Nikea Jean Smedley v. Aly Toure

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: June 30, 2026
• Docket: 40841-8
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED JUNE 30, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

NIKEA JEAN SMEDLEY, ) ) No. 40841-8-III Appellant, ) ) and ) ) ALY TOURE, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondent. )

STAAB, C.J. — Nikea Smedley appeals the trial court’s final child support order,

arguing the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) failing to order Aly Toure to pay past

due child support and medical support, (2) granting Toure a downward deviation from the

standard child support calculation without substantial evidence or written findings, and

(3) failing to impose sufficient conditions on the allocation of tax dependency

exemptions. No. 40841-8-III Smedley v. Toure

We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant Toure a downward deviation and

impose conditions on the allocation of exemptions. However, we reverse that portion of

the court’s final order that refused to address the issue of past child support and expenses.

RCW 26.26B.020(3) requires a judgment and order to contain appropriate provisions

concerning the liability for past support if that issue is before the court. Here, the issue

was raised by Smedley’s petition and was properly before the court. While the court had

some discretion in determining the extent of Toure’s liability for past support, refusing to

address the issue was an abuse of discretion.

BACKGROUND

Smedley and Toure have two children in common (the twins). The twins were

born September 13, 2020. Smedley has one additional child, and Toure has four. The

parties were not married when the twins were born, but both parents signed and filed a

paternity acknowledgment.

On December 7, 2021, Smedley filed an application for nonassistance child

support services with the Department of Social and Health Services, Division of Child

Support (DCS). Following a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) signed a final

order of establishment for child support. The ALJ considered each party’s income and

circumstances and applied a downward deviation to Toure’s monthly obligation because

of his additional children. The ALJ ordered Toure to pay ongoing monthly support and

back support from December 7, 2021. Pursuant to WAC 388-14A-3350(1)(a), the order

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provided that the order of support became effective on the date Smedley applied for

services.

On April 15, 2022, Smedley filed a petition in superior court seeking a parenting

plan or residential schedule for the twins. On July 8, 2022, she filed a second petition

under the same cause number asking the court to order current and back child support

along with medical costs and other expenses.

On September 28, 2022, Smedley moved for a temporary family law order in

superior court requesting child support, day care support, and medical support.

Additionally, she sought “back child support from September 13, 2020, through

December 6, 2021, prior to the DCS administrative order which was established

beginning December 7, 2021.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 35. The superior court entered a

temporary child support order on January 13, 2023. It granted Toure a downward

deviation from the standard calculation because of his other children. The court reserved

the question of past due child support, medical support, and other expenses for trial.

Trial was held on April 26, August 16, and September 28, 2023.

The court issued a letter ruling that was incorporated into the final child support

order by reference. The letter ruling acknowledged that “[t]he only unresolved issues in

this parentage action are the amount of Mr. Toure’s support obligation and Mrs.

Smedley’s request for back support.” CP at 467. The court outlined several factors

considered in determining the amount of support due. These factors included the number

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of children, net monthly income, depreciation of rental property, periods of voluntary

unemployment for international travel, self-employment business expenses, and health

concerns. The order included a child support worksheet, which detailed the parties’

income and expenses and contained the “whole family formula deviation” calculations.

CP at 148-55. The court concluded Toure was “entitled to a whole family discount for

children from other relationships” and indicated that Smedley “agrees [Toure] is entitled

to that deviation for five but not six of his children.” CP at 468. Under “Tax Issues,” in

the child support order, each parent was entitled to claim one of the twins as a dependent

for purposes of personal tax exemptions.

With respect to past due support, the court’s letter ruling provided:

From the date of the children’s birth until December 7, 2021, Mr. Toure paid some amount to support the children without any order compelling him to do so. An administrative law judge, L’ Nayim Shuman Austin, imputed income to Mr. Toure and ordered him to pay Mrs. Smedley support monthly in the amount of $469.00. Her ruling disposes of all issues arising between December 7, 2021, and January 17, 2023, the date Commissioner Middleton issued the temporary support order in this case which superseded it, including Mrs. Smedley’s request to be compensated for medical insurance premiums during that time.

CP at 468. The court found Toure did not owe past support from September 13, 2020,

through December 6, 2021. It recorded this finding in section 23 of the order by

checking all of the form’s provided boxes to indicate that no parent owed past due child

support, medical support, or other expenses, nor interest on past due support.

