Nijhawan v. Reid

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Nijhawan v. Reid

2017 NY Slip Op 2046, 148 A.D.3d 1034, 49 N.Y.S.3d 756

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 22, 2017

Docket2016-01982

StatusPublished

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 2046 (Nijhawan v. Reid) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Nijhawan v. Reid, 2017 NY Slip Op 2046, 148 A.D.3d 1034, 49 N.Y.S.3d 756 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Brathwaite Nelson, J.), dated January 28, 2016, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when the left front side of his vehicle struck the right rear side of the defendants’ tractor-trailer, which was stopped in the center westbound lane of the Long Island Expressway in Queens. The plaintiff thereafter commenced this action against the defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending that the defendant driver was not at fault in the happening of the accident and that the plaintiff’s negligent operation of his vehicle was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The Supreme Court denied the motion.

*1035 The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that their vehicle was stopped on the Long Island Expressway due to mechanical failure for about five minutes when it was rear-ended by the plaintiff’s vehicle, and that the defendant driver was not at fault in causing the accident (see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]; Boulos v Lerner-Harrington, 124 AD3d 709, 709 [2015]; Blasso v Parente, 79 AD3d 923, 925 [2010]; Vespe v Kazi, 62 AD3d 408, 409 [2009]; Arias v Rosario, 52 AD3d 551, 552 [2008]). The evidence submitted by the defendants showed that their vehicle was stopped with its hazard lights activated. The defendant driver had also placed reflective hazard triangles in the roadway to illuminate the stopped vehicle. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Dillon, J.P., Austin, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Brathwaite Nelson, J.), dated January 28, 2016, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when the left front side of his vehicle struck the right rear side of the defendants’ tractor-trailer, which was stopped in the center westbound lane of the Long Island Expressway in Queens. The plaintiff thereafter commenced this action against the defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending that the defendant driver was not at fault in the happening of the accident and that the plaintiff’s negligent operation of his vehicle was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The Supreme Court denied the motion.

*1035 The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence demonstrating that their vehicle was stopped on the Long Island Expressway due to mechanical failure for about five minutes when it was rear-ended by the plaintiff’s vehicle, and that the defendant driver was not at fault in causing the accident (see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]; Boulos v Lerner-Harrington, 124 AD3d 709, 709 [2015]; Blasso v Parente, 79 AD3d 923, 925 [2010]; Vespe v Kazi, 62 AD3d 408, 409 [2009]; Arias v Rosario, 52 AD3d 551, 552 [2008]). The evidence submitted by the defendants showed that their vehicle was stopped with its hazard lights activated. The defendant driver had also placed reflective hazard triangles in the roadway to illuminate the stopped vehicle. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Dillon, J.P., Austin, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 2046, 148 A.D.3d 1034, 49 N.Y.S.3d 756, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nijhawan-v-reid-nyappdiv-2017.

Opinion

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