Nirangtar LLC d/b/a Red Roof Inn Cave City v. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedJanuary 23, 2026
Docket1:23-cv-00184
StatusUnknown

This text of Nirangtar LLC d/b/a Red Roof Inn Cave City v. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company (Nirangtar LLC d/b/a Red Roof Inn Cave City v. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nirangtar LLC d/b/a Red Roof Inn Cave City v. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company, (W.D. Ky. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY BOWLING GREEN DIVISION CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-00184-GNS-HBB

NIRANGTAR LLC PLAINTIFF d/b/a RED ROOF INN CAVE CITY

v.

NAVIGATORS SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motions in Limine (DN 68, 70). The motions are ripe for adjudication. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Nirangtar LLC (d/b/a Red Roof Inn Cave City) (“Red Roof”) alleges that a storm caused damage to its property. (Compl. ¶ 5, DN 1-1). At the time of the loss, Red Roof had an insurance policy with Defendant Navigators Specialty Insurance Company (“Navigators”). (Compl. ¶ 7). Claiming Navigators has refused to pay for the storm damage repairs as required by the policy, Red Roof filed this suit. (Compl. ¶ 15). II. JURISDICTION The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action through diversity jurisdiction because there is complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). III. STANDARD OF REVIEW “A motion in limine is ‘any motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered.’” Louzon v. Ford Motor Co., 718 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 (1984)). The purpose of a motion in limine is to “narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Id. (quoting Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990)). “It is often difficult to resolve evidentiary objections outside the context of trial, and Courts will exclude evidence on a motion in limine only when the challenged evidence

is clearly inadmissible.” Lotz v. Steak N Shake, Inc., No. 5:19-277-DCR, 2021 WL 2270353, at *1 (E.D. Ky. June 3, 2021) (citations omitted). “Unless the evidence meets this high standard, ‘rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.’” Gresh v. Waste Servs. of Am., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (quoting Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004)). Rulings on motions in limine are preliminary and entirely based on the discretion of the district court, which can later change its rulings. United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994). IV. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant’s Motions in Limine (DN 68) 1. Hearsay Testimony Navigators moves to exclude all evidence and testimony that consists of hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Def.’s Mot. Lim. 1, DN 68); see Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Red Roof objects in part. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Lim. 1). Red Roof acknowledges that hearsay is generally inadmissible, but correctly notes that the Federal Rules of Evidence provide exceptions to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 802-04, 807. Of course, both parties are expected to comply with the Federal Rules of Evidence. Brown v. TG Auto. Sealing Ky., LLC, No. 5:22-CV-00026-GNS-LLK, 2024 WL 3656218, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2024) (citing A.Hak Indus. Servs. BV Techcorr USA, LLC, Techcorr USA Mgmt., LLC v. A.Hak Indus. Servs. B.V., No. 3:11-CV-74, 2014 WL 12591696, at *2 (N.D.W. Va. Dec. 18, 2014) (“[C]ourts have denied motions in limine as improper when they merely seek an order requiring the parties to comply with court rules or the law . . . .”)). Navigators also contends that certain fact witnesses—namely Rodney Vanlandingham (“Vanlandingham”) and perhaps Dennis Kurttila (“Kurttila”)—may attempt to offer improper

hearsay testimony. (Def.’s Mot. Lim. 2). Red Roof argues that Navigators is attempting to make an untimely Daubert motion pointing out that although Kurttila was initially listed as a fact witness, he has been subsequently identified as an expert witness. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Lim. 1, 5). Accordingly, Red Roof has disclosed Kurttila’s expert report, and he has been deposed. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Lim. 1). Red Roof describes Vanlandingham as its “factual expert witness,” having listed him in its expert witness disclosure and asserted that he was not required to provide an expert report under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(c). (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Lim. 3; Pl.’s Expert Witness Disclosure 1, DN 77-1). Per this Court’s order, all Daubert motions were due by June 27, 2025. (Order 1, DN 41).

This Court denied Navigators’ motion to exclude Kurttila’s expert testimony. (Mem. Op. & Order 12, DN 58). Navigators did not move to exclude Vanlandingham’s expert testimony. Thus, both Kurttila and Vanlandingham may offer their expert opinions at trial. An expert may rely on hearsay in forming opinions, and that hearsay may only be presented to the jury “if [its] probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs [its] prejudicial effect.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. Accordingly, Navigators’ motion is denied. 2. Separate Witnesses Navigators moves the Court to order separation of witnesses at all trial proceedings. (Def.’s Mot. Lim. 2). Red Roof does not object. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Lim. 5). Federal Rule of Evidence 615(a) requires a court to exclude witnesses from the courtroom if a party requests exclusion. Fed. R. Evid. 615(a). This motion is therefore granted, and all witnesses shall be excluded from the courtroom.

3. “Reptile Theory” Tactics Navigators moves the Court to prohibit counsel from utilizing “Reptile Theory” tactics, which it defines as follows: [T]he “Reptile” theory attempts to utilize emotions, such as fear and anger, to impart upon the jury to award damages without regard to legal standards of care or violations of same. By doing so, a jury’s emotional appeal is influenced by portraying a defendant as a dangerous “threat” to the jury’s community and aims to bypass logical valuations of fact in favor of an emotional response. This is often achieved by establishing broad and vague “community” standards of care that are not grounded in any applicable law.

(Def.’s Mot. Lim. 2-3). Red Roof does not object, so long as Navigators is also prevented from using these same inappropriate tactics. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Lim. 5). This motion is therefore granted. 4.

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Related

Luce v. United States
469 U.S. 38 (Supreme Court, 1984)
United States v. Leonard Joseph Yannott
42 F.3d 999 (Sixth Circuit, 1995)
Moien Louzon v. Ford Motor Company
718 F.3d 556 (Sixth Circuit, 2013)
Indiana Insurance v. General Electric Co.
326 F. Supp. 2d 844 (N.D. Ohio, 2004)
Gresh v. Waste Services of America, Inc.
738 F. Supp. 2d 702 (E.D. Kentucky, 2010)

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Nirangtar LLC d/b/a Red Roof Inn Cave City v. Navigators Specialty Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nirangtar-llc-dba-red-roof-inn-cave-city-v-navigators-specialty-kywd-2026.