Nine v. Grant Town

437 S.E.2d 250, 190 W. Va. 86, 1993 W. Va. LEXIS 231
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 15, 1993
Docket21559
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 437 S.E.2d 250 (Nine v. Grant Town) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nine v. Grant Town, 437 S.E.2d 250, 190 W. Va. 86, 1993 W. Va. LEXIS 231 (W. Va. 1993).

Opinion

MILLER, Justice:

Grant Town, along with its mayor and council, (hereinafter collectively called “Town”), appeals the summary judgment order of the Circuit Court of Marion County entered on August 7, 1992. 1 The circuit court held that the Town’s excise tax on public utilities enacted pursuant to W.Va. Code, 8-13-5a (1971), 2 was invalid because it had not been published according to the requirements contained in W.Va.Code, 8-13-13 (1971), 3 which authorizes a municipality to adopt tax ordinances for certain essential or special services. This section requires publication of the ordinance. 4 The circuit court determined that the publication language in W.Va.Code, 8-13-13, required publication after the ordinance was adopted. Because the Town had only published the ordinance before it was adopted, the circuit court found the ordinance was invalid.

*88 The Town contends that the general publication provisions in W.Va.Code, 8-ll-4(a)(2) (1969), are applicable. This provision requires that a revenue ordinance must be published “[a]t least five days before the meeting at which a proposed ordinance ... is to be finally adopted!.]” 5 The Town also argues that only the revenue ordinances set out in W.Va.Code, 8-13-13, are covered by its separate publication provision and that the Town’s excise tax on public utilities authorized under W.Va.Code, 8-13-5a, is not within the Section 13 categories.

We agree with these contentions. First, as a preliminary matter with regard to the publication of an ordinance, we stated in City of Moundsville v. Yost, 75 W.Va. 224, 228, 83 S.E. 910, 912 (1914), that the purpose of publication is “to protect the property owners liable to special assessment as well as the general taxpayers by ample notice!.]” The chief purpose of any publication is to give advance notice of the occurrence of an event. This is to allow interested citizens to have a voice in the matter, and, in the case of an ordinance, to influence its passage or defeat. See generally 5 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 16.76 (3d ed. & 1989 Rev.). We recognized in Hager v. Melton, 66 W.Va. 62, 66 S.E. 13 (1909), that it is permissible to specifically require that an ordinance, after its adoption, not take effect until publication has been made. However, in the absence of express language requiring publication after a statute or ordinance has been passed, we concluded that a general statutory requirement for publication should be construed to require advance publication before its adoption.

Thus, with regard to the publication requirements of W.Va.Code, 8-13-13, because the statute is silent as to when publication should be made with regard to the adoption of an ordinance, the general rule is that publication should be done in advance of the passage of the ordinance. This will achieve the requisite advance notice to interested citizens.

We also find that W.Va.Code, 8-13-13, does not apply to a public utility tax enacted under W.Va.Code, 8-13-5a. There are a number of cases that have been decided under W.Va.Code, 8-13-13. These cases indicate that the purpose of W.Va.Code, 8-13-13, is to allow municipalities to enact tax ordinances to defray the cost of certain municipal services and to impose the tax on its citizens who are users of such services. See, e.g., City of Fairmont v. Pitrolo Pontiac-Cadillac Co., 172 W.Va. 505, 308 S.E.2d 527 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958, 104 S.Ct. 2169, 80 L.Ed.2d 553 (1984); Ellison v. City of Parkersburg, 168 W.Va. 468, 284 S.E.2d 903 (1981); State ex rel. Plymale v. City of Huntington, 147 W.Va. 728, 131 S.E.2d 160 (1963); McCoy v. City of Sistersville, 120 W.Va. 471, 199 S.E. 260 (1938). These cases do not indicate that W.Va.Code, 8-13-13, applies to every tax ordinance that may be adopted by a municipality.

The plain language of W.Va.Code, 8-13-13, recognizes the general publication provisions of W.Va.Code, 8-11-4(a)(2), 6 but foregoes that publication requirement in favor of the more stringent publication requirements of Class II legal advertisements, i.e., publication once a week for two successive *89 weeks. 7 It is clear from the foregoing statutory language that the publication requirements in W.Va.Code, 8-13-13, are only applicable to municipal ordinances imposing taxes that are authorized by that section.

Moreover, W.Va.Code, 8-13-5a, is one of a number of tax revenue sources permitted to be utilized by municipalities. 8 In none of these sections are there any specific requirement for publication. If the legislature intended to require an ordinance adopted under these sections, such as W.Va.Code, 8-13-5a, to be subject to the publication standards set out in W.Va.Code, 8-13-13, it could have referenced that section. In the absence of any specific publication requirements within W.Va.Code, 8-13-5a, the general publication provisions of W.Va.Code, 8-ll-14(a)(2), are applicable to the enactment of a municipal tax ordinance under W.Va.Code, 8-13-5a.

Finally, we do not think it can be argued that the Town’s tax on public utilities is a service tax under W.Va.Code, 8-13-13, requiring the publication standards enunciated therein to be followed. When the language of W.Va.Code, 8-13-5a, is examined, it is clear that what is levied is an excise tax which is collected by the utility from its customers within the municipality. 9 This tax does not fall within W.Va.Code, 8-13-13, which relates to taxes raised by a municipality that furnishes services to its citizens. Rather, the tax imposed under W.Va.Code, 8-13-5a, is on utility services supplied by public utilities not owned by the municipality. This service is supplied not through any labor or cost to the municipality, and even the collection of the tax is performed by the utility.

The legislature’s language under W.Va. Code, 8-13-13, is based on the premise that a municipality incurs some expense for furnishing, installing, continuing maintenance, or improving a service it renders to its citizens. 10 This type of service tax is distinguishable from the legislature’s authorization of a specific amount of tax revenue collected by a municipality for an activity conducted by a third party within the municipality. This distinguishing characteristic is the hallmark of the tax outlined in W.Va.Code, 8-13-5a, and related sections of Article 13. 11

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Bluebook (online)
437 S.E.2d 250, 190 W. Va. 86, 1993 W. Va. LEXIS 231, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nine-v-grant-town-wva-1993.