1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NINOSKA VERONICA FLORES No. 1:25-CV-01952-DJC-CSK AGUILAR, 12
13 Petitioner, ORDER 14 v. 15 CORECIVIC, Inc., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Ninoska Veronica Flores Aguilar is an immigration detainee who 19 received a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge in response to this Court’s 20 prior Order that Respondents provide her with one. At the hearing, the Immigration 21 Judge denied bond, concluding that Petitioner was a flight risk. Petitioner now 22 requests additional relief, contending that the bond hearing she received was 23 constitutionally inadequate. For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner’s request is 24 DENIED. 25 On March 19, 2026, this Court granted Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus and 26 ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing within seven (7) days. 27 (Prior Order (ECF No. 20).) Judgment was entered the same day. (ECF No. 21.) On 28 March 25, 2026, Petitioner appeared for a bond hearing before an Immigration 1 Judge. (See generally March 25, 2026 Recording (ECF No. 24) at Ex. 1 (lodged audio 2 recording).) Because Petitioner’s counsel, Mario Salgado, was not present in court, 3 the Immigration Court contacted Petitioner’s counsel over the phone. (Id.) After 4 communicating with Petitioner’s counsel, the Immigration Court continued the 5 hearing to the next day, March 26, 2026. (Id. at Ex. 2 (lodged audio recording).) On 6 March 26, 2026, Petitioner and different counsel, Victor Garza, appeared for the 7 hearing. (See generally March 26, 2026 Recording (ECF No. 24) at Ex. 3 (lodged 8 audio recording).) At the March 26, 2026, hearing, the Immigration Judge denied 9 bond because she concluded that Petitioner was a flight risk. (Id.; see also IJ Order 10 (ECF No. 24-1) at 2–3.) 11 On April 13, 2026, Petitioner filed a status report with this Court challenging the 12 constitutional sufficiency of the bond hearing she received and requesting additional 13 relief. (Status Rep. (ECF No. 22).) This Court directed Respondents to file a Response 14 to Petitioner’s status report, and Respondents complied. (Resp. (ECF No. 24.)) 15 Respondents also lodged audio recordings with the Court. (See ECF Nos. 25, 26.) 16 Petitioner then filed a Reply. (Reply (ECF No. 27).) 17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 In constitutional challenges to an Immigration Judge’s detention determination, 19 a habeas court generally reviews mixed questions of fact and law under an “abuse of 20 discretion” standard. Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2024). This type of 21 review does not involve “reweigh[ing] evidence” but rather determining whether the 22 Immigration Judge “applied the correct legal standard.” Id. (citation and quotations 23 omitted). “In reviewing the IJ’s determination, a district court may not second guess 24 the IJ’s weighing of the evidence. . . review is limited to whether the IJ’s decision 25 ‘reflects clear legal error or is unsupported by sufficient evidence.’” Quan v. Barr, No. 26 20-cv-08118-LB, 2021 WL 308610, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2021) (citation and 27 quotations omitted). The reviewing court must bear in mind that “the government’s 28 discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due 1 process.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017). Courts may 2 review an Immigration Judge’s finding that an alien poses a flight risk for abuse of 3 discretion. See Zaitsev v. Warden, No. 2:26-cv-00454-SPG-AS, 2026 WL 391429, at 4 *10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026) (collecting cases). 5 DISCUSSION 6 I. Sufficiency of the Bond Hearing 7 Petitioner asserts that she did not have adequate legal counsel at her bond 8 hearing, that the Immigration Judge improperly relied on her lack of tax 9 documentation to find flight risk, and that the Immigration Judge did not conduct an 10 individualized analysis to find she was a flight risk. (See generally Status Rep.) Each of 11 these arguments fails. 12 First, Petitioner claims her right to counsel was violated when “the bond 13 proceeding went forward despite the absence of any meaningful communication 14 between Petitioner and her attorney” because her counsel was “effectively absent.” 15 (Status Rep. at 3.) In her Reply, Petitioner clarifies that “contrary to any implication 16 otherwise[,]” (Reply at 1), “the abbreviated timeline between notice, consultation, and 17 hearing impaired counsel’s ability to adequately prepare evidence, develop the 18 record, and effectively advocate on Petitioner’s behalf,” (id. at 2). Petitioner’s shifting 19 characterization of events is not well taken. The lodged audio recordings reflect that 20 when Petitioner’s counsel failed to appear at the first bond hearing, the Immigration 21 Judge immediately reached out to his office, made contact with counsel, and 22 continued the hearing to the next day. (See Exs. 1, 2.) Therefore, the Immigration 23 Judge complied with her duty that “if counsel fails to appear, the [Immigration Judge] 24 must take reasonable steps to ensure that the immigrant’s statutory right to counsel is 25 honored.” Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1089-90. At the bond hearing the 26 next day, the record further reflects that Petitioner’s counsel was present and 27 advocated on her behalf. (See Ex. 3.) Accordingly, the Court concludes that 28 1 Petitioner is not entitled to relief on her claim that she lacked meaningful 2 representation during her immigration proceedings. 3 Second, Petitioner alternatively contends the Immigration Judge improperly 4 relied on her lack of financial documentation, particularly her lack of tax records, to 5 conclude she was a flight risk. (Status Rep. at 4.) Not so. The record reflects that the 6 Immigration Judge identified multiple independent reasons to warrant a finding of 7 flight risk and denial of bond, in addition to Petitioner’s lack of tax records 8 documentation. For example, the Immigration Judge identified Petitioner’s lack of a 9 stable residential history, her unlawful entry into the country, and her lack of 10 immediate family members from whom she might be able to derive status. The 11 Immigration Judge further observed, upon questioning, that Petitioner was unable to 12 provide an explanation as to why she had not paid taxes since her entry into the 13 country in 2022. (See Ex. 3 at 10:58–12:50.) The Court may not second guess the 14 Immigration Judge’s weighing of the evidence and does not find that the Immigration 15 Judge’s determination reflected clear legal error or lacked sufficient evidence. Quan, 16 2021 WL 308610, at *4.1 17 Third, the Immigration Judge applied the correct legal standard of clear and 18 convincing evidence, which was both individualized to Petitioner and supported by 19 reasoned analysis as the record demonstrates. The Ninth Circuit has explained that if 20 the immigration court “expressly cited and applied the relevant case law in rendering 21 its decision,” the Court accepts that it “applied the correct legal standard,” unless 22 there is an indication that “something is amiss.” Martinez, 124 F.4th at 785 (cleaned 23 up); see Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, after 24 allowing for argument from both parties, the Immigration Judge questioned 25 Petitioner and ultimately concluded that the Government carried its burden to show
26 1 Petitioner’s reliance on Hernandez v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NINOSKA VERONICA FLORES No. 1:25-CV-01952-DJC-CSK AGUILAR, 12
13 Petitioner, ORDER 14 v. 15 CORECIVIC, Inc., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Petitioner Ninoska Veronica Flores Aguilar is an immigration detainee who 19 received a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge in response to this Court’s 20 prior Order that Respondents provide her with one. At the hearing, the Immigration 21 Judge denied bond, concluding that Petitioner was a flight risk. Petitioner now 22 requests additional relief, contending that the bond hearing she received was 23 constitutionally inadequate. For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner’s request is 24 DENIED. 25 On March 19, 2026, this Court granted Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus and 26 ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing within seven (7) days. 27 (Prior Order (ECF No. 20).) Judgment was entered the same day. (ECF No. 21.) On 28 March 25, 2026, Petitioner appeared for a bond hearing before an Immigration 1 Judge. (See generally March 25, 2026 Recording (ECF No. 24) at Ex. 1 (lodged audio 2 recording).) Because Petitioner’s counsel, Mario Salgado, was not present in court, 3 the Immigration Court contacted Petitioner’s counsel over the phone. (Id.) After 4 communicating with Petitioner’s counsel, the Immigration Court continued the 5 hearing to the next day, March 26, 2026. (Id. at Ex. 2 (lodged audio recording).) On 6 March 26, 2026, Petitioner and different counsel, Victor Garza, appeared for the 7 hearing. (See generally March 26, 2026 Recording (ECF No. 24) at Ex. 3 (lodged 8 audio recording).) At the March 26, 2026, hearing, the Immigration Judge denied 9 bond because she concluded that Petitioner was a flight risk. (Id.; see also IJ Order 10 (ECF No. 24-1) at 2–3.) 11 On April 13, 2026, Petitioner filed a status report with this Court challenging the 12 constitutional sufficiency of the bond hearing she received and requesting additional 13 relief. (Status Rep. (ECF No. 22).) This Court directed Respondents to file a Response 14 to Petitioner’s status report, and Respondents complied. (Resp. (ECF No. 24.)) 15 Respondents also lodged audio recordings with the Court. (See ECF Nos. 25, 26.) 16 Petitioner then filed a Reply. (Reply (ECF No. 27).) 17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 In constitutional challenges to an Immigration Judge’s detention determination, 19 a habeas court generally reviews mixed questions of fact and law under an “abuse of 20 discretion” standard. Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2024). This type of 21 review does not involve “reweigh[ing] evidence” but rather determining whether the 22 Immigration Judge “applied the correct legal standard.” Id. (citation and quotations 23 omitted). “In reviewing the IJ’s determination, a district court may not second guess 24 the IJ’s weighing of the evidence. . . review is limited to whether the IJ’s decision 25 ‘reflects clear legal error or is unsupported by sufficient evidence.’” Quan v. Barr, No. 26 20-cv-08118-LB, 2021 WL 308610, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2021) (citation and 27 quotations omitted). The reviewing court must bear in mind that “the government’s 28 discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due 1 process.