NLMA v. NSPC, JH Jackson

2010 DNH 080P

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: May 6, 2010
• Docket: CV-09-290-JM
• Status: Published

Opinion

NLMA v . NSPC, JH Jackson CV-09-290-JM 05/06/10 P UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Northeastern Lumber Manufacturers Assoc.

v. Civil N o . 09-cv-290-JM Opinion N o . 2010 DNH 080P Northern States Pallet Company, Inc. and James H . Jackson

O R D E R

Plaintiff Northeastern Lumber Manufacturers Association

(“NeLMA”) is a trade association that certifies the grade and

quality of lumber and whether lumber used in wood packaging

materials has been treated according to industry standards

governing the control of wood-borne insects and plant-based

diseases. Defendants Northern States Pallet Company, Inc.

(“Northern States”) and its president, James H . Jackson

(“Jackson”), were engaged in the sale, service and removal of

wood pallets used in shipping both domestically and overseas. In

this action, NeLMA alleges defendants misappropriated a

certification stamp and used it to mark untreated lumber as

actually comporting with industry safety standards. Before the court is NeLMA’s motion for partial summary judgment on counts

one, two and three, which assert claims of trademark infringement

and unfair competition in violation of The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1501, et seq. (“the Lanham Act”), and the New Hampshire

Consumer Protection Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Ch. 358-A (“CPA”).

Document n o . 3 8 . Defendants object, contending NeLMA does not

have viable trademark claims or unfair competition claims because

its registered marks cover lumber, not wood packaging materials

(“WPM”) like the pallets defendants used, and NeLMA has not

controlled the use of the marks in its certification programs.

For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s motion is denied in

part and granted in part.

Discussion

1. Uncontested Facts

NeLMA is accredited by the American Lumber Standards

Committee (“ALSC”) to provide inspection services to facilities

that manufacture timber, lumber and wood packaging materials, and

has been engaged in this type of work since at least 2002. See

Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., 9/4/09 Easterling Aff. (document n o .

12.4) (“Easterling Aff.”), ¶ 8 . NeLMA owns trademarks which it

promotes as certifying to both the industry and the public that

2 lumber used in WPM complies with national and international

standards. See Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts (document n o .

38.3) (“Pl.’s Facts”), ¶¶ 3-4. NeLMA owns two marks: N o .

2731831 (the “831 mark”), registered on July 1 , 2003; and N o .

3061638 (the “638 mark”), registered on February 2 8 , 2006. See

Pl.’s Facts, ¶ 1.1 The registration forms for both marks state:

“The certification mark, as used by authorized persons, certifies

the quality level of the grade of lumber on which it is placed.”

See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Facts (document n o . 40.2) (“Defs.’

Resp.”) at 6 (quoting Defs.’ Mot. to Supp. O b j . to Pl.’s Mot. for

Expedited Relief, Ex. 2 (9/30/09 Aff. of Jeffrey L . Snow)

(document n o . 23-2)) (“9/30/09 Snow Aff.”), ¶¶ 1 & 2 (attaching

copies of the marks’ registrations with the U.S. Patent and

Trademark Office (“PTO”)). The registrations also state that the

marks are for “Lumber, in Class A,” with the 831 mark stating its

“First Use In Commerce [was] 2-1-1971,” and the 638 mark’s “First

Use In Commerce [was] 5-1-2004.” See id.

NeLMA enforces two distinct certification programs: one for

softwood lumber products and one for wood packaging materials.

1 The 831 mark is NeLMA’s logo, which depicts three trees growing out of the word NeLMA, inside a circle. The 638 mark is simply the word “NeLMA” in bold, block letters. See Easterling Aff., Ex. A .

