No.

Colorado Attorney General Reports·Decided October 9, 1992·Published

Opinion

Steven V. Berson Executive Director Department of Regulatory Agencies 1560 Broadway, Suite 1550 Denver, Colorado 80202

Dear Mr. Berson:

This responds to your September 18, 1992 letter requesting an interpretation of § 11-30-103(2), C.R.S. (1992). Financial Services Commissioner David Paul (hereinafter "Commissioner Paul") has conditionally approved an application by Lowry Federal Credit Union (hereinafter "Lowry") to convert from a federally-chartered to a state-chartered credit union with a field of membership consisting of its current membership and the City of Aurora, Colorado, with some exclusions.1 You have inquired whether § 11-30-103(2) permits such a state charter to be issued. This opinion reflects an analysis of the statutory and other legal questions you have raised. As we discuss below, setting aside public policy and business concerns, this opinion relies on relevant statutory language, case law and legislative history. Our opinion was not based on, nor does it take a position concerning, the desirability of community based credit unions at issue here.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND CONCLUSIONS

Your request for an Attorney General's opinion presents the following questions:

1. Do the provisions of § 11-30-103(2), C.R.S. (1992) permit a credit union to be granted a state charter if the field of membership is the residents of the City of Aurora, Colorado, with the specific exclusions ordered by Commissioner Paul?

No.

2. If § 11-30-103(2), C.R.S. (1992) permits a credit union with the field of membership as approved by Commissioner Paul, does the Banking Board have jurisdiction pursuant to state law to seek injunctive relief against Lowry to prohibit it from operating as a bank without a charter?

This question is conditioned upon an affirmative answer to Question No. 1. Since this opinion has answered Question No. 1 in the negative, a response to this question is unnecessary.

ANALYSIS

Section 11-30-103(2), C.R.S. (1992), provides, in pertinent part:

(2) Credit union organization and membership, other than those of a central credit union, shall be limited to groups having a common bond of employment or association or groups which reside within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district having a population of no more than twenty-five thousand or as otherwise authorized by the commissioner. . . .

The language of § 11-30-103(2) describes two types of groups which qualify for credit union membership: (1) groups having a common bond of employment and association; or (2) groups which reside within a well-defined neighborhood, community or rural district having a population of no more than 25,000 or as otherwise authorized by the commissioner.

A well-established canon of statutory construction is that a statute is passed as a whole, not in parts or sections, and is guided by a general purpose and intent. Each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section to produce a harmonious whole. See PeoplesBank v. Banking Board, 436 P.2d 681 (Colo. 1968); Bynumv. Kautzky, 784 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1988).

The inquiry in this matter must focus on the meaning of the words ". . . having a population of twenty-five thousand or as otherwise authorized by the commissioner." It is clear that §11-30-103(2) gives the Financial Services Commissioner discretion to approve a field of membership for a geographic community which exceeds 25,000 in population. The next question is whether the commissioner's authority is unlimited.

If the phrase "or as otherwise authorized by the commissioner" is interpreted to give the commissioner authority to approve neighborhoods, communities and rural districts of any population size whatsoever for credit union membership, then the preceding phrase, "having a population of no more than twenty-five thousand," is superfluous and meaningless. A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions and no part is rendered inoperative or superfluous. SeeIn Re Estate of David v. Snelson, 776 P.2d 813 (Colo. 1989). If the language of a statute may be interpreted in two ways, one which will carry out and the other defeat the general purpose and intent of the whole act, then it should receive the interpretation which will further the general purpose and intent. See Ragsdale Brothers Roofing, Inc. v.United Bank of Denver, 744 P.2d 750 (Colo.App. 1987). "[The court's] primary task in interpreting a statute is to give it a construction and interpretation that will render it effective in accomplishing the purpose for which it was enacted." CivilService Commission v. Pinder, 812 P.2d 645, 648 (Colo. 1991).

In order to determine the general purpose and intent of a statute, a court may review background information about circumstances leading up to the enactment of the statute, events surrounding the enactment, and developments pertinent to subsequent operation of the statute. Singer, SutherlandStatutory Construction 5th Ed., § 48.01 (1992). In the matter at hand, a review of the nature and history of credit unions is warranted.

A credit union is a democratically controlled, cooperative, nonprofit society organized for the purpose of encouraging thrift and self-reliance among its members by creating a source of credit at a fair and reasonable rate of interest in order to improve the economic and social conditions of its members. A credit union is fundamentally distinguishable from other financial institutions in that the customers may exercise effective control.

La Caisse Populaire Sante Marie v. United States,563 F.2d 505, 509 (1st Cir. 1977).

One of the traditional indicia of a credit union is the "common bond" requirement. La Caisse Populaire Sante Marie,supra at 508. The purpose of this requirement is evident from the nature of credit unions:

The union's purposes are threatened by directors that are unmindful of members' funds or unresponsive to their collective interests. Thus, Congress ensured that federal credit unions would retain their character as self-managed cooperatives by establishing democratic principles of decision and control. The common bond provision reinforces this aim by advancing the formation of credit unions among groups that may realistically operate with unity of purpose. It encourages the election of directors who possess a common interest or occupation with the membership they serve.

Branch Bank Trust Co. v.

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Related

Bowman v. Eldher
369 P.2d 977 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1962)
Estate of David v. Snelson
776 P.2d 813 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1989)
Peoples Bank v. Banking Board
436 P.2d 681 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1968)
Civil Service Commission v. Pinder
812 P.2d 645 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1991)
Ragsdale Bros. Roofing, Inc. v. United Bank of Denver, N.A.
744 P.2d 750 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1987)
Shimmel v. People
121 P.2d 491 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1942)
Bynum v. Kautzky
784 P.2d 735 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1989)