NIKKI BROWN * NO. 2024-CA-0388 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR * CHILD JARRED MICHAEL COURT OF APPEAL CAFFEY * FOURTH CIRCUIT VERSUS * STATE OF LOUISIANA JASON CAFFEY *******
APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 1998-14152, DIVISION “K” Honorable Bernadette D'Souza, Judge ****** Judge Roland L. Belsome ****** (Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Dale N. Atkins)
Christine L. DeSue ATTORNEY AT LAW 3445 N. Causeway Blvd. Suite 505 Metairie, LA 70002
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
Renee L. Swanson RENEE SWANSON, LLC 412 Dolhonde Street Gretna, LA 70053
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
AFFIRMED DECEMBER 27, 2024 RLB
DLD
DNA
Appellant Jason Caffey (“Mr. Caffey”) seeks review of the trial court’s
judgment which denied, in part, his petition to annul a contempt judgment that
ordered him to pay child support arrearages. For the reasons that follow, the trial
court’s judgment is affirmed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal arises from a decades old action to establish and enforce child
support. The initial action in this matter was instituted in August 1998 when
Appellee Nikki Brown (“Ms. Brown”) filed a petition to establish paternity and
support obligation against Mr. Caffey. Ms. Brown and Mr. Caffey were never
married and have two children together, J.M.C. and J.A.B.
In June 1999, the parties entered into a consent agreement that established
child support in the amount of $7,500.00 per month. In February 2000, the trial
court signed an order ex parte making the consent agreement a part of the record.
1 In December 2000, the trial court granted Ms. Brown’s rule for contempt and wage
assignment order. Thereafter, Mr. Caffey moved to rescind the December 2000
contempt judgment. Ms. Brown also filed a motion and order to rescind the
judgment and submitted an interim amended judgment. The hearing on the
motions resulted in the trial court entering an interim amended judgment
establishing child support in an amount of $7,500.00 per month and ordering of
DNA test. Mr. Caffey appealed the judgment; however, during the pendency of
the appeal to this Court, the parties entered into a consent agreement in April 2002.
The April 2002 Consent Agreement (“the April 2002 Agreement”), which is the
subject of the present appeal, was entered into the record on April 30, 2002.
Notably, the April 2002 Agreement does not bear the trial judge’s signature or a
place for the trial judge’s signature.
In December 2002, Ms. Brown moved to have the consent agreement made
part of the record. The matter was then set for a hearing.
The procedural history thereafter is called into question as the remainder of
the record suggests portions are missing. Namely, in February 2008, Mr. Caffey
filed a rule to decrease child support that references an August 16, 2005 consent
judgment. Additionally, the record in Mr. Caffey’s bankruptcy matter in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Alabama, took notice
of the pending rule to decrease child support and a proof of claim filed by Ms.
Brown in the bankruptcy proceedings. Despite efforts to locate any missing
volumes of the record in this case, the purported August 2005 consent judgment
could not be located. Likewise, the bankruptcy record did not contain an August
2005 consent judgment.
2 Nevertheless, in December 2007, Ms. Brown filed a rule for contempt for
failure to pay child support. On February 12, 2008, the trial court found Mr.
Caffey in contempt and made executory child support arrearages in the amount of
$214,000.00. In October 2018, Ms. Brown filed another rule for contempt alleging
that Mr. Caffey failed to meet his child support obligation since February 2008.
While awaiting a hearing on Ms. Brown’s rule for contempt, in November 2018,
the trial court signed a qualified domestic relations order regarding the February
2008 judgment of contempt and child support arrearages. In April 2019, a hearing
on Ms. Brown’s October 2019 rule for contempt was held, and the trial court
rendered judgment in May 2019, finding Mr. Caffey in contempt and made
executory the child support arrearages of $791,250.00.
In January 2023, Ms. Brown filed a rule to show cause to sign the domestic
relations order. Thereafter, Mr. Caffey filed petitions to annul the May 2019
judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. arts. 2002 and 2004. The trial court heard the
matter in March 2019 and rendered judgment granting in part and denying in part
Mr. Caffey’s petitions to annul. Mr. Caffey files the instant appeal of the trial
court’s denial of his petition to annul pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2004 only.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In this case, the trial court granted in part Mr. Caffey’s petition to annul
based on inadequate service as provided by La. C.C.P. art. 2002; however, the trial
court denied in part Mr. Caffey’s petition to annul pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2004,
finding that Ms. Brown’s action to collect on child support arrears is not
prescribed. A trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for manifest error.
Richard v. Richard, 14-1365, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/3/15), 171 So.3d 1097, 1100.