3 With respect to the softwood lumber products, NeLMA is authorized

by ALSC to issue to lumber and timber manufacturers stamps that

are used to reflect the grade of the wood based on preset

industry standards for quality and size.2 NeLMA provides

instruction, supervision and technical information about grading

to lumber and timber manufacturers throughout the Northeastern

and Great Lakes regions of the United States, who agree to

regular inspections by NeLMA to ensure the grading standards are

being followed. See 9/30/09 Snow Aff., ¶ 3 (attaching article on

lumber grading from NeLMA’s website).

With respect to wood packaging materials, NeLMA inspects the

facilities that produce WPM to ensure they are following certain

international safety standards that are designed to reduce the

phytosanitary3 problems caused by the spread of wood-borne

insects and diseases through WPM used in global trade. NeLMA’s

2 The standards are known as Voluntary Product Standards that are set by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (“NIST”), an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. See 9/30/09 Snow Aff., ¶ 3 (attaching an article posted on NeMLA’s website). Lumber must comply with PS 20-05. See id. 3 Phytosanitary is derived from two Greek words, phyto meaning plant and sanitary, meaning clean. Phytosanitary certification is required by many countries for the import and export of nonprocessed, plant and agricultural products. See http://ask.reference.com/related/Phytosanitary+Certificate?

4 inspection program follows the “International Standard for

Phytosanitary Measures (“ISPM”) - Guidelines for Regulating Wood

Packaging Material in International Trade.”4 See id., ¶ 4

(attaching article on WPM inspection from NeLMA’s website); see

also Pl.’s Facts, ¶¶ 7-8. ISPM 15 requires all lumber used in

WPM to be treated either by a heat process or a chemical

fumigation process. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. NeLMA certification indicates

that lumber was heat treated, not chemically treated. Id. ¶ 1 1 ;

see also 9/30/09 Snow Aff. ¶ 4 (attaching web pages). ALSC-

accredited inspection agencies like NeLMA examine the facilities

using WPM and certify that the facilities are following IPSM 1 5 .

Once certified, each facility gets its own IPPC stamp that

includes the IPPC logo, the facility’s unique number, and the

logo of the certifying agency, such as NeLMA. See id.

Heat treatment of lumber is a two-step process. See id. At

the first step, each piece of heat-treated lumber is marked with

an “HT” stamp and an ALSC-accredited inspection certification

stamp, like NeLMA’s logo. Then the certified facility uses the

heat-treated lumber to manufacture finished WPM, such as pallets,

4 These standards were developed at the International Plant Protection Convention (“IPPC”) in March 2002 and have been adopted by more than 150 participating countries.

5 skids, crates or boxes. See id.; see also Pl.’s Facts ¶ 12-16.

The cut pieces of the heat-treated lumber do not each need to be

stamped, but the finished WPM item must display its certification

stamps on at least two opposite sides, clearly visible to customs

officials and signifying to them that the item complies with ISPM

15. Id. ¶ 1 7 ; see also 9/30/09 Snow Aff. ¶ 4 (attaching NeLMA’s

web pages).

The NeLMA logo is a valuable asset to the certified facility

using i t , because it is widely accepted as a sign of quality

assurance. See Pl.’s Facts, ¶¶ 18-19. Defendants were neither

certified by NeLMA nor authorized to use NeLMA’s marks, yet

Jackson admitted to having used a NeLMA stamp in his business

from 2006 until NeLMA discovered that unauthorized use in the

summer of 2009. Id. ¶¶ 2 0 , 25-27, 29 & 31-32. Northern States

sold new and recycled pallets and skids, with the type of heat-

treated pallets at issue here representing about 5% of its annual

business. See Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File Response, Att. 3 ,

8/31/09 Aff. of James H . Jackson (document n o . 7.3) (“Jackson

Aff.”), ¶¶ 4 & 5 . In 2006, another company, Index Packaging,

Inc. (“Index Packaging”), which was a facility certified by NeLMA

to heat-treat WPM, delivered some pallets to Northern States.

