Nielson v. Harley Davidson Motor Company Group

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedMarch 10, 2021
Docket4:18-cv-00013
StatusUnknown

This text of Nielson v. Harley Davidson Motor Company Group (Nielson v. Harley Davidson Motor Company Group) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nielson v. Harley Davidson Motor Company Group, (D. Utah 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

ANGELA K. NIELSON, individually and on MEMORANDUM DECISION behalf of THE ESTATE OF BRETT W. AND ORDER GRANTING NIELSON; RYLEE NIELSON; ERIC MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY NIELSON; and LINDA NIELSON, JUDGMENT AND Plaintiffs, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO SERVE v. DEFENDANT BELLINGHAM HARLEY-DAVIDSON, INC. HARLEY-DAVIDSON MOTOR COMPANY GROUP, LLC; GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES NORTH AMERICA, LTD.; THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.; Case No. 4:18-cv-00013-DN-PK SUMITOMO RUBBER USA, LLC; and BELLINGHAM HARLEY-DAVIDSON, District Judge David Nuffer INC., Magistrate Judge Paul Kohler

Defendants.

This action arises from a motorcycle accident allegedly caused by a sudden and catastrophic failure of the motorcycle’s rear tire.1 Plaintiffs initiated this action against Defendants, whom Plaintiffs allege designed, manufactured, and distributed the motorcycle and its rear tire.2 Plaintiffs assert claims for: (1) negligence and gross negligence; (2) strict products liability; and (3) breach of implied and express warranties.3 Defendants Sumitomo Rubber USA, LLC f/k/a Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, Ltd. (“Sumitomo”), The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (“Goodyear”), and Harley-Davidson Motor Company Group, LLC (“Harley”) seek

1 Second Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) ¶¶ 19-20 at 4, docket no. 57, filed May 2, 2019. 2 Id. ¶¶ 11 at 3, 15 at 4, 25 at 5, 59 at 11-12, 67 at 13, 87 at 17. 3 Id. ¶¶ 24-101 at 5-19. summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims (collectively “Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment”).4 Procedurally, Plaintiffs’ responses5 to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment fail to comply with local rule DUCivR 56-1(c)(3),(4) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1) and fail to

adequately dispute any of the material facts set forth in Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. Substantively, Plaintiffs fail to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Sumitomo, Goodyear, and Harley are entitled to judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of law because causation is an essential element for each of Plaintiffs’ claims and Plaintiffs cannot present sufficient admissible evidence to establish causation. Therefore, Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment6 are GRANTED. Additionally, because it appears from the record that Plaintiffs have not served Defendant Bellingham Harley-Davidson, Inc. (“Bellingham”), by no later than March 19, 2021, Plaintiffs must file a memorandum showing cause as to why their claims against Bellingham should not be dismissed for failure to timely serve and prosecute.

4 Defendant Sumitomo Rubber USA, LLC f/k/a Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, Ltd.’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law (“Sumitomo’s Motion”), docket no. 136, filed Oct. 9, 2020; Defendant The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Law (“Goodyear’s Motion”), docket no. 138, filed Oct. 9, 2020; Harley-Davidson Motor Company Group, LLC’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Law (“Harley’s Motion”), docket no. 139, filed Oct. 9, 2020 (collectively “Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment”). 5 Response to Harley-Davidson Motor Group, LLC’s Second Motion for Final Summary Judgment [Doc. 139] and Supporting Memorandum of Law (“Response to Harley’s Motion”), docket no. 159, filed Nov. 6, 2020; Response to Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 138] and Supporting Memorandum of Law (“Response to Goodyear’s Motion”), docket no. 161, filed Nov. 6, 2020; Response to Defendant Sumitomo Rubber USA, LLC f/k/a Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, Ltd.’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 136] and Supporting Memorandum of Law (“Response to Sumitomo’s Motion”), docket no. 164, filed Nov. 6, 2020. 6 Docket no. 136, filed Oct. 9, 2020; docket no. 138, filed Oct. 9, 2020; docket no. 139, filed Oct. 9, 2020. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment each set forth a statement of undisputed material facts containing separately numbered facts supported by citation to evidence.7 Local rule DUCivR 56-1(c)(3) requires that a response to a statement of undisputed material facts include:

A restatement of each fact the opposing party contends is genuinely disputed or immaterial, a concise statement explaining why the fact is disputed or immaterial, and a citation with particularity to the evidence upon which the non-moving party relies to refute that fact. [And a]ny factual citations must reference the appropriate party’s Appendix of Evidence, rather than either party’s factual statements or responses.8 Plaintiffs made no effort to comply with these requirements in responding to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment.9 Indeed, Plaintiffs did not expressly respond to any of the undisputed material facts set forth in Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs’ responses, instead, included background sections.10 The purported purpose of these sections was to provide “additional background facts.”11 Plaintiffs cite to evidence to support these facts.12 But Plaintiffs do not assert or argue that these facts are material to the disposition of Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, or that they are undisputed.

7 Sumitomo’s Motion at 5-10; Goodyear’s Motion at 6-7; Harley’s Motion at 3-4. 8 DUCivR 56-1(c)(3). 9 Response to Sumitomo’s Motion at 2-7; Response to Goodyear’s Motion at 1-3; Response to Harley’s Motion at 1-5. 10 Response to Sumitomo’s Motion at 2-6; Response to Goodyear’s Motion at 1-2; Response to Harley’s Motion at 1-4. 11 Response to Sumitomo’s Motion at 2; Response to Goodyear’s Motion at 2; Response to Harley’s Motion at 2. 12 Response to Sumitomo’s Motion at 2-6; Response to Goodyear’s Motion at 2; Response to Harley’s Motion at 2-4. Plaintiffs’ responses also included sections titled “Undisputed Material Facts” wherein Plaintiffs assert numerous separately numbered additional facts.13 However, ignoring the requirements of local rule DUCivR 56-1(c)(4) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1), these facts contain no citations to evidence. And they are not directly responsive to the statements of undisputed

material facts in Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. Several options are available when “a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of facts as required by Rule 56(c).”14 Among these options are “[to] consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion . . . [and to] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials – including the facts considered undisputed – show that the movant is entitled to it.”15 Because of Plaintiffs’ complete failure to comply with DUCivR 56-1(c)(3),(4) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1), the undisputed material facts set forth in Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment16 are considered undisputed for purposes of the Motions. Also, the additional “Undisputed Material Facts” set forth in Plaintiffs’ responses17 will not be considered for

purposes of Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. Regardless, even if considered for purposes of Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, none of the background facts or “Undisputed Material Facts” set forth in Plaintiffs’

13 Response to Sumitomo’s Motion at 6-7; Response to Goodyear’s Motion at 2-3; Response to Harley’s Motion at 4-5. 14 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). 15 Id. at 56(e)(2),(3). 16 Sumitomo’s Motion at 5-10; Goodyear’s Motion at 6-7; Harley’s Motion at 3-4. 17 Response to Sumitomo’s Motion at 6-7; Response to Goodyear’s Motion at 2-3; Response to Harley’s Motion at 4-5. responses18 are sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude entry of summary judgment.

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Nielson v. Harley Davidson Motor Company Group, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nielson-v-harley-davidson-motor-company-group-utd-2021.