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Smedley moved for reconsideration. With respect to past due support and the

downward deviation, the trial court denied the motion.

With respect to each parent’s right to claim a child as a dependent on tax returns,

Smedley requested that the court place a condition on Toure’s right to claim one of the

twins—if Toure was not current on his support obligations by December 31 each year, he

would lose his right to the tax exemption. The court agreed: “Yeah, he’s not able to

claim them where he doesn’t pay his child support, you will be able to claim them.” Rep.

of Proc. (RP) at 21.

The court held a post-reconsideration presentment hearing on November 15, 2024.

The parties argued over the condition placed on Toure’s ability to claim one of the twins

as a dependent. Smedley wanted to ensure Toure was current on all child support

obligations—including day care and medical expenses—before he was entitled to the

exemption. Toure argued the exemption should only rely on his prompt payment of

monthly child support because the other obligations could fluctuate according to billing

practices or inopportune timing. The court agreed with Toure, ruling that “he is not

allowed to claim an exemption/dependency or Child Tax Credit for that calendar year in

which he was delinquent on the . . . monthly ongoing support payment as of 31

December.” CP at 453.

Smedley also asked the court to rewrite the provision in section 23 relating to past

due amounts. Smedley explained that Toure was undisputedly thousands of dollars in

5 No. 40841-8-III Smedley v. Toure

arrears from the temporary orders, and the final order as written prevented DCS from

continuing its collection efforts. The court agreed to revise the order. The court stated,

“I’m just going to have just remove the checks. Leave the boxes unchecked.” RP at 55.

Toure’s counsel confirmed: “Okay, so the court’s reversing itself on the box checks.” RP

at 55. And the court replied: “On the box checks, that’s right.” RP at 55.

Section 23 of the revised final child support order states: “This order does not

address any past due amounts or interest owed. . . . The court acknowledges that past due

amounts (arrears) assessed by [DCS] in accordance with the court’s previous child

support orders remain valid and enforceable and are not affected or altered by the

provisions of this order.” CP at 455.

Smedley appeals. Toure did not filed a responsive brief that complied with the

RAPs.1

ANALYSIS

Smedley argues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) failing to order past due

child support and medical support, (2) granting Toure a downward deviation from the

standard child support calculation without substantial evidence or written findings, and

1 Toure moved for oral argument, and Smedley objected to the motion. We denied this motion because Toure is precluded from presenting oral argument under RAP 11.2(a) (“A party of record may present oral argument only if the party has filed a brief.”). Here, Toure’s briefs were rejected for filing, and he failed to file an amended brief that complied with the RAPs. 6 No. 40841-8-III Smedley v. Toure

(3) failing to impose sufficient conditions on the allocation of tax dependency

exemptions. We set forth the standard of review, then discuss each contention in turn.

We review a trial court’s order of child support for abuse of discretion. In re

Parentage of A.L., 185 Wn. App. 225, 238, 340 P.3d 260 (2014). A trial court abuses its

discretion when its decision rests on unreasonable or untenable grounds or when its

ruling relies on an erroneous understanding of the facts or incorrect legal analysis. Id. at

238-39. Under this standard, “we give great deference to the trial court’s determination:

even if we disagree with the trial court’s ultimate decision, we do not reverse that

decision unless it falls outside the range of acceptable choices because it is manifestly

unreasonable, rests on facts unsupported by the record, or was reached by applying the

wrong legal standard.” State v. Curry, 191 Wn.2d 475, 484, 423 P.3d 179 (2018).

“We review a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine

whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and, if so,

whether the conclusions are supported by those findings.” Welch Foods, Inc. v. Benton

County, 136 Wn. App. 314, 321, 148 P.3d 1092 (2006). “Substantial evidence” is

“evidence . . . sufficient to persuade a rational, fair-minded person that the finding is

true.” Cantu v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 168 Wn. App. 14, 21, 277 P.3d 685 (2012).

1. PAST DUE CHILD SUPPORT AND MEDICAL SUPPORT

Smedley raises several arguments as to why the trial court erred by failing to order

past due child support and medical support from the date of the twins’ birth, September

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13, 2020, through the date of the DCS order, December 6, 2021. We do not address all of

these arguments because we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing

to address Smedley’s request for past child support and expenses in its final order.

