PD-1158-15 PD-1158-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 9/21/2015 10:00:48 PM Accepted 9/22/2015 2:45:20 PM ABEL ACOSTA NO. ____________ CLERK
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS FOR TEXAS
* * * * * * * * * * * * CLEVELAND NIXON
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
ON APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS AND FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 6 OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS THE HON. JEANINE HOWARD, PRESIDING TRIAL COURT NO. F-1121243
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
DYER & LIBBY James H. Dyer Bar Card No. 06315700 Joseph D. Libby Bar Card No. 12318500 3501 Prairie St., Suite 100 Houston, Texas 77002 September 22, 2015 (713) 222-7757 phone (713) 222-7758 fax Email: josephlibbyattorney@yahoo.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a list of the Judge and all parties and counsel in this matter:
Judge: Jeanine Howard Judge of the Criminal District Court No. 6 of Dallas County, Texas 133 N Riverfront Blvd. Dallas, Texas 75007 Phone: 972-739-3910 Fax: 214-875-2342 Email: JLHoward@dallascounty.org
Petitioner: Cleveland Nixon
Attorneys for Petitioner at the trial court level:
L. Charles Humphreys Bar Card No. 10277010 Humphreys & Peterson Law Firm, P.L.L.C. 5502 Broadway Garland, Texas 75043 (972) 303-4529 phone (972) 303-1673 fax
James E. Polk, II Bar Card No. 16089500 Attorney and Counselor at Law 2201 Main Street Suite 1018, Lock Box 107 Dallas, Texas 75201 (214) 742-9805 phone (214) 742-7212 fax
Kristen R. Brown Bar Card No. 24081458 Attorney at Law 1701 North market Street, Suite 402 Dallas, Texas 75202 (214) 446-3909 phone
2 (214) 481-4868 fax
Attorneys for Petitioner at the appellate court level:
DYER & LIBBY James H. Dyer Bar Card No. 06315700 Joseph D. Libby Bar Card No. 12318500 3501 Prairie St., Suite 100 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 222-7757 phone (713) 222-7758 fax Email: josephlibbyattorney@yahoo.com
Respondent: The State of Texas
Attorneys for Respondent at the trial court level:
Craig Watkins, former District Attorney for Dallas County State Bar No. 00791886
Josh Healy, Assistant District Attorney, Dallas County State Bar No. 24026288
Attorneys for Respondent at the appellate court level:
Susan Hawk, District Attorney for Dallas County 133 N Riverfront Blvd. Dallas, Texas 75207 Phone: 214-653-3600 Fax: 214-653-5774 Email: shawk@dallascounty.org
3 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Judge, Parties and Counsel ....................................................................... 1
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................... 4
Index of Authorities ................................................................................................... 6
Statement of Oral Argument ...................................................................................... 9
Statement of the Case ............................................................................................... 10
Statement of Procedural History .............................................................................. 11
Grounds for Review ................................................................................................. 12
I. Whether the Fifth Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court was not restricted to the evidence presented at the October 14, 2014 request for bond on appeal hearing under 44.04 (c) C.C.P.?
II. Whether the Fifth Court of Appeals erred in holding that “The trial court is not required to use magic words to establish that it has considered the evidence previously presented to it.”?
III. Whether the Fifth Court of Appeals erred in considering evidence not brought before it in the appellate record?
IV. Whether the trial court as affirmed by the Fifth Court of Appeals denied Petitioner due course of law under art. 1 § 19 of the Texas Constitution in its opinion which lessened the defendant’s right to know the evidence considered by the court against the defendant and consequently deprived the defendant of his right to a meaningful hearing ?
V. Whether the trial court as affirmed by the Fifth Court of Appeals denied Petitioner due process of law under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteen Amendments to the United States Constitution in its opinion which lessened the defendant’s right
4 to know the evidence considered by the court against the defendant and consequently deprived the defendant of his right to a meaningful hearing?
