2026 IL App (1st) 251168-U No. 1-25-1168
Order filed August 28, 2026 Fifth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
SANJA NOBLE, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 23 CH 09267 )
WMC MORTGAGE CORP., U.S. BANK NATIONAL ) Honorable ASSOCIATION, as Trustee for Mastr Asset Backed ) David B. Atkins, Securities Trust 2006-WMC3 Mortgage Pass-Through ) Judge, Presiding. Certificates, Series 2006-WMC3, )
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
JUSTICE ODEN JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Mikva and Wilson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s section 2-1401 (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024)) petition seeking leave to file a third amended complaint where the proposed amendments failed to cure the defect of failing to state a cause of action for quiet title.
¶2 Plaintiff Sanja Noble (Noble) filed a pro se complaint against defendant WMC Mortgage Corp., U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for Mastr Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-
WMC3 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-WMC3 (WMC Mortgage), seeking to quiet title to real estate located at 16338 Emerald Avenue in Harvey, Illinois. That complaint was dismissed on defendant’s motion, as was Noble’s amended complaint. The circuit court denied Noble leave to file a second amended complaint with prejudice. More than 30 days after the circuit court’s final order, Noble sought leave to file a third amended complaint but the circuit court held that it lacked jurisdiction to enter any further orders. Noble then filed a pro se section 2-1401 (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024)) petition to vacate the circuit court’s order finding that it lacked jurisdiction because she did not receive the court’s order denying her leave to file her second amended complaint. The circuit court denied that petition and Noble appeals pro se from the denial of her section 2-1401 petition.
¶3 On appeal, Noble contends that: (1) the circuit court erred in dismissing Noble’s verified complaint to quiet title where the certified record contains no evidence of any valid assignment of the 2006 WMC mortgage after WMC Mortgage withdrew from Illinois in 2008 and later dissolved, and where no defendant established standing as a real party in interest; (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Noble leave to amend her complaint despite newly-presented, record- anchored evidence that would have cured any pleading defects and warranted an evidentiary hearing on standing and chain of title; (3) dismissal and denial of amendment permitted unjust enrichment by allowing SPS to collect payments without proof of authority or standing, contrary to Illinois equity and federal servicing law; and (4) the court’s refusal to adjudicate standing and its disparate treatment of a pro se litigant constituted structural due process violations warranting reversal and targeted remand. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶4 BACKGROUND
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¶5 In May 2006, Noble borrowed $85,500 from WMC Mortgage and the loan was secured by a mortgage recorded in 2006 against real property located at 16338 Emerald Avenue in Harvey, Illinois (the property).
¶6 A pro se verified complaint was filed by the prior plaintiff, SQD Revocable Living Trust (the Trust), on November 6, 2023, alleging that Noble, Trustee of the Trust, owned the property since September 27, 2005. The Trust alleged that it refinanced the property with WMC Mortgage on May 3, 2006, and that there was a note and mortgage recorded on the property by WMC Mortgage on May 26, 2006. The Trust alleged that WMC Mortgage claimed an interest in the property adversely affecting the Trust, which claimed to have “exclusive, complete, actual, open, notorious, hostile, and continuous possession of the property adverse to the defendants for more than 17 years.” Additionally, the Trust alleged that Noble had made and paid for all repairs, upkeep and insurance on the property for more than 17 years but was unable to borrow on the property. The Trust attempted to allege an adverse possession claim and sought to be declared the owner of the property and that WMC Mortgage had no interest in the property. Noble represented the Trust pro se.
¶7 Defendant U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for Mastr Asset Backed Securities Trust 2006-WMC3 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-WMC3 moved to dismiss the Trust’s complaint on three grounds: (1) Noble, who was not an attorney, could not represent the Trust; (2) the Trust could not maintain an adverse possession claim because it was not in possession of the property for 20 years; and (3) the Trust failed to and was required to name Noble, the Trustee of the Trust, as a necessary and indispensable party.
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¶8 In January 2024, the Trust deeded the property to Noble, subject to mortgages and other instruments of record insofar as they may lawfully affect the property. After the deed was recorded, the circuit court granted the Trust leave to substitute Noble as the plaintiff and also granted her leave to file an amended complaint. In her amended complaint, Noble alleged that she refinanced the property with WMC Mortgage and that a note and mortgage were recorded against the property on May 26, 2006. Noble alleged that she called the loan servicer in September 2023 to request the name of the lender on the loan they were servicing for the property. She alleged that to date, she had not received any information validating an entity that SPS was collecting for. Nobel concluded in her quiet title claim that from this, she was entitled to a judicial declaration that she was the 100% owner of the property and she sought to quiet title to the property in her name alone as of the date of the first amended complaint.