6 Jackson found Index Packaging’s NeLMA-issued stamp on a trailer

and took i t , in order to stamp Northern States’ wooden pallets,

despite knowing that Northern States was not certified and was

not following ISPM 1 5 . See id. ¶¶ 20-25, 2 7 , 2 9 , 31-32. Jackson

understood that using a NeLMA stamp created the misimpression

that Northern States’ WPM had been heat treated, and he also

understood the environmental risks that his noncompliance with

ISPM 15 created. See id. ¶¶ 28-33.

NeLMA’s certification program involves regular inspection of

certified facilities, including their equipment and inventory,

yet NeLMA did not realize that Index Packaging’s stamp was

missing for nearly three years before it was returned on August

1 9 , 2009. See Jackson Aff. ¶ 8 ; see also Defs.’ Resp., Ex. 1

(document n o . 4 0 . 3 ) . After returning the Index Packaging stamp,

Northern States had no other certification stamp or any other

stamp resembling plaintiff’s marks at issue here. Northern

States also has depleted its inventory of all the wooden pallets

that bore the Index Packaging stamp with NeLMA’s mark. See id.

¶¶ 8-9.

2. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings,

7 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A genuine issue is one “that properly can be resolved

only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved

in favor of either party,” Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 2 4 2 , 250 (1986), and a material fact is one “that might

affect the outcome of the suit.” Id. at 248. The evidence and

all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom must be construed in

the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Navarro v . Pfizer

Corp., 261 F.3d 9 0 , 94 (1st Cir. 2001); Suarez v . Pueblo Int’l,

Inc., 229 F.3d 4 9 , 53 (1st Cir. 2000).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7 , 323

(1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden

shifts to the nonmovant to “produce evidence on which a

reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate proof burden,

could base a verdict for i t ; if that party cannot produce such

evidence, the motion must be granted.” Ayala-Gerena v . Bristol

8 Myers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 8 6 , 94 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Celotex,

477 U.S. at 323 and Anderson 477 U.S. at 2 4 9 ) . Neither

conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, nor unsupported

speculation are sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See

Carroll v . Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 2 3 1 , 236-37 (1st Cir. 2002); see

also Price v . Canadian Airlines, 429 F. Supp. 2d 459, 461 (D.N.H.

2006).

3. Default Judgment against Northern States

On April 1 6 , 2010, default judgment was entered by the court

against Northern States. See Document n o . 4 8 ; see also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 5 5 . Plaintiff’s claims remain only against Jackson and

shall be analyzed accordingly.

4. Lanham Act Trademark Infringement & Unfair Competition

Plaintiff argues it is entitled to summary judgment on both

counts one and two because Jackson’s admissions demonstrate there

is no genuine dispute that he knowingly misused NeLMA’s marks to

misrepresent that his pallets had been heat-treated in compliance

with ISPM 1 5 . In Count I , plaintiff alleges Jackson’s repeated,

unauthorized use of its marks constituted trademark infringement,

9 in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 5 In Count I I , plaintiff

alleges he is also liable under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 for unfair

competition, because he misrepresented and falsely designated the

origin of certain pallets by passing them off as having been

heat-treated in compliance with ISPM 15 when they had not been.6

Plaintiff also asserts that Jackson’s deliberate misuse of

NeLMA’s marks has destroyed its goodwill and value, entitling it

5 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (West 2009) provides, in relevant part: “Any person who shall, without consent of the registrant, (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, [or] distribution . . . of any goods or services . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction . . . to . . . packages. . . intended to be used in commerce. . . which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.” 6 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (West 2009) provides: “Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”

10 to injunctive relief and treble damages under 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1116(d) & 1117(b).

Plaintiff only argues the facts, not citing any cases to

support its position. Jackson does not dispute that he marked

Northern States’ pallets with the Index Packaging-NeLMA stamp,

knowing that the pallets had not been certified by NeLMA and had

not otherwise complied with the heat-treatment requirements of

ISPM 1 5 . He also concedes that he shipped those mislabeled

pallets into the stream of commerce, understanding that customers

and government officials would think the pallets complied with

ISPM 15 and were pest-free. But Jackson asserts this conduct did

not violate either § 1114 or § 1125. Jackson makes two arguments

in support of this position.