Argument .................................................................................................................. 13
Reasons for Granting This Petition .......................................................................... 27
Prayer for Relief ....................................................................................................... 28
Certificate of Service................................................................................................ 28
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................ 29
Appendix A. Opinion of the Court of Appeals
B. Trial court order denying bond on appeal
C. Order of the Court of Appeals by Justice Ada Brown, May 7, 2015
D. Online website docket of Court of Appeals
E. Letter of Court Reporter requesting that all five volumes be filed in this appeal, May 6, 2015
F. Reporter’s Record Volume 5
G. The State’s Brief in the Court of Appeals
H. The Supplemental Clerk’s Record
I. Petitioner’s designation of reporter’s record
J. Petitioner’s designation of clerk’s record
5 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Texas Cases
Ballard v. Texas, 438 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1971).................................................................................20
Barrientez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)…………………………….17, 19
Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727, 730-732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978 en banc) .................. 18, 21, 26
Broussard v. State, 598 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980 en banc) ............................... 17, 18
Dervishi v. State, (unpublished opinion 2-04-495-CR Fort Worth delivered May 26, 2005) .........17
Eldridge v. State, 731 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1987) .............................. 16, 22
Ex parte Turner, 612 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ....................................................17
Ex Parte Williams, 630 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Tex.App. -- San Antonio 1982), PDR refused ................20
Kaman v. State, 923 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1996) .............................26
Moore v. State, 11 S.W.3d 495, 499 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.]2000, no pet.).................21
O’Hern v. State, 527 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) ............................................................19
6 Putnam v. State, 582 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ............................................................26
Rogers v. State, 640 S.W.2d 248, 252 (Tex. Crim. App 1982) .....................................................22
Ruedas v. State, 583 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ............................................................22
Shockley v. State, 717 S.W.2d 922 (Crim. App. 1986 en banc) .......................................... 16, 19, 20
State v. Cobb, 851 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993 en banc) ........................................ 22, 23
Staten v. State, 328 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 2010) .................................................21
Stephenson v. State, 500 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ............................................................19
Federal cases
Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611-12, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 L.Ed.2d 1756 (1985) ........................22
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971)............................21
Brown v. Wilmot, 572 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1978).................................................................................20
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) ........................................21
Finetti v. Harris, 609 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1979).................................................................................20
7 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759-760, 36 L. Ed2d 656 (1973) .... 21, 22
Matthews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)....................... 15, 16
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ..........................................22
Statutes
Tex. Code of Crim. Procedure § 44.04(c)........................................................ passim
Other Authorities
1 McCormick and Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, 2nd ed., Sec. 151 .........................18
Rules
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 66.3 .......................................................27
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 201……..…………………………………….23
Texas Constitutional Provisions
art. 1 § 19 of the Texas Constitution ....................................................... 4, 12, 16, 22
United States Constitutional Provisions
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution…….…………………4, 12, 16
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution…………………4, 12, 16, 20
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ...................... 4, 12, 16,20
8 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Petitioner believes that the issue of requiring the record to reflect the
evidence that the trial court is considering against the Petitioner at the hearing is
one of importance to the jurisprudence of the State of Texas.
However the Petitioner believes that the issues reflected in this Brief are set
out with sufficient clarity that the Petitioner’s position and legal arguments are
clear.
However, in the event that the State seeks oral argument and that this court
believes that oral argument may be of assistance in resolving this appeal, counsel
for Petitioner is prepared to make an oral argument.
9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case: This case involves an accelerated appeal from denial of bail
or bond on appeal following a contested proceeding to adjudicate guilt and
assessment of five years of incarceration. (Supp. CR p. 8 and RR Vol. 5 p. 4 ll. 9 -
16) The trial court incorrectly refers to the proceeding as a revocation of
probation as opposed to adjudication proceeding. (RR Vol. 5 p. 4 ll. 9 - 16) There
is a separate appeal pending in the Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at
Dallas [No. 05-14-01627-CR] appealing from the adjudication proceeding.
Course of Proceedings: A formal hearing for bail on appeal was held October
14, 2014, contained in volume 5 of the Reporter’s Record. On May 7, 2015,
Justice Ada Brown, Fifth Court of Appeals, sua sponte, ordered the Clerk to file
only Volume 5 of the Reporter’s Record in this appeal. (App. C) The State did
not move for any additional reporter’s record to be part of the record in this
appeal. (see App D ) The Fifth Court of Appeals entered no further or additional
order(s) regarding the record on appeal, other than the Order by Justice Brown.
(see App C and D)
Trial Court’s disposition of the case: On October 14, 2014, following a
contested hearing on the oral Motion for Bail Pending Appeal, the trial court
denied the motion for bond on appeal. (RR vol. 5 p. 16 ll. 8 - 9) On April 2, 2015,
following a mandamus proceeding, [No. 05-15-00263-CV] the trial court entered a
10 written order denying bond on appeal and in the same order entered findings of
fact. (App. B) This appeal is taken from the order denying bond on appeal. (App.
