Niven v. Universal Music Group, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 22, 2026
• Docket: 24-7273
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALAN G. NIVEN; HEATHER VINCENT No. 24-7273 NIVEN, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-07917-SVW-PVC Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.

UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, INC., a Delaware corporation, doing business as Capitol Records Group; UMG RECORDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation; JOHN DOES, 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 18, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: LEE, BUMATAY, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Alan Niven, and his wife Heather Vincent-Niven (“the Nivens”), sued

Universal Music Group and UMG Recordings (collectively “UMG”), alleging they

improperly charged Alan roughly $1 million dollars for “unrecouped [] video

expenses” from when he was the manager and producer of the platinum-selling rock

band, Great White. UMG moved to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit was barred by

the statute of limitations. The district court granted the motion and denied leave to

amend, and the Nivens now appeal.

We review dismissals based on the statute of limitations de novo. McGreevey

v. PHH Mortgage Corp., 897 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018). And we review

a district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Reddy v. Litton,

Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990).

1. The Nivens first allege that the statute of limitations should not apply

because UMG fraudulently induced them to enter into a tolling agreement. To allege

fraud, “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud,”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), identifying “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the

alleged fraud. Bodenburg v. Apple, Inc., 146 F.4th 761, 771 (9th Cir. 2025)

(simplified). Conclusory allegations alone are not enough. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy

Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003). Instead, plaintiffs must “give

defendants notice of the particular [fraudulent] misconduct . . . so that [defendants]

can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.”

2 24-7273 United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1051–52 (9th

Cir. 2001) (simplified); Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 999

(9th Cir. 2010). For example, we have previously found that a party comes short

where they allege general misrepresentation but “do[] not identify any specific

misrepresentations or specify when and where they occurred.” Vess, 317 F.3d at

1107 (citing Lee, 245 F.3d at 1051).

The Nivens argue that UMG had falsely assured them they would investigate

the charge and provide an explanation for it. But that is the extent of the fraud

allegations. The Nivens do not provide any details about their communications with

UMG, how frequently the parties talked, or anything to show that UMG lied about

investigating the accounting as to induce them to enter the tolling agreement. Thus,

the Nivens only provide “mere conclusory allegations of fraud,” without any

examples or details. Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540

(9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the suit

because the Nivens did not plead fraud with sufficient particularity.

2. Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to

amend because amending the complaint in this case would be futile. Generally, “a

court should liberally allow a party to amend its pleading.” Sonoma Cnty. Ass’n of

Retired Emps. v. Sonoma County, 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013). But it may

deny leave to amend if amending would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,

3 24-7273 182 (1962); Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991).

Here, amendment would be futile because the Nivens haven’t shown that

amending their complaint would solve the underlying issue: that they missed their

deadline to file suit. They state that they could amend to show UMG’s “delay

tactics” during the tolling period. But the tolling agreement the plaintiffs signed

expressly states that Nivens had to re-file any lawsuit before April 1, 2022. And the

plaintiffs missed that deadline, not by a few days, but by over 17 months. Even if

we assume that UMG fraudulently induced the Nivens into the tolling agreement

and used “delay tactics,” that wouldn’t change the last date that the Nivens could

have reasonably thought they could re-file their lawsuit. The Nivens haven’t

presented any facts that would excuse their failure to file suit after the filing period,

or 17 months after it expired. So the district court did not abuse its discretion.

AFFIRMED.

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