First, he argues that NeLMA’s marks do not cover WPM, but

instead are limited to lumber. Jackson contends that because the

misused stamp bore NeLMA’s mark for the quality and grade of

lumber, not for WPM compliance with ISPM 1 5 , his use of the stamp

on pallets did not infringe, misappropriate, devalue or otherwise

misuse NeLMA’s marks in violation of the Lanham Act. Jackson

asserts that the separate certification programs for lumber and

WPM, including both the distinct governing standards and the

11 different overseeing agencies, demonstrate that NeLMA’s marks at

issue here would not confuse, deceive or cause mistake in the

minds of the relevant public about the quality or origins of his

pallets. As Jackson explains: “NeLMA and the relevant industry

treat lumber and wood packaging materials such as pallets as

separate products and distinguish between the certification

programs for them.” Defs.’ O b j . to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ.

J. (document n o . 40) (“Defs.’ Obj.”) at 3 (emphasis in original).

Second, Jackson argues that his misuse of Index Packaging’s

stamp did not violate the Lanham Act because NeLMA has not

adequately policed its marks or enforced its ISPM certification

program. Because NeLMA did not even realize defendants had the

stamp for nearly three years, Jackson contends NeLMA cannot claim

its certification program was violated, misrepresented or

devalued when NeLMA was not itself effectively overseeing i t .

Likelihood of confusion is the critical issue in both

plaintiff’s trademark infringement and its unfair competition

claims. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v . Caught-On-Bleu, Inc., 288 F.

Supp. 2d 105, 113 (D.N.H. 2003) (citing authority), aff’d, 105

Fed. Appx. 285 (1st Cir. 2004). “The Act protects both the

public and the owner of a trademark by ‘preventing the use of the

12 same or similar marks in a way that confuses the public about the

actual source of the goods or service.’” Id. (quoting Star Fin.

Servs. v . Aastar Mortgage Corp., 89 F.3d 5 , 9 (1st Cir. 1996)).

To prevail, plaintiff must establish (1) that it uses the marks

and so “owns” them, (2) that defendants used the same or similar

marks, and (3) that defendants’ use is likely to confuse the

public and harm plaintiff as a result. See id. at 113-14. The

facts clearly establish that plaintiff owns its marks and that

defendant used them. The critical question on summary judgment,

therefore, is whether Jackson’s use of the marks caused the

requisite confusion.

Whether Jackson’s use of the Index Packaging stamp caused

confusion to NeLMA’s detriment is a question of fact, considering

the following eight factors: “‘(1) the similarity of the marks;

(2) the similarity of the goods; (3) the relationship between the

parties’ channels of trade; (4) the relationship between the

parties’ advertising; (5) the classes of prospective purchasers;

(6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) the defendant’s intent in

adopting the mark; and (8) the strength of the plaintiff’s

mark.’” Id. at 114 (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v .

Wheeler, 814 F.2d 8 1 2 , 817 (1st Cir. 1987). Assessing the record

13 against these factors demonstrates that plaintiff has not carried

its burden of proving its marks were infringed. While certain

factors, such as the similarity of the marks, the defendant’s

intent and the strength of plaintiff’s mark point toward finding

Jackson’s use of Index Packaging’s stamp was deliberately done to

cause the relevant public of potential customs officials and

buyers to believe his pallets complied with ISPM 1 5 , there remain

genuine questions about what NeLMA’s marks in fact covered that

are not answered by the evidence before the court.

