Nirosh H. De Silva v. Pima County Government; et al.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMay 6, 2026
Docket4:24-cv-00200
StatusUnknown

This text of Nirosh H. De Silva v. Pima County Government; et al. (Nirosh H. De Silva v. Pima County Government; et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nirosh H. De Silva v. Pima County Government; et al., (D. Ariz. 2026).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 6 Nirosh H. De Silva, ) No. CV 24-00200-TUC-MAA 7 ) Plaintiffs, ) ORDER 8 ) vs. ) 9 ) ) 10 Pima County Government; et al., ) ) 11 Defendants. ) ) 12 ) 13 Pending before the court is the defendants’ motion to exceed page limits filed on 14 February 11, 2026. Doc. 137. The plaintiff filed a response on February 23, 2026. Doc. 15 139. The defendants filed a reply on March 2, 2026. Doc. 140. 16 The plaintiff’s response, filed on February 23, 2026, included a motion to strike. Doc. 17 139. The defendants filed a response on March 9, 2026. Doc. 142. The plaintiff filed a 18 reply on March 15, 2026. Doc. 143. 19 Previously, on October 17, 2025, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 20 and a statement of facts. Docs. 105, 106. The court permitted the defendants to file a 36- 21 page brief. Doc. 108. Subsequently, the court permitted the plaintiff to file a 34-page 22 response. Doc. 133. In the pending motion, the defendants seek permission to file a 44-page 23 reply. Doc. 137. They assert that “Plaintiff’s Response [] contains many vague, ambiguous, 24 or oversimplified statements and theories which required in-depth analysis to rebut.” Doc. 25 137, pp. 1-2. 26 In his response, the plaintiff objects to the length of the proposed reply. Doc. 139, p. 27 7. He argues generally that they have “introduced new evidence,” “rehashed previous 28 arguments,” and “bloated their responses.” Id. 1 In their reply, the defendants describe specific arguments that the plaintiff made in his 2 response and explain why they need extra space to effectively address those arguments. Doc. 3 140. The court finds the defendants’ reasoning persuasive. The court will allow the 4 defendants to file a 44-page reply. Doc. 137. 5 The plaintiff further moves that this court strike Exhibits A, B, C, and D from the 6 proposed reply. Doc. 139. 7 In Exhibit B of the proposed reply, the defendants attached certain documents that the 8 defendants asserted were included in Pima County’s initial disclosure and were not, as the 9 plaintiff stated, disclosed as the result of a public records request. Lodged Reply, Doc. 138, 10 p. 13; Doc. 139, pp. 4-5. The plaintiff maintains in his motion to strike that he originally 11 received these documents on a thumb drive and they are pertinent to the 2022 Buyer Principal 12 Hiring Process. Doc. 139, p. 5. 13 In their response, the defendants state that they have conducted further investigations 14 and agree that the plaintiff is correct. Doc. 142, p. 2. They do not object to the exclusion of 15 Exhibit B. Id. 16 In Exhibit D of the proposed reply, the defendants attached the “notes from the scored 17 first interview” because they believed that the plaintiff inadvertently failed to attach them to 18 his Controverting Statement of Facts. Doc. 138, p. 36. The plaintiff explains in his motion 19 to strike that he did attach them (they are marked Exhibits 1, 2, and 3) and therefore Exhibit 20 D is redundant. Doc. 139, p. 7. 21 In their response, the defendants concede that Exhibit D is redundant and do not 22 object to its exclusion. Doc. 142, p. 6. 23 Exhibit A, which is attached to the proposed reply, contains an Amended Declaration 24 of Cathy Bohland and an Amended Declaration of Scott Loomis. Doc. 138-1. The original 25 Declarations of Cathy Bohland and Scott Loomis are attached to the defendants’ Statement 26 of Facts in support of their motion for summary judgment, but they lack an acknowledgment 27 that they were completed “under penalty of perjury” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Doc. 28 106-1, pp. 379-391. The plaintiff noticed the omission and argued in his Controverting 1 Statement of Facts that the Declarations could not be used by the defendants to support their 2 motion for summary judgment. Doc. 139, p. 2. Apparently, the defendants attempted to fix 3 the error by attaching amended declarations as Exhibit A to their proposed reply brief. Doc. 4 139, p. 2. 5 The plaintiff moves that the court strike the Amended Declarations. Doc. 139. He 6 directs the court to Harris Tech. Sales, Inc. v. Eagle Test Sys., Inc., No. 06-02471-PHX-RCB, 7 2008 WL 343260, at *6 (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 2008). In that case, he explains, a “statement from 8 a plaintiff’s witness [that lacked the statutory language] was deemed inadmissible and no 9 opportunity to cure was allowed in the motion for partial summary judgment.” Doc. 139, p. 10 3. 11 This court agrees with Harris in so far as that court held that a statement that fails to 12 comply with section 1746 is inadmissible for the purposes of a motion for summary 13 judgment. Harris at *5-6. And this court agrees with the plaintiff that the Harris court did 14 not state that the plaintiff could cure the error. There was, however, no indication in Harris 15 that the plaintiff asked the court for an opportunity to do so. Harris does not stand for the 16 proposition that this court may not allow the defendants an opportunity to cure their error by 17 offering amended declarations. 18 As the Harris court noted, “summary judgment practice” is to promote “judicial 19 efficiency” and avoid “costly litigation.” Harris at *2. It would be contrary to Fed.R.Civ.P. 20 1 to forbid the defendants from amending their declarations if, as the plaintiff concedes here, 21 they would be able to admit the declarants’ statements under oath at trial. Doc. 139, p. 4. In 22 fact, the recently amended Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(1) provides that “[i]f a party fails to properly 23 support an assertion of fact [offered on a motion for summary judgment] . . . the court may 24 . . . give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact. . . .”); see, e.g., Matos v. 25 Merck & Co., 2015 WL 894253, at *2, n. 6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2015) (“Because Merck has 26 cured this defect by submitting a supplemental declaration from Cooper, in which he 27 reaffirms and declares that he made . . . each of the assertions of fact . . . subject to and under 28 1 the penalties of perjury. . . the Court declines to strike the declaration from the summary 2 judgment record.”) (punctuation modified), aff’d, 643 F. App’x 187 (3d Cir. 2016). 3 The plaintiff suggests that the defendants’ “error” might have been a purposeful 4 attempt to submit the declarants’ testimony in a manner that would allow them to avoid 5 culpability if any of their statements proved false. Doc. 139, p. 2. The plaintiff, however, 6 does not offer any evidence to support this theory. 7 The plaintiff further asserts that he would be prejudiced if the court allowed the 8 defendants to correct their error now, but he does not explain how it would be better for him 9 to confront the declarants’ statements at trial rather than in summary judgment proceedings. 10 If the declarants’ statements prove that there is no genuine issue of material fact and a trial 11 would be unnecessary, everyone, including the plaintiff, would benefit from knowing that 12 now rather than later. 13 The court is, however, sympathetic to the plaintiff’s argument that the defendants’ 14 inclusion of the defective declarations in their original Statement of Facts influenced the 15 arguments he presented in his response brief and his Controverting Statement of Facts. Doc. 16 143, p. 3. He argues that he “would thus be prejudiced and irreparably harmed” if the court 17 were to allow the defendants to file corrected statements. Doc.143, p. 3. The court does not 18 entirely agree. If the amended declarations were allowed, some of the arguments he made 19 in his response brief would become moot.

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Bluebook (online)
Nirosh H. De Silva v. Pima County Government; et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nirosh-h-de-silva-v-pima-county-government-et-al-azd-2026.