The “birth of a child gives rise to certain rights and responsibilities, including the

obligation imposed by law to provide for the maintenance and welfare of the child.”

Hughes v. Hughes, 11 Wn. App. 454, 461, 524 P.2d 472 (1974). The total support

obligation includes basic child support, health care costs, and certain other expenses such

as day care costs. RCW 26.19.080. The requirements of chapter 26.19 RCW apply to

petitions filed under “Dissolution Proceedings” (ch. 26.09 RCW) and the Uniform

Parentage Act of 2002, ch. 26.26 RCW. RCW 26.09.100; RCW 26.26B.020.

When determining the extent of liability for past support, the court may exercise

discretion within certain parameters. State v. Base, 131 Wn. App. 207, 217, 126 P.3d 79

(2006) (interpreting a former version of this statute under RCW 26.26.130(3) and (5)).

For instance, “[a] court may not order payment for support provided or expenses incurred

more than five years prior to the commencement of the action.” RCW 26.26B.040.

Additionally, “[t]he court may limit the parent’s liability for the past support to the child

to the proportion of the expenses already incurred as the court deems just.” RCW

26.26B.020(5). While courts retain some discretion regarding past child support, the

court is required to determine “the extent of any liability for past support furnished to the

child if that issue is before the court,” and the judgment and order must state the court’s

8 No. 40841-8-III Smedley v. Toure

finding. RCW 26.26B.020(3); see RCW 26.18.020(5) (“duty of support” includes

“necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and health care”); State v. Burns, 190 Wn.

App. 826, 833, 363 P.3d 1 (2015) (concluding the definition of “duty of support” in

former RCW 26.18.020(3) (2016), recodified as RCW 26.18.020(5), applies to ch. 26.19

RCW).

Here, the court initially determined that the extent of Toure’s liability for past due

support was zero. The court’s letter ruling acknowledged Smedley’s request for back

support but found that “[f]rom the date of the children’s birth until December 7, 2021,

Toure paid some amount to support the children without any order compelling him to do

so.” CP at 468. The proposed order on child support had six boxes checked, indicating

that no parent owed past due child support, medical support, or other expenses, nor

interest on past due support.

On reconsideration, Smedley argued that the court failed to make a ruling on back

support, or alternatively, that it erred by finding Toure’s liability was zero. The court

denied reconsideration, recalling its reasoning and noting it was not satisfied with the

documentation of the money Toure paid and “the records that were made for the tax

form.” RP at 33.

However, at the presentment hearing following reconsideration, the court

indicated, “I’m just going to have just remove the checks. Leave the boxes unchecked.”

RP at 55. Toure’s counsel confirmed, “Okay, so the court’s reversing itself on the box

9 No. 40841-8-III Smedley v. Toure

checks.” RP at 55. And the court replied, “On the box checks, that’s right.” RP at 55.

The final order on child support explicitly states that it “does not address any past due

amounts or interest owed.” CP at 455.

The court’s final order constitutes an abuse of discretion. While we recognize that

the court was attempting to address several competing concerns, RCW 26.26B.020(3)

required the court to decide the extent of Toure’s liability for any past due child support if

that issue was before the court. The final order acknowledges that past due child support

was before the court but goes on to conclude that it was not deciding the issue. This is an

abuse of discretion. As such, we remand for the trial court to decide whether and to what

extent Toure owes past support, including expenses, and enter findings as required by

RCW 26.26B.020.2

2. DOWNWARD DEVIATION

Smedley next contends the court erred by granting Toure a downward deviation in

his child support obligation without making the requisite findings and without substantial

evidence to support those findings. We disagree.

“The court may deviate from the standard calculation when either or both of the

parents . . . owe[ ] a duty of support” to children from other relationships. RCW

2 We recognize that the trial court judge has since retired. Consequently, on remand, the assigned judge will need to conduct another evidentiary hearing and make findings and conclusions as to the extent of Toure’s liability for past support furnished, including expenses. See RCW 26.26B.030(3).