B)
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. The date the opinion of the Fifth Court of Appeals was handed down is
August 4, 2015.
2. No motion for rehearing was filed.
11 GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
I. Whether the Fifth Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court was not restricted to the evidence presented at the October 14, 2014 request for bond on appeal hearing under 44.04(c) C.C.P.?
II. Whether the Fifth Court of Appeals erred in holding that “The trial court is not required to use magic words to establish that it has considered the evidence previously presented to it.”?
III. Whether the Fifth Court of Appeals erred in considering evidence not brought before it in the appellate record?
IV. Whether the trial court as affirmed by the Fifth Court of Appeals denied Petitioner due course of law under art. 1 § 19 of the Texas Constitution in its opinion which lessened the defendant’s right to know the evidence considered by the court against the defendant and consequently deprived the defendant of his right to a meaningful hearing ?
V. Whether the trial court as affirmed by the Fifth Court of Appeals denied Petitioner due process of law under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteen Amendments to the United States Constitution in its opinion which lessened the defendant’s right to know the evidence considered by the court against the defendant and consequently deprived the defendant of his right to a meaningful hearing?
12 ARGUMENT This appeal is taken from an order denying bond on appeal pursuant to
44.04(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure entered after a mandamus
proceeding [05-15-00263-CV] was conditionally granted compelling the trial court
to make a written order for purposes of appeal from the bond denial hearing of
October 14, 2014 (see App A).
During the 44.04(c) hearing, no judicial notice request was made by any
party, nor did the Trial Court announce it was taking judicial notice of any other
hearing, testimony or facts had in other unrelated proceedings had against the
Petitioner.
The trial court referenced that this “was additional testimony” being taken,
yet there had been no prior evidentiary hearing on the 44.04(c) request for bond,
and therefore no ongoing hearing to which additional testimony refers..
What the reference to “additional” testimony alludes to, since there was no
prior 44.04(c) hearing or testimony, is unclear and incapable of being ascertained.
The Dallas Court of Appeals Opinion (App. A) states that “no magic words”
regarding prior testimony are required for the court to consider evidence from prior
hearings, however, as constitutionally required under both the Texas Constitution
and the United States Constitution, the court must use care that the record reflects
the evidence that is being considered against the Petitioner, and the judicial notice
13 procedure, uniformly required in Texas jurisprudence satisfies the due process and
meaningful hearing requirements.
At the beginning of the October 14, 2014 hearing, the trial court made the
following statement on the record:
“THE COURT: …. Back on September 29, 2004, (sic) we had a contested revocation hearing, and at that time you had plead true – plead not true, and after hearing the additional testimony on that date, combined with testimony from September 25, the Court found you had violated your probation, granted the state’s motion, revoked your probation, found you guilty and charged of injury (sic) to a child and set your punishment at five years confinement in the penitentiary.
Your attorney later that day, or two days after that, I should have that on another docket sheet documented, I’m not asking you to get it right now, but you approached me about an appeal bond, and I denied that request based on the testimony I had heard, you know, during the revocation hearing and pursuant to Article 44.04(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Now, Mr. Humphreys, today you want to put a little more testimony on the record concerning the appeal bond?” (RR Vol. 5 page 4 ll. 9– 24, see App. F) (emphasis ours)
The trial court concluded the 44.04(c) hearing with this statement:
“THE COURT: All right. I’m going to deny your motion on the bond. Again, it’s the same ruling as before. I’m going to deny bond pursuant to Article 44.04(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (RR Vol. 5 page 16 ll. 8–11, see App. F)
As of October 14, 2014, there had been no prior testimony adduced of any
nature regarding a request for an appeal bond pursuant to 44.04(c). (RR Vol. 5)
14 Since this was not a continuation of a 44.04(c) hearing, the statement of the
trial court at the beginning of the hearing refers to non-existent testimony. (RR
Vol. 5 page 4) The statement by the trial court, who could have stated for the
record that the court was taking judicial notice of the testimony from specifically
enumerated unrelated prior hearings, but did not, does not indicate that the court is
considering any evidence in the case other than the testimony which is being
presented to the court on October 14, 2014. (RR Vol. 5 page 4)
The hearing on the oral motion for an appeal bond under 44.04(c) was a
finite hearing on the matter of a bond on appeal. (RR Vol. 5)
Each case or type of case is considered independently in the analysis of what
is required for a meaningful hearing. Mathews v. Eldridge, infra. In the criminal
context, due course of law and due process of law are violated when there is a lack
of notice to the Defendant of what is being offered in evidence and considered by
the court against the Defendant, because as a fundamental due course and due
process tenant, the defendant is deprived of fair notice of the evidence against him
and an opportunity to respond to that evidence.
