kennedy v. 6 Columbus Mfg., Inc., No. 17-cv-03379-EMC, 2017 WL 4680079, *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 7 2017); Staton v. U.S. Airways Inc., 2011 WL 855789, *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2011). 8 To determine whether a questionnaire requests remedial action, the Court examines 9 the document “from the standpoint of an objective observer to determine whether, by a 10 reasonable construction of its terms, the filer requests the agency to activate its machinery 11 and remedial processes.” Holowecki, 552 U.S. at 402. Holowecki liberally favors the 12 employee such that “documents filed by an employee with the EEOC should be construed, 13 to the extent consistent with permissible rules of interpretation, to protect the employee’s 14 rights and statutory remedies.” Id. at 406. 15 Despite Plaintiff’s insistence to the contrary, the March 1, 2024 Intake does not 16 constitute a charge of discrimination. A claimant’s request for remedial action must be 17 objectively apparent from the questionnaire. See id. at 402; see also Hasktn v. US Airways, 18 No. 2:14-cv-02901-SVW-JEM, 2015 WL 13357437, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2015) 19 (finding the intake questionnaire constituted a charge as the plaintiff “checked a box 20 indicating that he wishe[d] to file a discrimination charge.”); Blackburn v. Regents of the 21 Univ. of Cal., No. C 07-4151 JF, 2008 WL 11388538, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2008) 22 (concluding the intake questionnaire was a formal charge where the plaintiff expressly 23 requested the EEOC initiate a full investigation into the alleged discriminatory conduct). 24 Plaintiff claims that answering “yes” to the following declaration on the Intake’s 25 final page implies a request for agency action: “[b]y submitting this form electronically, I 26 declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Arizona that the information 27 in this questionnaire is true and accurate.” (Doc. 13-1 at 9; see Doc. 15 at 10). But the mere 28 completion of the Intake creates no such inference. See Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 F. 1 App’x 707, 713 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Standing alone, these questionnaires cannot reasonably 2 be construed as ‘a request for the agency to take remedial action’ because they relate only 3 factual information about the Officers’ allegations of discrimination and make no requests 4 of the agency.”). As Defendant stated in its reply, a “declaration attesting to the truth of the 5 information in [an] intake questionnaire . . . does nothing more than affirm the accuracy of 6 the information provided.” (Doc. 18 at 5). The Court is unable to construe the declaration 7 in Plaintiff’s Intake as a request for remedial action. See E.E.O.C. v. Freeman, No. RWT 8 09cv2573, 2010 WL 1728847, at *7 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2010) (finding the intake 9 questionnaire did not constitute a charge because it did not evince an intent “to invoke the 10 EEOC’s investigative and remedial process,” and the plaintiff’s subsequent charge of 11 discrimination suggested “that she was not requesting agency action at the time she filed 12 her intake questionnaire.”). 13 Thus, the Court is left only with the date Plaintiff filed her actual charge: June 17, 14 2024. (See Doc. 13-1 at 11). And, because the Charge was filed more than 300 days after 15 August 2, 2023, the last possible date of discrimination, Plaintiff’s claims are untimely. 16 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Zaki v. Banner Pediatric Specialists LLC, No. CV- 17 16-01920-PHX-DLR, 2017 WL 105991, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2017) (“Claims not filed 18 with the EEOC within 300 days are time-barred.”). 19 B. Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply 20 In the alternative, Plaintiff argues in the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply 21 because the ACRD allegedly mishandled her claim. (Doc. 15 at 12–13). Defendant 22 contends that Plaintiff cannot rely on equitable tolling as she “did not act diligently in 23 pursuing her charge prior to the expiration of the 300-day statute of limitations. (Doc. 18 24 at 7). 25 Filing a timely EEOC charge “is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal 26 court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and 27 equitable tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). For a 28 statute of limitations to be equitably tolled, a plaintiff “must establish that they pursued 1 their rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstances stood in the way.” 2 WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 181 F. Supp. 3d 651, 671 (D. Ariz. 2015). 3 Such “extraordinary circumstances include situations where the claimant has actively 4 pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or 5 where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into 6 allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 Here, the Court cannot conclude that equitable tolling is warranted from the facts 8 alleged in the FAC. Plaintiff briefly notes in her Response that the ACRD mishandled the 9 Charge, (Doc. 15 at 13), but the FAC does not allege any facts showing Plaintiff actively 10 pursued her judicial remedies or that the ACRD’s investigation into Plaintiff’s claims 11 prevented her from filing a charge by the applicable deadline. See WildEarth Guardians, 12 181 F. Supp. 3d at 671. Because the FAC offers no basis to excuse Plaintiff’s untimely 13 filing, dismissal is warranted. See Hukman v. Alaska Airlines Inc., No. CV-18-01104-PHX- 14 DLR, 2018 WL 6928741, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2018) (dismissing a Title VII claim 15 because the plaintiff’s complaint offered “no basis for equitably tolling Title VII’s time 16 period for filing an EEOC charge.”). 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 In sum, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14). The March 19 1, 2024 intake questionnaire does not constitute a charge of discrimination as Plaintiff 20 made no request for remedial action, and Plaintiff has not pleaded facts sufficient to 21 demonstrate that equitable tolling applies. 22 A district court, however, should grant leave to amend “unless it determines that the 23 pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & 24 Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990); see Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 15(a)(2). It may be possible for Plaintiff to allege additional facts about the 26 mismanagement of the Charge that supports equitable tolling. Therefore, leave to amend is 27 warranted. See Ajanovic v. O.F.F. Enters., No. CV10-2487-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 549876, 28 at *2(D. Ariz. Feb. 21, 2012) (granting leave to amend to allow the opportunity to address the tolling of the statute of limitations argument). 3 Accordingly, 4 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is granted. The 5 | First Amended Complaint (Doc. 13) is dismissed. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint curing 7 | the defects identified in this Order by July 11, 2026. If Plaintiff does not do so, the action 8 | will be dismissed without further notice. 9 Dated this 10th day of June, 2026. 10

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