Niles v. USA

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 20, 2026
• Docket: 25-63
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID E. NILES, No. 25-63 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:24-cv-05597-MJP v. MEMORANDUM** UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; NICHOLAS W. BROWN*,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 3, 2026 Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, PAEZ, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

David Niles presents Second Amendment challenges to three statutes: the

Washington law that directs courts to prohibit firearm possession upon entry of a

qualifying protection order, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.800; the Washington law that

* Nicholas W. Brown is substituted in for Robert Ferguson in his official capacity as Attorney General of Washington. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. criminalizes firearm possession by individuals subject to a qualifying protection

order, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.040(2)(a)(ii); and the latter law’s federal

counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Because the parties are familiar with the facts,

we do not recite them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

reverse and remand.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. Regino

v. Staley, 133 F.4th 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2025). Our de novo review includes

jurisdictional questions related to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Cogan v.

Trabucco, 114 F.4th 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 2024), and ripeness, Stockton v. Brown,

152 F.4th 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2025).

Because the complaint does not ask a federal court to overturn a state-court

judgment, the district court erred in barring Niles’s complaint under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.

280, 284 (2005) (holding that Rooker-Feldman “is confined to cases of the kind

from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers . . .

inviting district court review and rejection of [state-court] judgments”). Niles

challenges the lawfulness of Washington’s statutes as implemented in the

protection order rather than the protection order itself. See id. at 293 (“If a federal

plaintiff presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion

that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party, then there is

2 25-63 jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under

principles of preclusion.” (citation modified)); Miroth v. County of Trinity, 136

F.4th 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2025) (noting that even if a lawsuit “might imply the

invalidity of the state court’s judgment,” that “does not mean that Rooker-Feldman

applies”); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that

Rooker-Feldman does not bar a challenge to the “continued enforcement” of a

statute “by an adverse party” (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir.

2003))). And regarding the challenge to section 922(g)(8), the United States

agrees with Niles that Rooker-Feldman does not apply.

Ripeness also does not bar Niles’s challenges. Niles’s claims arise from

purported violations of his Second Amendment rights, which do not require

demonstration of “some special need” before he can invoke them. See New York

State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 70 (2022). Niles alleges that

the statutes he challenges currently prohibit him from possessing a firearm.

Because Niles sufficiently alleges an injury in fact, constitutional ripeness is

satisfied, and prudential ripeness considerations also lead us to conclude that

Niles’s claims are ripe. See Stavrianoudakis v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 108

F.4th 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2024) (setting forth the considerations for evaluating

ripeness).

We remand to the district court to resolve Niles’s Second Amendment

3 25-63 challenges as well as to consider any other objections to Niles’s suit that could be

interposed, including issue preclusion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

4 25-63