By requiring the trial court to note what judicial notice of testimony and
evidence offered in a separate hearing is being taken, the Defendant is put on
notice of what the court is being asked to consider, or if the judicial notice is
recited by the court itself, it gives the defendant notice of what the court is
15 intending to consider that is not apparent in the record. Additionally, the Petitioner
is then afforded an opportunity to object to the taking of judicial notice.
A meaningful hearing and its elements and balancing tests were extensively
discussed by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Matthews v. Eldridge
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
In the matter of a deferred adjudication case, the Petitioner is entitled to due
course of law under art. 1 § 19 of the Texas Constitution and entitled to due
process of law under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. See Eldridge v. State, 731 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App. – Houston
[1st Dist.] 1987) and Shockley v. State, 717 S.W.2d 922 (Crim. App. 1986 en banc).
In the matter of a bond on appeal, assuming the statutory qualifications are
met, the defendant is entitled to due course of law under art. 1 § 19 of the Texas
Constitution and is also entitled to due process of law under the Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Shockley v. State,
717 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986 en banc)
Petitioner’s counsel requested that Volume 5, which represented the entire
hearing on the 44.04(c) bond on appeal motion be filed in this case. (App. I) The
Court reporter attempted to file the entire record in this case and even wrote a letter
to this effect. (App. E) The Dallas Court of Appeals, sua sponte, entered its order
signed by Justice Ada Brown, that only volume 5 be filed in this appeal. (App. C)
16 The State never requested or attempted to supplement the reporter’s record, and
almost the entirety of the State’s Brief is outside the record of this appeal and
notated as coming from volumes 2, 3, or 4, which represent volumes filed in the
main appeal of the decision to proceed to adjudicate, which is before the Dallas
Court of Appeals in a separate appeal. (App. G State’s Brief) It is unknown how
the Dallas Court of Appeals arrived at an Opinion referencing facts that are neither
in volume 5 of the reporter’s record nor in the clerk’s record before the appeals
court in this case.
In the case of Dervishi v. State, (unpublished opinion 2-04-495-CR Fort
Worth delivered May 26, 2005) the Court of Appeals stated:
“At the hearing on Dervishi’s motion to set bond, the trial court took judicial notice of the court’s file and the proceedings of the trial on the underlying offense, and heard testimony from Dervishi.”
Also in footnote 3 the Second Court of Appeals stated in Dervishi:
“3. See Ex parte Turner, 612 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (holding taking of judicial notice at habeas corpus hearing of evidence adduced at prior revocation hearing before same judge proper); Barrientez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (holding trial judge presiding over revocation hearing could take judicial notice of evidence adduced at criminal trial over which he presided).”
In the case of Broussard v. State, 598 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980 en banc) Presiding Judge Onion in a dissent stated:
17 “… It is not proper for this court to look to another appellate record to supply any deficiency in the proof of another case under consideration on appeal.” Citations omitted.
In an appeal from an order revoking probation, Bradley v. State, 564
S.W.2d 727, 730-732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978 en banc), Judge Odom stated:
“We draw a distinction between the obligation to secure inclusion in the record on appeal of material that was part of the record in the proceedings in the trial court and the obligation urged by the State, that the appealing party go beyond the record to secure and place in the record matter that is part of the State’s case. It is proper that the appealing party be required to present as complete a record of the trial proceedings as is necessary to consider and dispose of the issues urged on appeal. Here, the complete record of the probation revocation proceeding has been made a part of the record on appeal. It is not proper to require the appellant to go beyond that trial record to make the State’s case against himself. In short, we draw a distinction between the burden on the appellant to bring from the trial record the matter he relies on for appeal issues and the burden on the State to bring to the trial record the evidence it relies on to meet its burden of proof. Appellant has presented a complete record; the State did not meet its burden to present the material relied on to meet its burden of proof in a manner capable of reflection in the trial record, so that a meaningful review could be had on the appellate record in this Court.