Whereas, appellate review of questions of law are “simply a decision as to whether
3 the trial court’s decision is legally correct or incorrect.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
The granting of a petition to annul a judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 2004
requires proof that the judgment was obtained through fraud or ill practices.
Determination of whether a judgment was obtained through fraud or ill practices
considers whether: “(1) the circumstances under which the judgment was rendered
showed the deprivation of legal rights of the litigant seeking relief, and (2) the
enforcement of the judgment would have been unconscionable and inequitable.”
Power Mktg. Direct, Inc. v. Foster, 05-2023, p. 12 (La. 9/6/06), 938 So.2d 662,
670. Our jurisprudence further recognizes that “there need not necessarily be a
showing of intentional fraud or wrongdoing for a [petitioner] to prevail…Even
innocent acts which deprive a party cast in judgment of some legal right can form
the basis of [a] nullity action.” Id., 05-2023, pp. 12-13, 938 So.2d at 671 (citation
omitted).
Mr. Caffey maintains that the parties’ April 2002 Agreement was never
made a judgment of the trial court. Therefore, he cannot be held in contempt for
violating a judgment that does not exist. On this basis, he claims the May 2019
contempt judgment for failure to pay child support was obtained by ill practice in
violation of La. C.C.P. art. 2004.
While Mr. Caffey makes much of whether the April 2002 Agreement is
deemed a judgment or a contract between the parties, we find that, in this particular
case, how the child support obligation was memorialized is of no moment. The
outcome remains the same. We address below the child support obligation under
each form separately.
4 Existence of the Child Support Judgment
Although Mr. Caffey argues on appeal that no judgment memorializes the
April 2002 Agreement, we note that Mr. Caffey’s own pleadings indicate that a
consent judgment was in fact made a part of the record. Namely, Mr. Caffey’s
February 11, 2008 rule to decrease child support references a child support
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NIKKI BROWN * NO. 2024-CA-0388 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR * CHILD JARRED MICHAEL COURT OF APPEAL CAFFEY * FOURTH CIRCUIT VERSUS * STATE OF LOUISIANA JASON CAFFEY *******
APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 1998-14152, DIVISION “K” Honorable Bernadette D'Souza, Judge ****** Judge Roland L. Belsome ****** (Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Dale N. Atkins)
Christine L. DeSue ATTORNEY AT LAW 3445 N. Causeway Blvd. Suite 505 Metairie, LA 70002
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
Renee L. Swanson RENEE SWANSON, LLC 412 Dolhonde Street Gretna, LA 70053
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
AFFIRMED DECEMBER 27, 2024 RLB
DLD
DNA
Appellant Jason Caffey (“Mr. Caffey”) seeks review of the trial court’s
judgment which denied, in part, his petition to annul a contempt judgment that
ordered him to pay child support arrearages. For the reasons that follow, the trial
court’s judgment is affirmed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal arises from a decades old action to establish and enforce child
support. The initial action in this matter was instituted in August 1998 when
Appellee Nikki Brown (“Ms. Brown”) filed a petition to establish paternity and
support obligation against Mr. Caffey. Ms. Brown and Mr. Caffey were never
married and have two children together, J.M.C. and J.A.B.
In June 1999, the parties entered into a consent agreement that established
child support in the amount of $7,500.00 per month. In February 2000, the trial
court signed an order ex parte making the consent agreement a part of the record.
1 In December 2000, the trial court granted Ms. Brown’s rule for contempt and wage
assignment order. Thereafter, Mr. Caffey moved to rescind the December 2000
contempt judgment. Ms. Brown also filed a motion and order to rescind the
judgment and submitted an interim amended judgment. The hearing on the
motions resulted in the trial court entering an interim amended judgment
establishing child support in an amount of $7,500.00 per month and ordering of
DNA test. Mr. Caffey appealed the judgment; however, during the pendency of
the appeal to this Court, the parties entered into a consent agreement in April 2002.
The April 2002 Consent Agreement (“the April 2002 Agreement”), which is the
subject of the present appeal, was entered into the record on April 30, 2002.
Notably, the April 2002 Agreement does not bear the trial judge’s signature or a
place for the trial judge’s signature.
In December 2002, Ms. Brown moved to have the consent agreement made
part of the record. The matter was then set for a hearing.
The procedural history thereafter is called into question as the remainder of
the record suggests portions are missing. Namely, in February 2008, Mr. Caffey
filed a rule to decrease child support that references an August 16, 2005 consent
judgment. Additionally, the record in Mr. Caffey’s bankruptcy matter in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Alabama, took notice
of the pending rule to decrease child support and a proof of claim filed by Ms.
