Nippon Dry Goods Co. v. United States

4 Cust. Ct. 563, 1940 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3909
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedJanuary 19, 1940
DocketNo. 4704; Entry No. 6048
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 4 Cust. Ct. 563 (Nippon Dry Goods Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nippon Dry Goods Co. v. United States, 4 Cust. Ct. 563, 1940 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3909 (cusc 1940).

Opinion

Cline, Judge:

This is an appeal for a reappraisement of certain wearing apparel made of rayon fabrics. The merchandise was imported from Yokohama, Japan, on November 16, 1935, and, upon entry thereof at the port of San Francisco, the importer added the total amount of 165.86 yen to the invoice value to meet advances made by the appraiser on merchandise covered by entries 6532, 6785, and 10238. The amounts added to the various items are noted in lead pencil on the invoice opposite the extended total value of the items. A so-called “duress” certificate attached to the invoice contains the following;

It is contended that duty should be assessed on the basis of a value exclusive of the items specified; in other words, that the Japanese textile tax is not a part of dutiable value.
Items: Japanese textile tax of 4 percent on all rayon and/or woolen goods articles equals Yen 165.86.

The merchandise was appraised at its entered value which included the amount added under duress by the importers. Counsel for both parties agree in their briefs that the question involved is whether or not an amount equal to a certain Japanese consumption tax should be added to the invoice value of the merchandise to make foreign value.

Evidence was introduced in this case on July 10, 1936, February 23, 1938, June 15, 1938, and March 15, 1939. At the trial on March 15, 1939, objections were made to the receipt of certain documentary evidence. The exhibits were marked for identification and the objections taken under advisement. These objections will be disposed of first.

The plaintiff offered an affidavit of Kazo Takemura executed in San Francisco on June 7, 1938, and, on objection thereto, it was marked “Exhibit 7 for identification.” The record shows that the objection was made to the receipt of the affidavit on the ground that Kazo Takemura is not the author thereof as an inspection of it would indicate that it could not have been drawn by a Japanese. At the close of defendant’s case, counsel for the Government raised a further objection, namely, that the affidavit does not comply with the provisions of section 501 of the Tariff Act of 1930 because it is not shown that the personal attendance of the witness could not reasonably be had at the trial.

The plaintiff called Mr. James G. Otagiri as a witness. He testified that he was the secretary of the importing company and that Mr. Kazo Takemura was in Japan at the time of that hearing (March 15, 1939); that the affidavit was sworn to in his presence by Mr. Takemura on June 7, 1938; that Mr. Takemura, whose place of business is in Yokohama, Japan, came to the United States in May 1938 and remained 3 or 4 months; that the next day after he executed the [565]*565affidavit he left for New York but later he returned to San Francisco from which place he sailed for Japan. The plaintiff called also Mr. Minoru lino, an attaché of the consul general’s office in San Francisco, who testified that he was able to read and speak both the English and the Japanese languages; that on June 7, 1938, he accurately and truthfully interpreted the affidavit and read it to Mr. Takemura, who swore to the same, and that he, the witness, also signed the document on the last page before a notary public.

In the brief filed by counsel for the defendant the only reason urged for rejection of the affidavit is that it was executed in San Francisco and the affiant was present in San Francisco on June 8, 1938, which is 5 days prior to the beginning of the court’s calendar at that port and the presence of the affiant before the court could easily have been accomplished. The record discloses that the affiant executed the affidavit on June 7, 1938, and left the next day for New York and that subsequently he returned to San Francisco and sailed for Japan; that the case was called for trial in San Francisco on June 15, 1938, which is 8 days after the affidavit was executed; that at that hearing counsel for the Government moved for a continuance on the ground that he was not ready to proceed. This is shown by the following excerpt from the record of the hearing on June 15, 1938:

Mr. Tuttle. This case has been partially tried and if the Government is ready to try its case, we are ready. But we don’t want to put in all of our evidence and have the case continued to another docket.
* * * * # * ijc
Mr. McDeemott. The Government is not ready.
Judge Evans. How long has this case been on?
Mr. Tuttle. The matter was first tried two years ago.
Judge Evans. It seems to me everything ought to have been ready in that time.
Mr. McDeemott. I have correspondence to the effect our office requested another special agent’s report, and that report has not been received as yet.
Judge Evans. Well, what are you doing? Are you asking for a continuance?
Mr. McDeemott. I am asking for a continuance of two dockets.
Judge Evans. Continued at the request of the Government for two dockets.

On this state of the record it is obvious that counsel for the plaintiff can not be censured for failing to offer his evidence at the hearing on June 15, 1938. Exhibit 7, for identification, was offered in evidence at the trial on March 15, 1939, which is over 9 months after it was executed, and the affiant was not in the United States at that time. If the affidavit had been offered when the affiant was present in the United States and was available as a witness at the place of hearing, that might alter the situation. It may be well to point out that in the case of United States v. Arthur Schuster et al., Reap. Dec. 4328, 73 Treas. Dec. 1594, an affidavit executed in El Paso, Tex., the day before the trial at El Paso, was admitted in evidence upon a showing that the affiant lived in Chihuahua, Mexico, which is 200 miles distant [566]*566from El Paso, and, in Hensel, Bruckmann & Lorbacher, Inc. v. United States, Reap. Dec. 4209, 73 Treas. Dec. 1350, affidavits of persons residing in the United States, but not in New York, where the hearing was held, were admitted. When the case was before the Third Division of the court on appeal (United States v. Hensel, Bruckmann & Lorbacher, Inc., 1 Cust. Ct. 591, Reap. Dec. 4376), counsel for the Government argued that the admission of the affidavits was error but the court held that the admission of such evidence was within the discretion of the trial court. Upon rehearing of the case, however, the court reviewed its decision on that point and held that, since an objection was made to the admission of the affidavits on the ground that it was not shown that the witnesses could not be produced at the trial, such objection should have been sustained in the absence of evidence showing that the witnesses were not available. United States v. Hensel, Bruckmann & Lorbacher, Inc., Reap. Dec. 4523. The court said:

The language is plain that affidavits may be admitted of persons whose attendance cannot reasonably be had.

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12 Cust. Ct. 376 (U.S. Customs Court, 1944)

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Bluebook (online)
4 Cust. Ct. 563, 1940 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 3909, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nippon-dry-goods-co-v-united-states-cusc-1940.