Although this record reflects all that occurred at the hearing on the motion to revoke probation, it does not reflect the content of the matters judicially noticed by the trial court upon the State’s motion and necessary to meet the State’s burden of proof. While the theory allowing judicial notice of a fact is that the fact ‘is so easily determinable with certainty from sources considered reliable, it would not be good sense to require formal proof.’ 1 McCormick and Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, 2nd ed., Sec. 151, this does not dispense with the
18 requirement, for purposes of review, that the facts so noticed be apparent from the record. Under the Barrientez rule for revocation of probation hearings, the facts judicially noticed here were matters of testimony heard in the prior criminal trial, i.e., that certain witnesses gave certain testimony. Those facts, i.e., what the testimony was, are not shown in this record and are not known to this Court, and yet, to dispose of the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence raised in this case, such facts judicially noticed must be made known to this Court. The statement in the record that judicial notice was being taken of unstated facts is not a sufficient presentation of the matter relied on by the State to meet its burden of proof such as to be meaningful to this Court and to allow disposition of the issue raised in this appeal. How are we to dispose of this matter?
....
The defect to be avoided or cured is the failure of the record to reflect the fact or facts judicially noticed by the trial court. The defect may be avoided in the first instance by precisely reciting such facts for the record or placing them in the record. For judicial notice of such facts as here considered, this may be done by placing the transcribed court reporter’s notes, appropriately identified, into the record, as was done in O’Hern v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 527 S.W.2d 568, or, if the matter is not excessively long, by reading the testimony judicially noticed into the record, as was done in Stephenson v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 500 S.W.2d 855.”
In a third en banc opinion from the Texas Court of Appeals, Shockley v.
State, 717 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986 en banc) Justice Miller in his
concurring Opinion caused to be published the “thinking” of the Court of Criminal
Appeals as to the constitutional protections afforded a defendant in a hearing on
bail pending appeal. The Shockley opinion has been quoted by various Courts of
19 Appeal in Texas as to the following aspects of Constitutional protections provided
in a 44.04 hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals in Shockley, having determined
that a 44.04 bail request provided due process protection to the eligible convicted
defendant, the Court of Criminal Appeals, proceeded to address the issue of:
“II. How Much Due Process is Required Before the Trial Court May Deny Bail Pending Appeal?
In examining the meaning of due process, once a state has made provision for bail pending appeal, the federal courts have stated: ‘the Eighth and Fourteen Amendments require that it not be denied arbitrarily or unreasonably.’ Finetti, supra at 599; Brown v. Wilmot, 572 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1978); Ballard, supra. However this does not clarify what due process would have to be supplied before a decision to deny bail would not be arbitrary or unreasonable. To determine the quantum of due process required, we must look to the basic ingredients of due process itself.
We now balance those competing interests. First, a defendant’s private interest in retaining liberty while his appeal is pending cannot be dismissed as insignificant. The opportunity to remain at liberty pending appeal is a ‘substantial right.’ Williams, supra at 804. The importance of liberty to a defendant who is seeking review of a conviction is no less important than the liberty he enjoys before trial. Therefore, we accord great weight to defendant’s private interest in retaining liberty while his appeal is pending.
20 The nature of the hearing prior to denial of bond pending appeal does not require a full adversarial proceeding extant in a criminal trial. As the Supreme Court has indicated, ‘[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.’ Cleveland, supra 105 S.Ct. at 1495, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). What is required is that the trial court provide the defendant with reasonable notice that it intends to deny bail pending appeal and allow the defendant a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”
In Staten v. State, 328 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 2010), the
Beaumont Court of Appeals stated:
“While a defendant at a revocation proceeding need not be afforded the full range of constitutional and statutory protections that are available in the trial of a criminal case, a person on community supervision is entitled to certain due process protections. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781- 82, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759-760, 36 L. Ed2d 656 (1973); Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727, 729-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Moore v. State, 11 S.W.3d 495, 499 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) In Scarpelli, the United States Supreme Court recognized that due process protections extend to state revocation proceedings because the revocation deprives an individual of a conditional liberty, 411 U.S. at 781-82; 93 S.Ct. 1756. Due process in connection with community supervision revocation proceedings, entitles a defendant to (1) the written notice of the claimed violations of the terms of the community supervision order; (2) the disclosure of the evidence against him; (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) a neutral and detached hearing body; (5) the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses, ‘unless the hearing body specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation [;]’ and (6) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and
21 reasons for revoking community supervision. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611-12, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985); Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756. The defendant who has been placed on community supervision is also protected by the due course of law provisions of the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const. art. I, § 19; Rogers v. State, 640 S.W.2d 248, 252 (Tex. Crim. App 1982).”