As an initial matter, nowhere in the record is there any

depiction of the Index Packaging stamp that Jackson used to

demonstrate how NeLMA’s marks were misused. The record indicates

that certified facilities are issued a stamp which has three

parts to i t : the IPPC logo, the facility’s unique number, and

the certifying agency’s stamp, NeLMA’s here. What that stamp

looks like and which of NeLMA’s marks is part of the stamp is

completely unclear. Are the three component parts together on

one stamp, which tri-part stamp is then branded onto two sides of

the WPM to certify that it comports with ISPM 15 standards? Or

does the WPM just have to show all three marks somewhere on two

separate sides, so that a NeLMA-marked piece of cut-up lumber is

14 sufficient to show ISPM 15 compliance? The record suggests that

the certification stamp for ISPM 15 compliance requires all three

parts, as well as the letters “HT” branded onto the wood. Based

on my understanding of the current record, NeLMA’s logo alone

would not communicate that the WPM complied with ISPM 1 5 .

Second, the registration forms for both the 831 mark and the

638 mark state that, “The certification mark, as used by

authorized persons, certifies the quality level of the grade of

lumber on which it is placed.” See 9/30/09 Snow Aff., ¶¶ 1 & 2 .

The registrations also state that the marks are for “Lumber, in

Class A , . . ..” Id. Certification marks work as a seal of

approval of the mode of manufacture, the quality of the goods or

some other characteristic of goods or services. See 3 R.

Callmann, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and

Monopolies, 4th ed. (West 2009) (“Callmann”) § 17:18; see also 3

J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair

Competition, 4th ed. (West 2009) (“McCarthy”) §§ 19:90-91

(describing certification marks). NeLMA asserts that its

certification programs work to preserve certain standards of

quality in the lumber industry, and it has a well-established

reputation that its marks guarantee a certain level of quality.

15 While that very well may be true, and Jackson’s use of the Index

Packaging stamp that incorporated NeLMA’s logo substantiates that

assertion, the record is entirely unclear about the meaning of

the “quality level of the grade of lumber.” Does quality level

mean that the lumber comports with PS 20-05, or does quality

level mean that the lumber complies with the processes required

by ISPM 1 5 , or does it mean both? Lumber is obviously the

primary component of wood packaging materials, so certification

of the lumber could designate certification of the WPM, see 3

McCarthy § 19:92.50; however, the “grade” of lumber designated by

NeLMA’s marks does not necessarily mean that it has been heat-

treated in accordance with ISPM 1 5 , as NeLMA’s inspection program

certifies. Based on the record before m e , the 831 and 638 marks

themselves do not communicate any clear message about compliance

with international phytosanitary standards.

There are genuine issues of material fact about what

Jackson’s use of Index Packaging’s stamp actually said to the

relevant public. Jackson contends NeLMA is primarily involved in

the lumber industry, as reflected by the registration statements

of both the 831 and the 638 marks, so his use of the Index

Packaging stamp on his WPM pallets did not cause any confusion.

16 But NeLMA describes its business a s :

NeLMA’s signature service includes extensive up-to-date communications regarding the global implementation of [ISPM 1 5 ] . An easy reference summary of the latest information, in table format for each country, is provided on a regular basis and available online 24/7 to our customers. This valuable information tool is also available by subscription to others interested in staying abreast with the latest global wood packaging requirements.. . . In addition, the NeLMA staff is available upon request to present the details of the [ISPM 15 packaging standard] and the NeLMA Inspection Program to company personnel as a valuable service to potential customers or industry groups.

9/30/09 Snow Aff., ¶ 4 (attaching pages from website). This

evidence demonstrates that NeLMA considers its primary service as

helping enforce ISPM 1 5 , not regulating the American lumber

industry as Jackson proffers. How NeLMA uses its marks to

signify its ISPM 15 inspection service as compared to its PS 20-

05 inspection service is not clear. Maybe the marks indicate

compliance with both standards. In any event, NeLMA has not made

the requisite showing of clearly demonstrating what the 831 mark

or the 638 mark represent. See 3 McCarthy § 19:93 (requiring

that registered certification marks symbolize a designated

service).