¶9 Defendant moved to dismiss Noble’s amended complaint under section 2-619(a)(9) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2022)), arguing that she could not, on the one hand, borrow $85,500 and grant a mortgage to secure payment of the loan, and on the other hand, seek to quiet title to the property when she agreed to take title to the property subject to the mortgage. Defendant argued that the mortgage was not a cloud on title since it was neither unfounded nor inequitable to enforce, and that the Conveyances Act (765 ILCS 5/30 (West 2022)) provided that the mortgage took effect when it was recorded in 2006. Defendant also argued that Noble pointed to no authority that her mortgage was invalid or unenforceable because her loan servicer may not have informed her of the identity of the current owner of the loan and mortgage. Defendant’s counsel provided Noble with documentation regarding the current owner of the loan and mortgage. Defendant further
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maintained that when Noble re-took title to the property in January 2024, she agreed to and took title to the property subject to the mortgage.
¶ 10 The circuit court granted defendant’s motion and dismissed Noble’s amended complaint without prejudice on July 1, 2024. The court reasoned that plaintiff admitted that she entered into the mortgage in 2006 and as recently as January 2024, transferred title on the property expressly subject to any mortgages to herself individually. The court noted that defendant provided all of the information sought by Noble, but found that even if it had not, lack of information on an admittedly valid mortgage was clearly no basis to extinguish it. The court further noted that this was a fact- pleading jurisdiction and as pled Noble had not stated a cause of action for quiet title.
¶ 11 Noble filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied on November 7, 2024, but the circuit court indicated that it had not denied leave to amend. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, alleging that: (1) since filing her first amended complaint, additional facts emerged regarding SPS’s failure to validate its authority as a loan servicer and provide requested documentation; (2) her amended complaint specified the legal bases for her claims, including the quiet title statute and provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations concerning error resolution and request for information from mortgage loan services; (3) her second amended complaint included a breakdown of damages she suffered due to payments made under SPS’s misrepresentations; and (4) her proposed amended pleading incorporated arguments and facts to preemptively address potential defenses. On January 27, 2025, the circuit court denied Noble’s motion with prejudice. Noble did not file a notice of appeal or motion to reconsider within 30 days of that order.
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¶ 12 On March 6, 2025, Noble filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. On March 12, 2025, the circuit court found that it lacked jurisdiction to enter any further orders pursuant to section 2-1203 (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2024)). Noble then filed a section 2-1401 (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024)) petition, arguing that she did not receive the court’s January 27, 2025, order until March 12, 2025. She further argued that the March 12, 2025, order should be vacated because she was “deprived of her constitutional right to due process” and her lack of notice of the court’s January 27, 2025, order constituted a valid legal basis for relief under the statute. Noble asked the circuit court to vacate the March 12, 2025, order so that she could file a motion to reconsider the January 27, 2025, order.
¶ 13 The circuit court denied Noble’s section 2-1401 petition on June 16, 2025. The court’s order stated that there was no basis to grant that relief because Noble raised the same arguments to the merits already repeatedly rejected and the only new argument raised was that Noble did not receive a copy of the January 27, 2025, order. However, the circuit court found that section 2-1401 required due diligence in filing such a claim, which included following the progress of one’s own case. The court noted that section 2-1401 also required a showing of a meritorious claim, which Noble again relied solely on the same arguments raised (and rejected) throughout the case and denied the petition.
¶ 14 Nobel filed a notice of appeal on June 18, 2025. No report of proceedings or certified bystander’s report was filed with the record on appeal.
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 On appeal, Noble contends that: (1) the circuit court erred in dismissing Noble’s verified complaint to quiet title where the certified record contains no evidence of any valid assignment of
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the 2006 WMC mortgage after WMC Mortgage withdrew from Illinois in 2008 and later dissolved, and where no defendant established standing as a real party in interest; (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Noble leave to amend her complaint despite newly-presented, record- anchored evidence that would have cured any pleading defects and warranted an evidentiary hearing on standing and chain of title; (3) dismissal and denial of amendment permitted unjust enrichment by allowing SPS to collect payments without proof of authority or standing, contrary to Illinois equity and federal servicing law; and (4) the court’s refusal to adjudicate standing and its disparate treatment of a pro se litigant constituted structural due process violations warranting reversal and targeted remand.