In Eldridge v. State, 731 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1987)
the Houston First Court of Appeals looked to Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973) for what due process requires in probation revocation cases and noted:
“… They include: written notice of the claimed violations of probation, disclosure to the probationer of the evidence against him, the opportunity to be heard in person, and by counsel, and to present witnesses, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Ruedas v. State, 586 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)” emphasis ours
In the 1993 case of State v. Cobb, 851 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993 en
banc), this Court was presented with a probation revocation hearing in which the
defense appealed on sufficiency of the evidence grounds contending that the fact
that the judgement of conviction and order of probation were not introduced into
evidence, nor judicially noticed by the trial court, created an insufficiency of the
evidence. The Court of Appeals had held the failure of the trial court to judicially
22 notice these documents in accordance with Rule 201 of the Texas Rules of
Criminal Evidence to be fatal.
This court reversed the court of appeals in Cobb because the judgment and
order were contained in the appellate record on appeal (the clerk’s record), even if
not filed or proved up in the trial court record (the reporter’s record), and this court
held that it had never required these documents [judgment of conviction and order
of probation] to be formally proved in a probation revocation hearing. See Cobb,
supra, at page 873
The case presently before this court involves a missing evidence attack on
the sufficiency of the evidence to have denied bond on appeal and whether the
Petitioner was deprived of a meaningful hearing.
The mischief that can or will be wrought by the underlying court of appeals
opinion in this case is significant. In nearly every case, it can be anticipated that
the trial judge’s position is that the trial judge recalls the evidence previously
introduced before it in earlier hearings, and there is a tendency and desire by the
trial judge to not have to have any prior testimony from different hearings
repeated, however, without evidence in the record of what prior testimony from
what hearing is actually being considered by the court, the Petitioner is deprived of
the notice of what evidence the court intends to consider against him that is not
contained in the record of testimony and evidence adduced at the hearing. At a
23 minimum, this Court should preserve the process, requiring judicial notice of prior
evidence and testimony proposed to be admitted against the defendant, to be
identified so it can 1) be objected to by the Defendant or the State; and 2) be
located and transcribed for purposes of appeal.
The relatively short § 44.04(c) hearing (RR vol. 5) does not contain many if
not most of the facts set forth the trial court’s finding of facts in the Order denying
bond entered many months after the October 14, 2014 hearing.
There were no exhibits offered or admitted. There was no request made by
either party’s counsel for the court to take judicial notice of any fact, or any
document, or any prior testimony or evidence offered in any court proceeding. The
trial court did not sua sponte take any judicial notice during the hearing of any
other hearing, or testimony or evidence. (RR vol. 5) No other witnesses, other than
the Petitioner’s wife, were called to testify. (RR vol. 5)
Following a hearing on an oral Motion for Bail Pending Appeal, the trial
court denied Petitioner a bond on appeal. (Supp. CR p. 8)
The trial court made findings of fact, which findings are not supported by
the record of the hearing requesting bond on appeal, in support of the conclusion
that Petitioner “is a continuing threat to the Complainant”, [identified as Keisha
Pope in the order denying bond] and “there is a high likelihood that the Defendant
24 will commit another assaultive offense against the Complainant if allowed an
appeal bond.”
The only evidence in the record is the testimony of Keisha Nixon, the wife
of Petitioner, contained in Volume 5 of the reporter’s record.
The trial court findings and the record on appeal:
Because there were no documents introduced and no judicial notice taken of
any facts, documents, evidence or testimony that may or may not have occurred
earlier, the Court of Appeals was left with an obscure record of testimony by one
reluctant and unhappy witness. There is no evidence of what probation conditions
existed, when they were put in place, whether conditions such as a “no contact”
provision was violated and if so when. It is apparent that there must be evidence of
the likelihood of committing an “offense” and a judge’s no contact order is not an
“offense” under Texas criminal law. There is no support in the record before the
court for linking a no contact order to a protective order. In fact, it is hard to
follow what occurred, what is alleged to have occurred, and what did not occur.
