Nodine v. Board of Trustees

44 A.D.2d 764, 354 N.Y.S.2d 248, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5295
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedApril 11, 1974
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 44 A.D.2d 764 (Nodine v. Board of Trustees) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nodine v. Board of Trustees, 44 A.D.2d 764, 354 N.Y.S.2d 248, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5295 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974).

Opinion

— Judgment, insofar as it dismisses the petition, unanimously reversed and matter remitted to Special Term for further proceedings in accordance with memorandum, and judgment, insofar as it dismisses the counterclaim, unanimously modified and counterclaim severed to continue as an action pursuant to section 871 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, all without costs. Memorandum: On the record Special Term had before it conflicting affidavits, purportedly by experts, which arrived at contrary conclusions as to whether a hazardous condition was presented by the service station filling facilities after the modifications. Under the authority of Matter of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Cashmore (4 N V 2d 727) these presented triable issues of fact which required a hearing at Special Term for their resolution, before a determination could be made as to whether the actions of the Village Board of Trustees were arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of O’Brien v. Commissioner of Educ. of State of N. Y., 3 A D 2d 321, app. dsmd. 4 N Y 2d 140, cert. den. sub nom. Murphy v. Commissioner of Educ. of State of N. Y., 361 U. S. 117). We agree with the determination by Special Term that the counterclaim, predicated upon an alleged encroachment on the public highway by gasoline pumps, should be removed from the article 78 proceeding reviewing the board’s determination. This could have been accomplished more appropriately by a severance under CPLR 407 rather than a dismissal, thus avoiding “the nuisance of commencing a new action” [765]*765(3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N. Y. Civ. Prac., par. 3019.03). (Appeals from judgment of Onondaga Special Term in article 78 proceeding.) Present — Witmer, J. P., Moule, Mahoney, Goldman and Del Vecehio, JJ.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
44 A.D.2d 764, 354 N.Y.S.2d 248, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nodine-v-board-of-trustees-nyappdiv-1974.