Nicotra v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co.

4 Conn. Super. Ct. 195, 4 Conn. Supp. 195, 122 Conn. 353, 1936 Conn. Super. LEXIS 150
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJune 22, 1936
DocketFile #51475
StatusPublished

This text of 4 Conn. Super. Ct. 195 (Nicotra v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nicotra v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., 4 Conn. Super. Ct. 195, 4 Conn. Supp. 195, 122 Conn. 353, 1936 Conn. Super. LEXIS 150 (Colo. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinion

CORNELL, J.

The parties here are at odds as to whether claimant’s loss of vision to both eyes is the result of an injury suffered to his left eye on November 27, 1933, or due to other causes not arising out of his employment.

Reference to the portions of the transcript certified reveals a considerable amount of medical testimony in substantial *196 agreement to the effect that atrophy of an optic nerve may result from (1) direct trauma; (2) secondary inflammatory conditions ensuing from trauma to the deeper tissues of the eye-ball, as e.g. interstitial keratitis or oedema; (3) toxic conditions and (4) the use of salvarsan in the treatment of syphilis.

Claimant does not contend that the atrophy of the optic nerve of his left eye was the result of direct trauma (i.e. sufficiently severe to fracture the bony canal in back of the eye through which the optic nerve enters the orbit) nor otherwise such that the injury instantly occurred to the optic nerve or its immediate tissue environs, upon being pierced by a foreign body.

Rather he rests his contentions on the theory that a trauma happened to the deeper tissues of the eye-ball through a very small flake or particle of metal, metal rust or rust dust which either lodged in the cornea or struck there and fell out and set up an inflammatory reaction which ultimately involved and destroyed the function of the optic nerve.

The great volume of medical expert testimony is to the effect that any trauma to the eye-ball sufficiently severe to to cause atrophy of an optic nerve or inflammatory conditions efficient for such purpose, would be visible to a physicia,n examining the eye. The evidence is that at no time, notwithstanding that claimant had continual medical attention, was either any foreign substance or any inflammatory condition discerned by any examining physician in the eye-ball as contradistinguished from the conjunctiva or eye-lid. Nor was there discerned any evidence of scarring such as would remain in the cornea, for example, had hemorrhaging occurred there.

Opposed to the medical expert testimony referred to, supra, is that of another physician who states that in his opinion a very small foreign particle may have imbedded itself in the tissue of the eye-ball in such manner as to have caused mechanical injury to the cornea from which point an irritation was set up which communicated posteriorally to the selera and thence to the optic nerve, the involvement causing an extravasation of lymph from the cerebral spinal fluid into the intra-conjunctival space from which an oedema or some occlusion of the optic nerve resulted; although, as he puts it, *197 the same result could have ensued from trauma contractu.

Such a foreign substance as this expert has in mind would be so small and so located in the eye tissue that it would not be revealed by opthalmoscopic examination and could only be objectively discovered by X-ray. A trauma such as he envisions whether resulting from an imbedded particle or one which merely penetrated the cornea and instantly bounded off, he seems to indicate would not necessarily leave evidence which could be seen by a physician examining the eye.

It was the duty of the commissioner to find the facts from this conflict of testimony. Cishowski vs. Clayton Manufacturing Co., 105 Conn. 651, 655, 656; Kosik vs. Manchester Construction Co., 106 Conn. 107. Insofar as that has been done his conclusions cannot be disturbed.

Examination of the facts upon which the conflicting medical views were based, shows that the history used by the doctor whose testimony was apparently accepted by the commissioner contained a fact which seemingly did not appear in the histories considered by opposing medical experts.

Thus the history used by most, if not all of the other medical experts was that claimant’s complaints from the day after the accident to about the time when his loss of vision was discovered was that there was something in his eye which the attending physician had failed to remove and of pain and distress attendant thereupon. The history used by Dr. Carroll, however, is consistently one of complaint of decreased or decreasing vision — of difficulty in seeing— as respects claimant’s left eye.

The finding apparently adopts Dr. Carroll’s conclusions but the subordinate facts contained therein where definitely stated, are rather those which formed an important part of the history upon which contrary medical expert opinion was based (see paragraph 11). The only reference to difficulty with sight is contained in paragraphs 10 and 15. Neither of these are the equivalent of the facts upon which Dr. Carroll based his opinion. Claimant’s testimony is devoid of any statement that he complained to either Dr. Breslin or Dr. Boss of failing vision and the former expressly denies that he did so.

The Commissioner’s conclusions, of course, must be tested *198 by the subordinate facts found by him and no resort can be had to the evidence for this purpose, where there is a lack of such facts in the finding. Sorrentino vs. Cersosimo, 103 Conn. 426, 429. It is not enough that a fact be found from a medical opinion. The grounds on which such medical opin' ion is based, should, also, appear. Gigleo vs. Dorfman & Kimiavsky, 106 Conn., 401, 410, 411.

Again, too, while Dr. Carroll’s opinion seems to be reas' onably definite insofar as it holds that a particle setting up an inflammatory process ultimately involving an optic nerve might be so minute as to escape discovery where, as here, no examination was made by X'ray and that such a presence or entering might leave no evidence which a physician on examination would see, his testimony does not appear equally unequivocal as respects evidence of the inflammation itself. Nor is there anything said in this connection as to when in relation to the day of the accident, on Dr. Carroll’s theory, within the realm of reasonable probability such inflammation would have set in and its probable duration.

Considering Dr. Carroll’s testimony in the light of that of other experts to the effect that an inflammatory condition sufficient in severity to produce an optic nerve atrophy would be apparent on competent medical examination, this question is certain to enter any future review of the commissioner’s ultimate -conclusions.

The foregoing has to do with the left eye. The award is-predicated upon a finding of total permanent blindness in both eyes. The factual foundation for this is stated in paragraph 17, viz., “Sympathetically, the right eye was affected by the injury to the left eye, so that the net result of the injury is that the claimant is industrially blind in both eyes.’”

Claimant contends that this is a conclusion drawn from the other facts which appear in the Finding. There is nothing contained in such statements, however, which throws any light upon what basis the conclusion that the right eye was sympathetically affected by the left, proceeds.

There is an amplitude of evidence to the effect that the condition of both of claimant’s eyes is the result of syphilis.

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Related

McCulloch v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
140 A. 114 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1927)
Cishowski v. Clayton Manufacturing Co.
136 A. 472 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1927)
Louth v. G. & O. Manufacturing Co.
133 A. 664 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1926)
Kosik v. Manchester Construction Co.
136 A. 870 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1927)
Kowalski v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
158 A. 914 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1932)
Callahan v. William Schollhorn Co.
137 A. 642 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1927)
Gennarino Sorrentino v. Cersosimo
130 A. 672 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1925)
Gigleo v. Dorfman and Kimiavsky
138 A. 448 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1927)
Kenyon v. Swift Service Corporation
184 A. 643 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1936)

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Bluebook (online)
4 Conn. Super. Ct. 195, 4 Conn. Supp. 195, 122 Conn. 353, 1936 Conn. Super. LEXIS 150, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nicotra-v-bigelow-sanford-carpet-co-connsuperct-1936.