These unanswered questions require me to deny plaintiff’s

17 motion for summary judgment on its Lanham Act claims against

Jackson. This denial does not mean Jackson did not violate the

Lanham Act; it simply means that plaintiff has not shown that the

record leads to the single conclusion that Jackson’s use of the

Index Packaging stamp infringed its marks in violation of 15

U.S.C. §§ 1114 & 1125. Genuine issues of material fact remain

about what NeLMA’s marks actually convey to the relevant public.

See id. §§ 19:91 & 19:92.50.

5. N.H. Consumer Protection Act Claim

In Count I I I , NeLMA alleges that Jackson’s unauthorized use

of its marks in his packaging business was a deceptive business

practice in violation of the CPA. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

(“RSA”) 358-A:1, et seq. (West 2009). NeLMA further asserts

Jackson’s deceptive practices were willful and knowing, entitling

it to the full panoply of damages available under the CPA.

Jackson argues NeLMA’s CPA claims are merely a restatement of its

Lanham Act claims and therefore should be summarily denied for

the same reasons its Lanham Act claims should b e , or at least

genuine issues of material fact preclude a decision at this time.

Jackson also argues that he cannot be held individually liable

because the facts do not justify applying the corporate veil

18 piercing doctrine, citing Unit Owners Ass’n of Summit Vista Lot 8

Condo. v . Miller, 141 N.H. 3 9 , 677 A.2d 138 (1996). Plaintiff

counters that Unit Owners dictates the corporate veil of Northern

States in fact can be pierced to hold Jackson personally liable,

but also that Jackson should be held directly liable for

violating the CPA.

Two issues may be quickly resolved. First, since default

judgment has been entered against Northern States, see section 3 ,

supra, it is liable on the CPA claims against i t . Second, the

doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is inapposite here. The

CPA applies to individuals, enabling NeLMA to assert its claims

directly against Jackson. See RSA 358-A:1, I (defining “Person”

to include natural persons in addition to various business

entities); see also Unit Owners Ass’n, 141 N.H. at 4 4 , 677 A.2d

at 141 (emphasizing that the person liable under the CPA is the

unlawful actor); Pacamor Bearings v . Minebea Co., 918 F. Supp.

491, 499 (D.N.H. 1996) (citing precedent for allowing “both

natural persons and corporations [to] avail themselves of the

protections and remedies afforded by the [CPA].”). Plaintiff did

not plead that Northern States’ veil should be pierced in order

to reach Jackson, and it correctly argues now that Jackson’ CPA

19 liability does not depend on the doctrine. See Bartholomew v .

