Noe v. State

2011 Ark. App. 155, 381 S.W.3d 915, 2011 Ark. App. LEXIS 190
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arkansas
DecidedMarch 2, 2011
DocketNo. CA CR 10-755
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2011 Ark. App. 155 (Noe v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Noe v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 155, 381 S.W.3d 915, 2011 Ark. App. LEXIS 190 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

LARRY D. VAUGHT, Chief Judge.

| Wendell Noe was convicted by the St. Francis County Circuit Court of violating Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (AGFC) Codes 11.03, 15.05, and 15.12 and fined $2500. On appeal, Noe argues that his convictions must be reversed because the AGFC Codes are preempted by and in conflict with four migratory-bird treaties entered into by the United States of America and that his actions were in full compliance with federal law. We disagree and affirm the convictions.

In 1984, Noe opened Ducks & Ducks, Inc., which raised and sold mallard ducks. Noe sold these captive-reared mallard ducks to hunting clubs, game preserves, retriever trials, and kennel clubs throughout the United States and Canada. On July 9, 2007, Noe was cited by AGFC Wildlife Officers with violations of AGFC Codes 11.03 (prohibiting the aiding, accompanying, or abetting of another in the illegal taking, attempting to take, possessing, Ubuying, or selling of protected wildlife), 15.05 (prohibiting the release into the wild any native or non-native species of wildlife without prior approval of the AGFC), and 15.12 (requiring a Wildlife Breeder/Dealer Permit for those persons who rear, breed, propagate, produce, or distribute any game birds).1

On October 15, 2007, the St. Francis County District Court found Noe guilty of violating Codes 11.03, 15.12, and 15.05 (which was merged into the violation of Code 15.12) and fined him $3000. Noe appealed his convictions to the St. Francis County Circuit Court. At trial, Noe admitted that he did not possess a valid Wildlife Breeder/Dealer Permit from the AGFC and that he released and/or sold captive-reared mallard ducks to both residents and non-residents of Arkansas throughout 2007. However, he argued that four treaties the United States entered into with Great Britain, Japan, Mexico, and Russia for the protection of migratory birds were federal law that preempted and conflicted with the AGFC Codes; therefore, he did not have to comply with them.

The trial court disagreed, and on March 9, 2010, it convicted Noe of violating Codes 11.03, 15.05, and 15.12, fining him $2500. In finding him guilty, the trial court stated that the migratory-bird treaties did not preempt the applicable AGFC Codes. Noe filed a timely appeal of these convictions.

The issue of preemption is a question of law, and we review questions of law de novo on appeal. Selmon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 372 Ark. 420, 424, 277 S.W.3d 196, 200 (2008). Likewise, the standard of review with respect to statutory and constitutional interpretation is de novo. Fitton v. Bank of Little Rock, 2010 Ark. 280, 365 S.W.3d 888. “On appeal, our task is to read the laws as they are written, and interpret them in accordance with established principles of statutory and constitutional construction.... The fundamental rule is that the words of the constitution or statute should ordinarily be given their obvious and natural meaning.” Fitton, 2010 Ark. 280, at 4, 365 S.W.3d at 891. Furthermore, we are not bound by the decision of the trial court; however, in the absence of a showing that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the law, that interpretation will be accepted as correct on appeal. Id., 365 S.W.3d at 891.

In August 1916, the United States and Great Britain entered into a migratory-bird treaty. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 (U.S.-Great Britain Convention). The United States subsequently entered into three similar treaties with Mexico,2 Japan,3 and Russia.4 These treaties generally prohibit the taking, sale, and transportation of migratory birds, their nests, and eggs.5

|4In 1918, Congress enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712, to give effect to the terms of the U.S.-Great Britain Convention.6 Currently, the MBTA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to adopt regulations governing and permitting the hunting, possession, sale, and transportation of migratory birds consistent with all four migratory-bird treaties. Noe v. Henderson, 373 F.Supp.2d 939, 943 (E.D.Ark.2005) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 703(a)). Nothing in the MBTA expressly prohibits state regulation of migratory birds. Noe, 373 F.Supp.2d at 943. To the contrary, the MBTA expressly permits state regulation:

Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prevent the several States and Territories from making or enforcing laws or regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of said conventions or of this subchapter, or from making or enforcing laws or regulations which shall give further protection to migratory birds, their nests, and eggs....

Noe, 373 F.Supp.2d at 943 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 708).

|fiIn December 2004, Noe and two of his customers filed a federal declaratory-judgment action, alleging that certain AGFC Codes were preempted by the MBTA and 50 C.F.R. § 21.13.7 Noe, 373 F.Supp.2d at 942. The district court granted summary judgment to the AGFC, holding that nothing in the MBTA or § 21.13 prohibited a state from regulating the raising, use, or transportation of captive-reared mallard ducks, and nothing in the AGFC Codes at issue conflicted with the MBTA. Id. at 944^5. Noe appealed the district court’s order of summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In an opinion handed down on August 7, 2006, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court. Noe v. Henderson, 456 F.3d 868 (8th Cir.2006).

In his appeal from the St. Francis County Circuit Court, Noe does not argue (as he did in federal court) that the MBTA, federal statutes, and federal regulations preempt the AGFC Codes. Rather, he argues that the treaties with Great Britain, Mexico, Japan, and Russia preempt the AGFC Codes because each treaty contains an exception specifically authorizing the taking, possessing, and buying or selling of migratory birds for propagating purposes.8 He also argues that the AGFC Codes conflict with the treaties because the treaties do not require citizens of the United States to obtain a permit to propagate, breed, produce, rear, distribute, or release mallard ducks in the United States.

| fiSince McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), it has been accepted that Congress has the constitutional authority to preempt state law. Goforth v. Smith, 338 Ark. 65, 71, 991 S.W.2d 579, 582 (1999). On this issue; the United States Constitution reads as follows:

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Bluebook (online)
2011 Ark. App. 155, 381 S.W.3d 915, 2011 Ark. App. LEXIS 190, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/noe-v-state-arkctapp-2011.