10 No. 40841-8-III Smedley v. Toure

26.19.075(1)(e). Such deviation “shall be based on consideration of the total

circumstances of both households.” RCW 26.19.075(1)(e)(iv). “All income and

resources of the parties before the court . . . and other adults in the households shall be

disclosed and considered.” RCW 26.19.075(2). “When reasons exist for deviation, the

court shall exercise discretion in considering the extent to which the factors would affect

the support obligation.” RCW 26.19.075(4). “The court shall enter findings that specify

reasons for any deviation or any denial of a party’s request for any deviation from the

standard calculation made by the court.” RCW 26.19.075(3). “However, the lack of a

trial court’s specific findings is not fatal, and in the absence of a finding on a particular

issue, an appellate court may look to the oral opinion to determine the trial court’s basis

for the deviation.” In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 560, 918 P.2d 954

(1996).

Here, the court entered written findings, determining a downward deviation was

appropriate because Toure supported children from other relationships. The court

indicated the finding was supported by an attached worksheet. The worksheet

contemplated the income and obligations of each party and calculated the whole family

formula deviation. As such, the court satisfied the statute’s requirement to “enter

findings that specify reasons for any deviation.” See RCW 26.19.075(3).

Smedley argues the court failed its statutory duty because it did not consider the

total circumstances of both households, specifically whether Toure has additional adults

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with additional income in his household. This argument fails for two related reasons.

First, “[a] trial court is not obligated to make findings of fact on every contention of the

parties. Rather, it is required to find only the material facts of the case, that is, findings

sufficient to inform us, on material issues, what questions the trial court decided and the

manner in which it did so.” City of Tacoma v. Fiberchem, Inc., 44 Wn. App. 538, 541,

722 P.2d 1357 (1986).

Second, an appellant must provide a sufficient record for review. RAP 9.2(b);

Tacoma S. Hosp., LLC v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., 19 Wn. App. 2d 210, 220, 494 P.3d 450

(2021). Here, Smedley did not provide a transcript of the trial or of the original

presentment hearing that presumably contained the court’s oral findings and opinion.

The court’s letter ruling and final child support order demonstrate that it considered

multiple factors including each of the parties’ additional children and household finances.

The record before us does not support Smedley’s contention that the court ignored any

critical factor.

Smedley also challenges the court’s statement that Smedley “agrees [Toure] is

entitled to that deviation for five but not six of his children.” CP at 468. She argues the

assertion is false, and moreover, that under RCW 26.19.075(5), “[a]greement of the

parties is not by itself adequate reason for any deviations from the standard calculation.”

See Appellant’s Br. at 32. She further contends that “ ‘acknowledgment of other

children’ is insufficient to support a deviation.” Appellant’s Br. at 17 (quoting In re

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Marriage of Choate, 143 Wn. App. 235, 244, 177 P.3d 175 (2008)). Although we agree

with the legal principles Smedley cites, the record does not indicate that the court relied

on Smedley’s alleged agreement to determine the deviation. Nor did the court merely

acknowledge the existence of Toure’s other children. Instead, the court considered the

number and domicile of other children, their alleged health concerns and financial needs,

and the parties’ nuanced financial situations based on self-employment.

In sum, the trial court entered a written finding specifying the reason for

determining a downward deviation. To the extent Smedley argues the finding is

unsupported, she fails to provide a sufficient record for review. As such, we find no

abuse of discretion.

3. TAX EXEMPTION CONDITIONS

Finally, Smedley argues that by conditioning the tax exemption solely on ongoing

monthly support, the court undermined the comprehensive nature of child support

obligations as outlined in RCW 26.19.080(3). We disagree.

Indeed, the statute requires health care costs and day care expenses to be shared by

the parents proportionately as part of the total child support obligation. RCW

26.19.080(2)-(3). However, nothing in the statute precludes a court from conditioning a

certain provision of a parenting plan on prompt payment of a single aspect of the child

support obligation. As such, Smedley fails to show that the court abused its discretion by

imposing the condition.

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CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s final order declining to address past child support,

including expenses, and remand for the court to determine the issue of past child support

and expenses. Otherwise, we affirm the court’s orders granting Toure a downward

deviation from the standard child support calculation and conditioning Toure’s ability to

claim a tax exemption solely on prompt payment of child support. We determine

Smedley is the substantially prevailing party for purposes of seeking costs on appeal.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

_________________________________ Staab, C.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, J.

_________________________________ Cooney, J.