¶ 17 We initially note that Noble’s issues on appeal include issues related to the dismissal of Noble’s second amended complaint; however, the denial of her section 2-1401 (735 ILCS 5/2- 1401 (West 2024)) petition is the actual order appealed from. Some of Noble’s arguments on appeal relate to the dismissal of her second amended complaint with prejudice, from which she failed to file a timely motion to reconsider or notice of appeal within 30 days of the date of the order in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 303 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). Filing of a timely notice of appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Taylor v. Highline Auto Sales, Inc., 2023 IL App (1st) 221590, ¶ 37. We therefore have no jurisdiction to review such matters as they are not properly before this court. Our review on appeal is therefore confined to review of the denial of Noble’s section 2-1401 petition.
¶ 18 A. Violations of Supreme Court Rule 341
¶ 19 We must first address the failure of Noble’s opening brief to fully conform with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). “The rules of procedure
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concerning appellate briefs are rules and not mere suggestions.” Niewold v. Fry, 306 Ill. App. 3d 735, 737 (1999). The purpose of the rules is to require parties before a reviewing court to present clear and orderly arguments so that the court can properly ascertain and dispose of the issues involved. Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7. A brief that lacks any substantial conformity to the pertinent supreme court rules may justifiably be stricken. Hall, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7.
¶ 20 Here, Noble’s brief is deficient in many ways.
¶ 21 Noble’s brief does not contain a proper summary statement or introductory paragraph as required by Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(1). Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(1) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Additionally, Noble’s brief violates supreme court rules 341(h)(2) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which requires an introductory paragraph that includes the nature of the action and of the judgment appealed from and whether the judgment was based upon the verdict or a jury and whether any question is raised on the pleadings.
¶ 22 Rule 341(h)(6) requires a statement of facts that contain the facts “necessary to an understanding of the case.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). While Noble’s brief contains a section captioned “material facts,” it does not contain any facts related to the procedural history of the case.
¶ 23 Rule 341(h)(7) requires that an appellant’s brief must contain contentions and the reasons in support, with citations to the authorities upon which Noble relies. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Noble’s brief contains only conclusory statements for those issues she chose to address, but no argument directly related to the denial of her section 2-1401 petition. Her arguments are mostly related to the dismissal of her amended complaint. A reviewing court is
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entitled to the benefit of clearly defined issues with pertinent authority cited and a cohesive legal argument. Wing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶11. Arguments that are unsupported by citation do not meet the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7) and are procedurally defaulted. Wing, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶11. We also note that Noble’s brief contains a “hallucinated” citation on page 10, which occurs when AI-generated responses are used and not verified. See In re Baby Boy, 2025 IL App (4th) 241427, ¶¶ 102-105. She cites Ferguson v. Georges, 389 Ill. App. 3d 543, 553-54 (2010) to state the standard of review for the circuit court’s denial of leave to amend. However, our research has determined that the citation is actually contained within People v. Mott, 389 Ill. App. 3d 539 (2009) and does not address the standard of review relied on.
¶ 24 An appellant’s pro se status does not alleviate the duty to comply with our supreme court rules governing appellate procedure. Wing, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 7. It is well settled that this court is not required to search the record to determine what legal issues are involved in an appeal. Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (2001). Although a pro se appellant’s deficient brief does not affect our jurisdiction to consider an appeal, when the procedural violations interfere with our review of issues, we may exercise our discretion and strike a brief for failure to comply with the rules. Wing, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11.
¶ 25 However, along with these general rules, this court has held that we may entertain an appeal as long as we can understand the issues an appellant intends to raise and especially where we have the benefit of a cogent brief from the other party. Twardowski, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 511. Here, as we have found, plaintiff’s brief clearly violates Rule 341 in many respects. However, WMC Mortgage has filed a brief and it is clear from the circuit court’s order what the subject matter of
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this appeal is. Thus, we decline to strike plaintiff’s brief and will not dismiss the appeal. That being said, we will not consider any inappropriate matters or unsupported assertions contained in Noble’s brief because mere contentions, without argument or citation of authority, do not merit consideration on appeal. Progressive Universal Insurance Company of Illinois v. Taylor, 375 Ill. App. 3d 495, 501-02 (2007).
