Nieto v. City of Visalia

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedOctober 17, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-00741
StatusUnknown

This text of Nieto v. City of Visalia (Nieto v. City of Visalia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nieto v. City of Visalia, (E.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 Leonard C. Herr, #081896 Caren L. Curtiss, #311218 2 HERR PEDERSEN & BERGLUND LLP Attorneys at Law 3 100 Willow Plaza, Suite 300 Visalia, California 93291 4 Telephone: (559) 636-0200

5 Attorneys for Defendants, CITY OF VISALIA, CHIEF JASON SALAZAR, OFFICER ANTONIO MATTOS, OFFICER ALEXANDER 6 CRUZ and SERGEANT RYAN PARK

7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, FRESNO DIVISION 10

11 URIEL NIETO, Case No. 1:24-cv-00741-JLT- BAM 12 Plaintiff, [PROPOSED] STIPULATED 13 v. PROTECTIVE ORDER

14 CITY OF VISALIA, a municipal 15 entity; CHIEF JASON SALAZAR, in his individual and official capacity; 16 OFFICER ANTONIO MATOS; OFFICER ALEXANDER CRUZ and 17 SERGEANT RYAN PARK and DOES 1-5, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19

20 21 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and among the Parties hereto, 22 through their respective counsel of record, that the Court grant a protective 23 order, as follows: 24 1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 25 Disclosure and discovery activity in this action are likely to involve 26 production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which 27 special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other 28 than prosecuting or defending this litigation would be warranted. 1 Accordingly, the Parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter 2 this Stipulated Protective Order. 3 The Parties acknowledge that this Stipulated Protective Order does not 4 confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and 5 that the protection it affords extends only to the specified information or 6 items that are entitled, under the applicable legal principles, to treatment as 7 confidential. 8 The Parties further acknowledge, as set forth below, that this 9 Stipulated Protective Order creates no entitlement to file confidential 10 information under seal, except to the extent specified herein; Eastern District 11 Local Rules 141, 141.1 and 251 set forth the procedures that must be 12 followed and reflects the standards that will be applied when a party seeks 13 permission from the court to file material under seal. 14 Nothing in this Stipulated Protective Order shall be construed so as to 15 require or mandate that a Party disclose or produce privileged information 16 or records that could be designated as Confidential Documents/Protected 17 Material hereunder. 18 2. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 19 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need 20 for a protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy 21 in peace officer personnel file records and associated investigative or 22 confidential records for the following reasons: 23 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege 24 of privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy 25 therein that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the 26 Pitchess protective procedure of California Law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana 27 Police Department, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City 28 of Stockton, 2012 WL 394200, *2-3, 5 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while 1 [f]ederal law applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal 2 claims,” the “state privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent 3 significantly assists in applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); 4 Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613, n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace 5 officers have constitutionally-based 6 “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel 7 records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. 8 Defendants further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel 9 file information can threaten the safety of Non-Party witnesses, officers, and 10 their families/associates. 11 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement 12 agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official 13 information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney- 14 client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the 15 personnel files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of 16 peace officer personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal 17 deliberations/decision-making or evaluation analysis, or communications 18 for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis, potentially 19 including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs 20 type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records 21 or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the 22 purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d 15 23 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 24 1089, 1092-105 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D., at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. 25 City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 26 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D.D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. 27 Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D.Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 28 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further contend that 1 such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public 2 entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 3 uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 4 impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and 5 statements and related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; 6 and a chilling of open and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation 7 into alleged misconduct that can erode a public entity’s ability to identify 8 and/or implement any remedial measures that may be required. 9 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the 10 same rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it 11 is contrary to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled 12 release of officers’ compelled statements. (See generally, Lybarger v. City of 13 Los Angeles (1985) 40 Cal.3d 822, 838-830.) 14 Accordingly, although Plaintiff disputes the extent to which the 15 foregoing categories of documents should remain confidential during 16 discovery, the Parties hereby otherwise agree, that to expedite the flow of 17 information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over 18 confidentiality of discovery materials, to adequately protect information the 19 Parties are entitled to keep confidential, to ensure that the Parties are 20 permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in preparation for and 21 in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the litigation, 22 and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is 23 justified in this matter. It is the intent of the Parties that information will 24 not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so 25 designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a 26 confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not 27 be part of the public record of this case. 28 The Parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need 1 for protection as to any medical or psychotherapeutic records, because of the 2 privacy interests at stake. Because of these sensitive interests, a court order 3 should address these documents rather than a private agreement between 4 the Parties. 5 3. DEFINITIONS 6 3.1. Party: Any party to this action, including all of its officers, 7 directors, employees, agents, consultants, retained experts, house counsel 8 and outside counsel (and/or the support staff thereof). 9 3.2.

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