Delahaye Group, Inc., Civ. N o . 95-20-B, 1995 WL 907897, *10

(D.N.H. Nov. 8 , 1995) (piercing the corporate veil pled as a

separate count); see also Druding v . Allen, 122 N.H. 823, 8 2 7 ,

451 A.2d 3 9 0 , 393 (1982) (requiring a distinct claim be asserted

for piercing the corporate veil). 7

There is no question that the CPA applies to the instant

matter, and that Jackson violated its provisions. The CPA is “‘a

comprehensive statute whose language indicates that it should be

given broad sweep.’” Pacamor Bearings, 918 F.Supp. at 499

(quoting Roberts v . Gen. Motors Corp., 138 N.H. 5 3 2 , 5 3 8 , 643

A.2d 956, 960 (1994)). The CPA makes it “unlawful for any person

7 Plaintiff’s CPA claims against Jackson depend on his personal unauthorized use of Index Packaging’s NeLMA stamp and not some misuse of the corporate form that might justify piercing the corporate veil. See e.g. Druding, 122 N.H. at 8 2 7 , 451 A.2d at 393 (finding individual not liable under veil piercing doctrine where he “neither suppressed the fact of incorporation nor misled the plaintiffs as to the corporate assets” to use the corporate form to promote an injustice); Unit Owners Ass’n, 141 N.H. at 4 4 , 677 A.2d at 141 (declining to impose individual liability for acts of the corporate entity where corporate veil cannot be pierced); c f . Bartholomew, 1995 WL 907897 at *11 (describing when the comingling of assets, concealing the fact of incorporation and misleading creditors as to corporate assets can justify piercing the corporate veil to reach individuals); Alman v . Danin, 801 F.2d 1 , 3-4 (1st Cir. 1986) (allowing corporate veil to be pierced to reach individual owners’ assets to enforce a pension plan that unfunded, shell corporation fraudulently negotiated).

20 to use any unfair method of competition or any unfair or

deceptive act or practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce

within this state” which includes, but is not limited t o :

I. Passing off goods or services of those of another;

II. Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;

III. Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection or association with, or certification by, another; . . .

V. Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, [or] characteristics . . . that they do not have; . . .

VII. Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade . . . if they are of another; . . . .

RSA 358-A:2 (describing unlawful acts). If a business practice

is not enumerated in the statute, it still is considered “unfair”

if “(1) it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law,

statutory, or other established concept of unfairness, (2) it is

immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, or (3) it causes

substantial injury to consumers.” Pacamor Bearings, 918 F. Supp.

at 499 (internal quotations omitted, emphasis in original); see

also Becksted v . Nadeau, 155 N.H. 615, 619, 926 A.2d 819, 822-23

21 (2007) (looking to the Federal Trade Commission Act standard for

guidance to determine unfair business practice). By its plain

language, the scope of unlawful activity covered by the CPA is

broader than the trademark infringement claims governed by the

Lanham Act which plaintiff asserts here.

The undisputed record establishes that Jackson deliberately

stamped pallets without any agreement or authorization from

either Index Packaging or NeLMA. Jackson admitted he did this

before business hours to prevent other people at Northern States

from knowing that he was misusing the stamp. He further admitted

that he allowed the mismarked pallets to be sold in his normal

business operations through Northern States. While Northern

States was the conduit through which Jackson’s mislabeled goods

got into the stream of commerce, nothing in the current record

indicates the corporate entity was a sham which Jackson used to

promote an injustice or fraud. Instead, the record establishes

that Jackson was personally responsible for mislabeling the

pallets to represent they were of a quality or standard which he

knew was not true and for which he had not paid.

Regardless of what the scope of NeLMA’s marks are, see

discussion supra, section 4 , by Jackson’s own admission he used

22 Index Packaging’s stamp to pass off his pallets as having some

type of approval, certification, quality or other competitive and

economic advantage that the pallets in fact did not have. This

conduct, which persisted for nearly three years and only stopped

after NeLMA discovered what Jackson was doing, unquestionably

demonstrates an unfair business practice that unscrupulously

sought to exploit the fortuitous misplacement of the Index

Packaging-NeLMA stamp to profit his business. Jackson directly

violated the CPA by personally stamping the WPM and moving the

mismarked pallets into Northern State’s inventory. Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment on Count III is granted with respect

to Jackson’s liability for violating the CPA.

Based on the current record, however, the issue of damages

cannot be resolved. Plaintiff has not proffered any evidence

that demonstrates the financial ramifications of these CPA

violations, and genuine issues of material fact preclude a

finding whether statutory damages rather than actual damages are

appropriate. See RSA 358-A:10 (providing damages calculations

for private CPA actions). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment with respect to damages, fees and costs is

denied.

23 Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment (document n o . 38) is disposed of as follows:

Counts I and II - denied with respect to both liability

and damages;

Count III - granted with respect to Jackson’s liability

but denied with respect to damages.

SO ORDERED.

James R. Muirhead United States Magistrate Judge

Date: May 5 , 2010

cc: George F. Burns, Esq. Dawnangela Minton, Esq. James H . Jackson, pro se