Brown in the bankruptcy proceedings. Despite efforts to locate any missing
volumes of the record in this case, the purported August 2005 consent judgment
could not be located. Likewise, the bankruptcy record did not contain an August
2005 consent judgment.
2 Nevertheless, in December 2007, Ms. Brown filed a rule for contempt for
failure to pay child support. On February 12, 2008, the trial court found Mr.
Caffey in contempt and made executory child support arrearages in the amount of
$214,000.00. In October 2018, Ms. Brown filed another rule for contempt alleging
that Mr. Caffey failed to meet his child support obligation since February 2008.
While awaiting a hearing on Ms. Brown’s rule for contempt, in November 2018,
the trial court signed a qualified domestic relations order regarding the February
2008 judgment of contempt and child support arrearages. In April 2019, a hearing
on Ms. Brown’s October 2019 rule for contempt was held, and the trial court
rendered judgment in May 2019, finding Mr. Caffey in contempt and made
executory the child support arrearages of $791,250.00.
In January 2023, Ms. Brown filed a rule to show cause to sign the domestic
relations order. Thereafter, Mr. Caffey filed petitions to annul the May 2019
judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. arts. 2002 and 2004. The trial court heard the
matter in March 2019 and rendered judgment granting in part and denying in part
Mr. Caffey’s petitions to annul. Mr. Caffey files the instant appeal of the trial
court’s denial of his petition to annul pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2004 only.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In this case, the trial court granted in part Mr. Caffey’s petition to annul
based on inadequate service as provided by La. C.C.P. art. 2002; however, the trial
court denied in part Mr. Caffey’s petition to annul pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2004,
finding that Ms. Brown’s action to collect on child support arrears is not
prescribed. A trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for manifest error.
Richard v. Richard, 14-1365, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/3/15), 171 So.3d 1097, 1100.
Whereas, appellate review of questions of law are “simply a decision as to whether
3 the trial court’s decision is legally correct or incorrect.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
The granting of a petition to annul a judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 2004
requires proof that the judgment was obtained through fraud or ill practices.
Determination of whether a judgment was obtained through fraud or ill practices
considers whether: “(1) the circumstances under which the judgment was rendered
showed the deprivation of legal rights of the litigant seeking relief, and (2) the
enforcement of the judgment would have been unconscionable and inequitable.”
Power Mktg. Direct, Inc. v. Foster, 05-2023, p. 12 (La. 9/6/06), 938 So.2d 662,
670. Our jurisprudence further recognizes that “there need not necessarily be a
showing of intentional fraud or wrongdoing for a [petitioner] to prevail…Even
innocent acts which deprive a party cast in judgment of some legal right can form
the basis of [a] nullity action.” Id., 05-2023, pp. 12-13, 938 So.2d at 671 (citation
omitted).
Mr. Caffey maintains that the parties’ April 2002 Agreement was never
made a judgment of the trial court. Therefore, he cannot be held in contempt for
violating a judgment that does not exist. On this basis, he claims the May 2019
contempt judgment for failure to pay child support was obtained by ill practice in
violation of La. C.C.P. art. 2004.
While Mr. Caffey makes much of whether the April 2002 Agreement is
deemed a judgment or a contract between the parties, we find that, in this particular
case, how the child support obligation was memorialized is of no moment. The
outcome remains the same. We address below the child support obligation under
each form separately.
4 Existence of the Child Support Judgment
Although Mr. Caffey argues on appeal that no judgment memorializes the
April 2002 Agreement, we note that Mr. Caffey’s own pleadings indicate that a
consent judgment was in fact made a part of the record. Namely, Mr. Caffey’s
February 11, 2008 rule to decrease child support references a child support
judgment from August 16, 2005, with the same terms as those in the April 2002
Agreement and which have been asserted throughout the life of this litigation—
$7,500.00 per month for both children in child support. This admission in Mr.
Caffey’s own pleading suggests that portions of the record are missing (including
the purported August 16, 2005 judgment) and that the parties proceeded in the
action as though there was a judgment. Mr. Caffey’s counsel went as far as
admitting so in pleadings filed on his behalf. Both parties filed pleadings in
accordance with this fact.
Further, the February 12, 2008 judgment rendered in connection with Ms.
Brown’s December 28, 2007 rule for contempt, established child support arrears in
the amount of $214,000.00. The judgment does not reference any prior judgments
or plainly state that a child support obligation was owed. Nevertheless, without
evidence of any intervening judgment for child support, namely the August 16,
2005 judgment, the arrearage had to be based on some monthly amount and could
have only been determined by the April 2002 Agreement. Therefore, even
assuming Mr. Caffey’s counsel was incorrect in referencing an August 16, 2005
consent judgment, a contention he does not make, the April 2002 Agreement was
recognized and approved by the trial court’s reliance on its terms to calculate the
amount of arrearages. Thus, the April 2002 Agreement became merged with the
February 12, 2008 contempt judgment that made the child support arrearage
5 executory.
