Nieblo Mfg. Co. v. Preston

31 F.2d 145, 1 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 29, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1034
CourtDistrict Court, D. Vermont
DecidedFebruary 18, 1929
DocketNo. 103
StatusPublished

This text of 31 F.2d 145 (Nieblo Mfg. Co. v. Preston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nieblo Mfg. Co. v. Preston, 31 F.2d 145, 1 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 29, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1034 (D. Vt. 1929).

Opinion

THOMAS, District Judge.

This suit involves the alleged infringement of Lowell patent, No. 1,493,687, for a golfing tee, granted to the plaintiff on May 13, 1924, on an .application filed May 5, 1922.

The defenses are noninfringement and invalidity by reason of anticipation by, and lack of invention over, prior patents and the prior art.

The single claim of the patent in suit reads as follows: “A golfing tee, formed of a single piece of material comprising a cone-shaped shank having a pointed end so as to be readily pressed into the ground, and a disk-shaped member connected with and carried by said shank, said member being dished or concaved in its upper surface to conform to the surface of the ball and surrounded by a marginal ball-retaining and supporting rim, said shank being centrally disposed with relation to the said dished ball-supporting member.”

In the specification the inventor says that this invention “has for its principal object to provide a novel and simply constructed” golfing tee, which is “formed of a single piece of material comprising a cone-shaped shank having ia pointed end so as to be readily forced into the ground, and having a disk-shaped member connected with and carried by said shank, said member being dished or concaved in its upper surface to conform to the surface of the golf-ball and being surrounded by a marginal ball-retaining and supporting rim, and said shank being centrally disposed with relation to the said ball-supporting member.”

It is thus apparent that the claim in suit follows the exact words of the specification as to the main object of the invention. Other objects of' the invention, as appear from the specification, are to provide a neat and cheap teeing deviee which can be carried in the pockets of the players and which will cost so little to manufacture that the loss of such a deviee to the player will be practically nil, and if struck and broken by contact with the club may be readily replaced by another, or if not struck may even be left in the green and another deviee used upon the next tee. This deviee is generally made of wood, but it may be made of material which will disintegrate and act as a fertilizer if left on the green.

The patentee asserts that prior to his invention golfing tees were made either of a plurality of component parts, or, if consisting of a single .element only, they were made of metal. The last-mentioned construction is objectionable because when left on the golf course it is liable to cut the feet of barefooted caddies or penetrate the rubber of [147]*147rubber-soled shoes, as well as nick and dull the blades of lawn mowers used in cutting the grass. It is further asserted that the tees used prior to the patentee’s invention were either ineffective or too expensive.

Plaintiff lays great stress on the extensive sales and commercial success of its golfing tees manufactured under the patent in suit. There is no question in my mind but that at least one form of the devices manufactured and sold by the defendants, as shown by Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, is a Chinese copy of the device manufactured by the plaintiff.

Defendants, contend that the golfing tees manufactured by them do not come within the terms of the claim of the patent in suit, because the plaintiff’s patent must be limited to the exact construction shown in the patent drawings, not only in view of the prior art, but by reason of the self-imposed limitations put therein by the patentee during the prosecution in the Patent Office of the application which eventuated in the patent as issued.

The patented golfing tee comprises a main body member or shank which may be either cone-shaped, as shown in the drawings, or it may taper at one end so as to provide a driving point in order to readily force or press the shank into the ground. Connected with the opposite end portion of the shank is a disk-shaped portion which is dished out or concaved in its upper surface conforming to the curved surface of the golf ball and which is surrounded by a marginal rim, all for the mounting and properly placing of the golf ball upon said disk-shaped portion after the device has been pressed into the ground, as is clearly shown from an inspection of the patent drawings. This golfing tee is usually turned out of wood. If made of celluloid, rubber, or other pliable material, it may be pressed into the desired shape by means of suitable molds.

The whole controversy turns upon the interpretation or construction to be given the following phrase of the claim of the patent, to wit: “Said member (disk-shaped member) being dished or concaved in its upper surface to conform to the surface of the ball and surrounded by a marginal ball-retaining and supporting rim.”

The plaintiff maintains that in the light of the specification, “conforming to the surface of the ball” means that the upper surface of the disk-shaped member conforms to the surface of the ball to the extent that may be necessary in order to permit the ball to rest in the concayity, or, to put it in another way, the conformity need only be a general conformity, and that “surrounded by a marginal ball-retaining and supporting rim” merely refers to the periphery of the concaved surface of the head, and does not call for any substantial breadth-

On the other hand, the defendants contend that the patentee means by the words “to conform to the surface of the golf ball” that the concavity is so formed that every portion of its surface can contact with the golf ball, or a concavity having the same radius of curvature as the golf ball; and that “surrounded by a marginal ball-retaining and supporting rim” means that the disk member is surrounded by a flange or thickened portion in the nature of something more than a mere line or narrow edge on which the ball may rest.

When any doubt exists as to the meaning of <a patent claim, or if it is susceptible of two interpretations, it is both right and proper that reference should be made to the drawings and specification, not for the purpose of changing or altering the claim, but to ascertain the true and proper interpretation to be given it. This is a universal rule. Its application to the case at bar, however, does not shed any light on the question presented, because the language of the specification is no clearer than the claim itself, unless it is attempted to restrict the claim to the precise construction disclosed in the drawings. Of course, a claim in a patent is a statutory requirement for the purpose of compelling a patentee to describe precisely what his invention is, and it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe a claim in a manner different from the import of its terms. Wtiien doubt arises as to the meaning of such terms, the court should place itself in the place of the patentee and the Patent Office Examiner at ‘the time the claim was made, and should read its terms in the light of the facts and circumstances which then surrounded them. These facts may, obviously, be ascertained from the file wrapper and contents of the application for the patent. Having recourse to this, it is manifest that both the patentee and the Patent Office Examiner intended to limit the patented device to a golf tee with a concavity, every portion of the surface of which is adapted to contact with the golf ball because the file wrapper shows that as amended by the amendment filed on or about July 18, 1923, the application contained four claims which stood rejected on United States patent No. 638,929 to Grant, and British patent to Mathew, No: 14,292 of 1897, both of which [148]

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Bluebook (online)
31 F.2d 145, 1 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 29, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1034, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nieblo-mfg-co-v-preston-vtd-1929.