¶ 26 Additionally, as noted above, Noble failed to file a report of proceedings or certified bystander's report. It is the duty of every appellant in a reviewing court to provide a sufficient record to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record, the reviewing court will presume that the trial court's order was in conformity with established legal principles and had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). In the absence of a proper record, a reviewing court may dismiss the appeal, or alternately, summarily affirm the judgment of the trial court. Marx Transport, Inc. v. Air Express International Corp., 379 Ill. App. 3d 849, 853 (2008). However, the failure to present a report of proceedings does not require automatic dismissal or affirmance where the issues can be resolved on the record as it stands. Marx Transport, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 853.
¶ 27 We find that dismissal or summary affirmance is not necessary in this case as the issues on appeal can be resolved on the record, and we proceed to address the issues raised by plaintiff on appeal.
¶ 28 B. Denial of Noble’s Section 2-1401 Petition (Issues 1-3)
¶ 29 As stated above, this appeal is before us on the denial of Noble’s section 2-1401 (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024)) petition challenging the circuit court’s denial of leave to amend the underlying complaint for the second time. Noble argues that she sought to amend the complaint to
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add curative facts and exhibits: SPS’s written responses and communications evidencing an inability to validate authority and her sworn affidavit of no assignment. Noble asserts that such material directly addressed any perceived pleading deficiencies by (1) identifying the absence of any assignment from WMC, (2) demonstrating SPS’s lack of validation, and (3) alleging concrete damages and ongoing impairment of title. Noble concludes that denying leave to amend under those circumstances, particularly as to a pro se litigant, was an abuse of discretion and the proper remedy is reversal and remand with directions to grant leave to amend.
¶ 30 On appeal, we review the judgment, not the reasoning of the circuit court, and we may affirm on any grounds in the record, regardless of whether the circuit court relied on those grounds. Couglan v. Beck, 2013 IL App (1st) 120891, ¶ 24. Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024)) provides a comprehensive procedure by which final orders, judgments, and decrees may be vacated after 30 days from the entry thereof. The filing of a section 2-1401 petition is considered a new proceeding, not a continuation of the old one. City of Rockford v. Gilles, 2022 IL App (2d) 210521, ¶ 55.
¶ 31 The standard of review for a dismissed section 2-1401 petition turns on whether the petition presents a purely legal challenge or whether it is fact- dependent. Warrant Conservation District v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 31. Where a section 2-1401 petition presents a purely legal challenge, the order on the petition is reviewed de novo. Id. Where the petition raises a fact- dependent challenge, the petition must set forth factual allegations supporting each of the following elements: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense (or claim); (2) due diligence in presenting this defense; and (3) due diligence in filing the section 2-1401 petition for relief. Id. ¶
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51. The circuit court’s ultimate decision on a fact-dependent petition is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
¶ 32 In this case, Noble’s section 2-1401 petition was filed after she failed to file either a motion to reconsider or appeal within 30 days of the January 27, 2025, order denying her leave to file a second amended complaint with prejudice. Noble’s petition sought leave to reconsider the filing of a second amended complaint with curative facts and exhibits, which raises a legal challenge as to whether the proposed amendments to the complaint stated a cause of action as a matter of law. Accordingly, our review is de novo.
¶ 33 Section 2-616(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 2024)) provides that at any time before final judgment, amendments may be allowed on just and reasonable terms. Although courts in Illinois are encouraged to freely and liberally allow the amendment of pleadings, the right to amend is not absolute and unlimited. In re Marriage of Lyman, 2015 IL App (1st) 132832, ¶ 51. Whether to allow an amendment of a complaint is a matter within the discretion of a trial court, and we review a court’s denial of leave to amend under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend, Illinois courts must determine “(1) whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; (2) whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; (3) whether the proposed amendment is timely; and (4) whether previous opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified.” Loyola Academy v. S & S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 273 (1992). The plaintiff must meet all four factors, and if the proposed amendment does not state a cognizable claim, and thus fails the first factor, courts of review will often not proceed with
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further analysis. Marriage of Lyman, 2015 IL App (1st) 132832, ¶ 51. Where it is apparent even after amendment that no cause of action can be stated, leave to amend should be denied. Id.