Mr. Caffey argues that even if the April 2002 Agreement is a valid
judgment, it would have been unenforceable by the time she filed her October
2019 rule for contempt. He claims that if considered a judgment, it is a money
judgment that prescribed after ten years and would have needed to be revived
before the lapse of the prescriptive period pursuant to La. C.C. art. 3501.
However, the law distinguishes money judgments under La. C.C. art. 3501
and child support judgments, which are specifically governed by La. R.S. 13:4291.
A child support judgment is treated differently from an ordinary money judgment
because it arises from an obligation of a parent to provide for the support of their
child.
La. R.S. 13:4291 addresses past-due child support rendered pursuant to the
judgment ordering the support. Under La. R.S. 13:4291(A)(1), “prescription shall
not begin to run against any such judgment until the child reaches the age of
majority or the obligation to provide child support ceases.” La. R.S.
13:4291(A)(2) states that a “judgment rendered in a summary proceeding
determining the amount of delinquent child support owed shall become a judicial
mortgage when it is final and has been recorded…[t]he effect of recordation…shall
prescribe ten years from the date of the judgment, unless revived and reinscribed in
accordance with law.” (Emphasis added). Additionally, La. C.C. art. 3501.1
provides, “[a]n action to make executory arrearages of child support is subject to a
[prescriptive period] of ten years.” As the trial court explained, “[o]nce the
obligation ceases, there is a ten-year prescriptive period to make the arrears
executory.”
Applying La. R.S. 13:4291 demonstrates that the prescriptive period in this
6 case has not lapsed. Prescription did not begin to run until the parties’ children
reached the age of majority. The parties’ son reached the age of majority in 2015,
and their daughter reached the age of majority in 2017. Mr. Caffey’s child support
obligation does not prescribe until 2025 and 2027. Therefore, we find no merit to
Mr. Caffey’s argument that even if the obligation to pay child support is deemed a
judgment, rather than an agreement, that the obligation has prescribed. On this
basis, the trial court correctly denied Mr. Caffey’s petition for nullity pursuant to
La. C.C. art. 2004.
Extrajudicial Agreement
Mr. Caffey also argues that because the April 2002 Agreement was never
made a judgment of the trial court it is nothing more than a contract between
himself and Ms. Brown. Mr. Caffey relies on La. C.C. art. 3499, which provides a
ten-year prescriptive period for personal actions. As such, Mr. Caffey maintains
that Ms. Brown had until April 2012 to seek enforcement of their April 2002
Agreement. We find no merit to Mr. Caffey’s argument.
La. C.C. art. 3462, provides in pertinent part, “[p]rescription is
interrupted…when the obligee commences action against the obligor.” Likewise,
“[a]n interruption of prescription resulting from the filing of a suit…continues as
long as the suit is pending.” La. C.C. art. 3463(A). Interruption continues in this
way unless “the plaintiff abandons the suit, voluntarily dismisses the suit…or fails
to prosecute the suit at the trial.” La. C.C. art. 3463(B). Furthermore, “dismissal
of a suit pursuant to a compromise does not constitute a voluntary dismissal.” Id.
The record is clear that Ms. Brown at no point abandoned or voluntarily
dismissed her action to seek enforcement of Mr. Caffey’s obligation to pay child
support. Ms. Brown’s December 2007 rule for contempt for failure to pay child
7 support, which resulted in the February 2008 judgment, would have interrupted
prescription. Therefore, even if the April 2002 Agreement did not become merged
and made a part of the February 2008 judgment, the April 2002 Agreement is not
prescribed.
CONCLUSION
Whether the April 2002 Agreement is a contract agreement or a judgment,
the result remains the same. As the trial court rightly concluded, “[i]f there is no
judgment, there is an agreement, and prescription is interrupted during the
pendency of the litigation. If there is a judgment, the prescription of the obligation
established therein will not begin to prescribe until ten years after the children
reach the age of majority.” The procedural concerns Mr. Caffey raises on appeal
do not change the fact that Mr. Caffey’s child support obligation is not prescribed.
DECREE
We find no error in the trial court’s denial of Mr. Caffey’s petition to annul
pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2004. Therefore, the trial court’s April 8, 2024 judgment
granting in part and denying in part Mr. Caffey’s petitions for nullity is affirmed.
AFFIRMED December 27, 2024