Ninoska Veronica Flores Aguilar v. CoreCivic, Inc., et al.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedDecember 29, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-01952
StatusUnknown

This text of Ninoska Veronica Flores Aguilar v. CoreCivic, Inc., et al. (Ninoska Veronica Flores Aguilar v. CoreCivic, Inc., et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ninoska Veronica Flores Aguilar v. CoreCivic, Inc., et al., (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NINOSKA VERONICA FLORES No. 1:25-cv-01952-DJC-CSK AGUILAR, 12

13 Petitioner, ORDER 14 v. 15 CORECIVIC, INC., et al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner is a noncitizen from Nicaragua who entered the United States in 2022 19 and was detained shortly thereafter. (Mot. (ECF No. 2-1) at 2.) Petitioner was then 20 released from custody, though the parties dispute the terms of her release. (Id.; 21 Opp’n (ECF No. 8) at 1.). In October of 2025, Petitioner was re-detained. (Mot. at 3; 22 Opp’n at 1.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Pet. (ECF No. 1)) and 23 a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) seeking release from the 24 custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Because there is a 25 significant dispute as to the facts of this case, Petitioner has not established likelihood 26 of success on the merits. Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s Motion for 27 Temporary Restraining Order and sets a further briefing schedule on a preliminary 28 injunction. 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 3 injunction are “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 4 Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, 5 Plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable 6 harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in her 7 favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 8 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious 9 questions going to the merits’ — a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the 10 merits — then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips 11 sharply in the plaintiff's favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” All. for 12 the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). The 13 Ninth Circuit employs a sliding scale approach to the Winter factors, under which a 14 strong showing on the balance of hardships may compensate for a lesser showing of 15 likelihood of success. See Where Do We Go Berkeley v. California Dep't of Transp., 32 16 F.4th 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2022). 17 DISCUSSION 18 Petitioner has not established a likelihood of success on the merits at this stage 19 of the proceedings. Petitioner initially asserted that she was subject to the 20 discretionary detention scheme set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which entitles Petitioner 21 to a pre-deprivation bond hearing. (Pet. ¶ 33.) However, Petitioner did not present 22 the Court with evidence supporting these facts and appears to concede in her Reply 23 that she may have been paroled rather than released on her own recognizance under 24 section 1226. (Reply (ECF No. 9) at 3.) The government also maintains that Petitioner 25 was previously paroled pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5) and that her parole was 26 subsequently revoked. (Opp’n at 1.) 27 Absent evidence clarifying the terms of her release, the Court cannot identify 28 which statutory scheme Petitioner is subject to. And without this information, the 1 Court cannot find Petitioner has established likelihood of success on the merits of her 2 claims as the statutory and constitutional rights attendant to the potentially applicable 3 statutes differ.1 If Petitioner was previously released on her own recognizance 4 pursuant to section 1226(a), she is likely entitled to a bond hearing. See Lopez v. 5 Lyons, No. 2:25-cv-03174-DJC-CSD, 2025 WL 3124116, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025); 6 Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01543-DJC-SCR, 2025 WL 3248059, at *2–4 (E.D. Cal. 7 Nov. 19, 2025); Mariagua v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01744-DJC-CSK, 2025 WL 8 3551700, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025). However, if Petitioner was released on 9 parole pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5), the factual details concerning whether and how 10 that parole was terminated determine whether Petitioner’s statutory or due process 11 rights have been violated by her present detention. See De la Torre v. Lyons, No. 12 1:25-CV-01516-DJC-CSK, 2025 WL 3237885, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). 13 Accordingly, Petitioner has not yet established she is likely to succeed on or 14 serious questions going to the merits of her claims and, therefore, is not entitled to 15 preliminary relief. See Apache Stronghold v. United States, 101 F.4th 1036, 1049 (9th 16 Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1480 (2025), reh'g denied, No. 24-291 (U.S. Oct. 6, 17 2025) (explaining that the “first factor—likelihood of success on the merits—is the most 18 important, and when a plaintiff has failed to show the likelihood of success on the 19 merits, we need not consider the remaining three factors” (cleaned up)).2 20 CONCLUSION 21 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 22 1. Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) is DENIED. 23 2. On or before January 2, 2026, Petitioner may file a further brief in support of 24 his request for a preliminary injunction. On or before January 9, 2026,

25 1 As these facts will also make clear if the pending Ninth Circuit appeal in Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. 26 Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025) will be dispositive of the issues in this case, the Court declines to grant Respondents’ request to stay all further briefing deadlines at this stage. (See Opp’n at 1–2.) 27 2 The Court declines to address Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) as it fails to follow the 28 Local Rules governing filing of motions. See L.R. 230(b). 1 Respondents may file an opposition. On or before January 14, 2026, 2 Petitioner shall file a reply, if any, to Respondents’ opposition. The 3 Preliminary Injunction is not currently set for a hearing, but the Court may 4 subsequently order one if it determines a hearing is necessary. 5 3. Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is DENIED WITHOUT 6 PREJUDICE to refilling a properly noticed motion in compliance with the 7 Local Rules. 8 9 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 10 | Dated: _ December 26, 2025 “Daal J CoO □□□□ Hon. Daniel alabretta " UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 | Jc7 - Aguilar25ev01952.tro 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Ninoska Veronica Flores Aguilar v. CoreCivic, Inc., et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ninoska-veronica-flores-aguilar-v-corecivic-inc-et-al-caed-2025.