¶ 34 Here, Noble sought leave to file a second amended complaint to quiet title. As noted above, she states that she wished to “add curative facts and exhibits: SPS’s written responses and communications evidencing an inability to validate authority and her sworn affidavit of no assignment.” She contends that such material directly addressed any perceived pleading deficiencies by (1) identifying the absence of any assignment from WMC, (2) demonstrating SPS’s lack of validation, and (3) alleging concrete damages and ongoing impairment of title.
¶ 35 An action to quiet title in property is an equitable proceeding in which a party seeks to remove a cloud on his title to the property. Hoch v. Boehme, 2013 IL App (2d) 120664, ¶ 41. A cloud on title is the semblance of title, either legal or equitable, appearing in some legal form but which is, in fact, unfounded or which it would be inequitable to enforce. Id. To prevail in an action to quiet title, the plaintiff must actually have title, though it need not be perfect. Id. The plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title rather than on defects in the defendant’s title. Id. Any instrument or proceedings in writing appearing of record and casting a doubt on the validity of the record title constitutes a cloud on title. Allensworth v. First Galesburg National Bank & Trust Co., 7 Ill. App. 2d 1, 4 (1955). A suit to quiet title generally applies only to instruments or other proceedings in writing which appear of record and cast doubt on the validity of the record title. Kile v. Swiney, 413 Ill. 350, 354 (1952). A valid property interest does not constitute a cloud on title. Illinois District of American Turners, Inc. v. Rieger, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1072 (2002).
¶ 36 Applying the first Loyola factor, whether the proposed amendment would cure a defective pleading, we find that Noble’s proposed curative facts and exhibits would not have cured the
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defective pleading. Noble’s verified complaint admits that she executed a mortgage with WMC Mortgage on May 3, 2006, which is not negated by whether or not there was a valid assignment of the mortgage recorded for the property. The proposed amended complaint does not allege specific violation of the statutes relevant to her requested relief, namely the Conveyances Act (765 ILCS 5/28 (West 2024)) and the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act (735 ILCS 5/15-1207). She does not allege any facts indicating that the mortgage that she executed was somehow invalid, unenforceable, or that it did not create a valid security interest in the property. Nor does Noble’s complaint set forth any facts to support her claim that there was no valid assignment. The supporting documentation provided indicated only that the information Noble sought was housed with a third party. Therefore, Noble’s verified complaint, even with the proposed “curative facts and exhibits,” would not state a cause of action to quiet title as a matter of law.
¶ 37 As such, Noble has not established that her proposed amendment would have cured the defects in her verified complaint. Because Noble cannot satisfy the first Loyola factor, we need not examine this issue further, including her arguments regarding lack of standing or authority of SPS to service the valid mortgage. Marriage of Lyman, 2015 IL App (1st) 132832, ¶ 51. Accordingly, we conclude that Noble’s section 2-1401 petition seeking leave to file a second amended complaint was properly denied.
¶ 38 C. Noble’s Pro Se Status
¶ 39 Although our determination above disposes of Noble’s appeal, we pause for a moment to address Noble’s argument that the circuit court’s refusal to adjudicate the issues raised in her complaint denied her a fair hearing and constituted a structural due process violation against a pro se litigant. This argument is without merit. The record indicates that Noble’s second amended
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complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Pro se litigants are presumed to have full knowledge of applicable court rules and procedures and must comply with the same rules and procedures as would be required of litigants represented by attorneys. In re Estate of Pellico, 394 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2009) (citing Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 528 (2001)). A party’s pro se status does not entitle them to more leniency.
¶ 40 Nevertheless, the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.2, Comment [4] states, “It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations, consistent with the law and court rules, to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.” However, “reasonable accommodations” is not the same as leniency and does not permit lax application of the rules. A court cannot overlook a plaintiff’s failure to state a claim properly. Defendants are entitled to notice of the claims against them, and the court must have a sufficient basis to assess the claim’s legal merits. When, as here, the complaint fails to articulate a valid claim, the case cannot proceed. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the circuit court denied Noble as a pro se litigant a fair opportunity to present her claims or violated her rights to due process.
¶ 41 Having disposed of Noble’s due process and unjust enrichment claims on other grounds, we will not address defendant’s claims of waiver.
¶ 42 CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 44 Affirmed.