The details of the allegations and questions are missing and not filled in with any
supplemental evidence in order to try to make sense of the situations alluded to in
the testimony given by the Petitioner’s wife.
When the court’s findings are not supported by the record, there is no burden
on the Petitioner to bring forth evidence not in the record to attempt to dispute the
25 accuracy or show the inaccuracy of the findings. Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727,
730 - 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978 en banc)
“This court cannot consider an item that is not a part of the record on
appeal.” Kaman v. State, 923 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.]
1996)
In this appeal Counsel for Petitioner made a specific request to the Clerk for
the Clerk’s Record and instead of complying with the request of Petitioner’s
counsel, the Clerk efiled or attempted to efile the reporter’s record related to the
entire case and underlying appeal of the revocation proceeding in appeal No. 05-
14-01627-CR. The only proper Clerk’s Record before this Court is the
Supplemental Clerk’s Record that the Dallas Court of Appeals instructed the
District Clerk to file. (see App C and H)
The trial court’s order denying bond on appeal (Supp. CR p. 8) to Petitioner
does not correctly set out the law which requires “good cause to believe” that the
defendant “is likely to commit another offense while on bail”.
Applying the case of Putnam v. State, 582 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979) explanation of proof of “good cause to believe” which must be “grounded in
evidence that the defendant is likely to commit another offense while on bail” and
which sets out the legal parameters for whether the trial court abused its discretion
in this appeal, the trial court has abused its discretion by going outside the record
26 and not taking its findings and conclusions and ruling from the facts and evidence
produced at the hearing, which in this case fail to meet the level and nature of
proof required to deny bond.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION
Rule 66.3 Rules of Appellate Procedure provide the following as reasons to
grant a petition for discretionary review. Petitioner states that he believes that the
following two basis are particularly important under the facts and decision of the
Court of Appeals in this case:
(b) whether a court of appeals has decided an important question of state or
federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by the Court of Criminal
appeals;
(f) whether a court of appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court, as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ power of
supervision.
Both of these reasons apply to the court of appeals opinion which does not
require the trial court to provide fair notice of the evidence being considered
against the Petitioner, and leaves the Petitioner and the reviewing court(s) to guess
at what is meant because there are no “magic words” such as “judicial notice”
which are required and which provide the required notice.
27 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Petitioner prays that the Court of Criminal Appeals reverse the Court of
Appeals, and remand this appeal to the Court of Appeals, to consider the
sufficiency of the evidence as reflected in Volume 5 of the record and restricted to
the Volume 5 of the reporter’s record of which the Petitioner was provided notice.
Respectfully submitted,
DYER & LIBBY
/s/ James H. Dyer ______________________________ James H. Dyer Bar Card No. 06315700
/s/ Joseph D. Libby ______________________________ Joseph D. Libby Bar Card No. 12318500
3501 Prairie St., Suite 100 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 222-7757 phone (713) 222-7758 fax Email: josephlibbyattorney@yahoo.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
We hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing Petition for Discretionary Review has been served on September 21, 2015 via email or fax to:
Susan Hawk District Attorney Dallas County, Texas
28 Lisa C. McMinn State Prosecuting Attorney Fax: 512-463-5724
/s/ James H. Dyer ___________________________________ James H. Dyer
/s/ Joseph D. Libby ___________________________________ Joseph D. Libby
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
We hereby certify that this computer-generated document contains 4182
words (not including the caption, identity of Judge, Parties and Counsel, Table of
Contents, Statement of Oral Argument, Grounds for Review, the Index of
Authorities, Statement of the Case and Procedural History, signature,
certification, and certification of compliance and the appendix) and that we rely
upon the word count generator of Word 13 in making this representation to the
court.
/s/ James H. Dyer ______________________________ James H. Dyer
/s/ Joseph D. Libby ______________________________ Joseph D. Libby
29 APPENDIX A. Opinion of the Fifth Court of Appeals
C. Order of Justice Ada Brown, Fifth Court of Appeals
D. Docket sheet from website of Fifth Court of Appeals
E. Letter of Court Reporter requesting that all five volumes be filed in this appeal, May 6, 2015