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017). Courts may 2 review an Immigration Judge’s finding that an alien poses a flight risk for abuse of 3 discretion. See Zaitsev v. Warden, No. 2:26-cv-00454-SPG-AS, 2026 WL 391429, at 4 *10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026) (collecting cases). 5 DISCUSSION 6 I. Sufficiency of the Bond Hearing 7 Petitioner asserts that she did not have adequate legal counsel at her bond 8 hearing, that the Immigration Judge improperly relied on her lack of tax 9 documentation to find flight risk, and that the Immigration Judge did not conduct an 10 individualized analysis to find she was a flight risk. (See generally Status Rep.) Each of 11 these arguments fails. 12 First, Petitioner claims her right to counsel was violated when “the bond 13 proceeding went forward despite the absence of any meaningful communication 14 between Petitioner and her attorney” because her counsel was “effectively absent.” 15 (Status Rep. at 3.) In her Reply, Petitioner clarifies that “contrary to any implication 16 otherwise[,]” (Reply at 1), “the abbreviated timeline between notice, consultation, and 17 hearing impaired counsel’s ability to adequately prepare evidence, develop the 18 record, and effectively advocate on Petitioner’s behalf,” (id. at 2). Petitioner’s shifting 19 characterization of events is not well taken. The lodged audio recordings reflect that 20 when Petitioner’s counsel failed to appear at the first bond hearing, the Immigration 21 Judge immediately reached out to his office, made contact with counsel, and 22 continued the hearing to the next day. (See Exs. 1, 2.) Therefore, the Immigration 23 Judge complied with her duty that “if counsel fails to appear, the [Immigration Judge] 24 must take reasonable steps to ensure that the immigrant’s statutory right to counsel is 25 honored.” Montes-Lopez v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1085, 1089-90. At the bond hearing the 26 next day, the record further reflects that Petitioner’s counsel was present and 27 advocated on her behalf. (See Ex. 3.) Accordingly, the Court concludes that 28 1 Petitioner is not entitled to relief on her claim that she lacked meaningful 2 representation during her immigration proceedings. 3 Second, Petitioner alternatively contends the Immigration Judge improperly 4 relied on her lack of financial documentation, particularly her lack of tax records, to 5 conclude she was a flight risk. (Status Rep. at 4.) Not so. The record reflects that the 6 Immigration Judge identified multiple independent reasons to warrant a finding of 7 flight risk and denial of bond, in addition to Petitioner’s lack of tax records 8 documentation. For example, the Immigration Judge identified Petitioner’s lack of a 9 stable residential history, her unlawful entry into the country, and her lack of 10 immediate family members from whom she might be able to derive status. The 11 Immigration Judge further observed, upon questioning, that Petitioner was unable to 12 provide an explanation as to why she had not paid taxes since her entry into the 13 country in 2022. (See Ex. 3 at 10:58–12:50.) The Court may not second guess the 14 Immigration Judge’s weighing of the evidence and does not find that the Immigration 15 Judge’s determination reflected clear legal error or lacked sufficient evidence. Quan, 16 2021 WL 308610, at *4.1 17 Third, the Immigration Judge applied the correct legal standard of clear and 18 convincing evidence, which was both individualized to Petitioner and supported by 19 reasoned analysis as the record demonstrates. The Ninth Circuit has explained that if 20 the immigration court “expressly cited and applied the relevant case law in rendering 21 its decision,” the Court accepts that it “applied the correct legal standard,” unless 22 there is an indication that “something is amiss.” Martinez, 124 F.4th at 785 (cleaned 23 up); see Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, after 24 allowing for argument from both parties, the Immigration Judge questioned 25 Petitioner and ultimately concluded that the Government carried its burden to show
26 1 Petitioner’s reliance on Hernandez v. Sessions is unavailing because, in that case, there was no dispute 27 that the class of non-citizens at issue was not a flight risk and yet the class remained detained because of the noncitizens’ inability to pay the prescribed bond amount. 872 F.3d 976, 981–82 n.3 (9th Cir. 28 2017). That materially differs from the situation presented in this case. 1 | that Petitioner was a flight risk. As explained above, the Immigration Judge provided 2 | individualized analysis specific to Petitioner in making this determination. (See Ex 3 at 3 | 10:58-12:50 4 For all these reasons, the Court concludes that the Immigration Judge did not 5 | abuse her discretion or commit clear legal error. Therefore, Petitioner's request for 6 | additional relief is DENIED. 7 CONCLUSION 8 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Status 9 | Report requesting additional relief (ECF No. 22) is DENIED. 10 14 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 12 | Dated: _May 29, 2026 “Darel A CDbnetto Hon. Daniel alabretta 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28