Nicolet Minerals Co. v. Town of Nashville

2002 WI App 50, 641 N.W.2d 497, 250 Wis. 2d 831, 2002 Wisc. App. LEXIS 81
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedJanuary 29, 2002
Docket01-1339
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 2002 WI App 50 (Nicolet Minerals Co. v. Town of Nashville) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nicolet Minerals Co. v. Town of Nashville, 2002 WI App 50, 641 N.W.2d 497, 250 Wis. 2d 831, 2002 Wisc. App. LEXIS 81 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

HOOVER, PJ.

¶ 1. The Town of Nashville appeals a summary judgment enforcing the local agreement between the Town and Nicolet Minerals Company regarding the development of mining operations in Nashville and determining that the Town's subsequent attempt to rescind the agreement was invalid. We conclude that summary judgment was appropriate and that the parties entered into an enforceable local agreement pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 293.41, 1 which creates an exception to the ordinary zoning procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

*838 Background

¶ 2. Nicolet, formerly known as the Crandon Mining Company, seeks state and federal permits to begin mining operations in Forest County. A precondition of the state permit is that Nicolet conform to all applicable zoning ordinances. See Wis. Stat. § 293.49(l)(a)6. In order to satisfy local zoning regulations, Nicolet negotiated with the Town board and, in December 1996, entered into a local agreement pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 293.41. 2

*839 ¶ 3. In Article 2C of the local agreement, the Town granted Nicolet the right to mine in Nashville, assuming it received the applicable state and federal permits. Article 2F of the agreement was drafted to provide for all permits and approvals required for mining under the Nashville Zoning Ordinances and all other Town laws and regulations. Also in Article 2F, the Town granted Nicolet all conditional use, planned development and other permits, and all other approvals, variances or amendments that are or may be required for mining. In exchange, in Articles 2F, 3, 4 and 5, Nicolet agreed, among other things, to make various payments to the Town, to give hiring preference to local residents and to comply with all applicable state and federal laws. The Town and Nicolet concurred in Article 2F that compliance with the agreement constituted compliance with all applicable Nashville ordinances and regulations.

*840 ¶ 4. Public sentiment in the Town opposed the local agreement. As a result, the incumbent members of the board were defeated in the April 1997 election. After the new board passed a resolution rescinding the agreement, Nicolet brought an action against the Town to enforce the local agreement.

¶ 5. Both Nicolet and the Town moved for summary judgment. The Town argued that the local agreement was invalid and therefore unenforceable for a numbers of reasons, including that there were procedural flaws and that the Town exceeded its police powers by enacting the agreement. The Town also contended that by entering this particular agreement, the Town exceeded the powers granted to it by Wis. Stat. § 293.41. Nicolet maintained that all procedural requirements were met, the local agreement satisfied the requirements of § 293.41 and the agreement was a proper exercise of the Town's powers under the statute.

¶ 6. The trial court deemed the local agreement valid and enforceable under Wis. Stat. § 293.41 and granted Nicolet's motion for summary judgment. The court denied the Town's summary judgment motion and declared the rescission resolution null and void. The Town now appeals.

Standard of Review

¶ 7. When reviewing a summary judgment, we perform the same function as the trial court and our review is de novo. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). This case involves the validity of a local agreement entered into pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 293.41. The interpretation of a statute and its application to a set of facts are questions *841 of law we also review de novo. Reyes v. Greatway Ins. Co., 227 Wis. 2d 357, 364-65, 597 N.W.2d 687 (1999). "The purpose of statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature," and we look to the plain language of the statute to determine intent. Id. at 365. Only if the language of thé statute renders legislative intent ambiguous do we resort to judicial construction. Id.

Discussion

I. Local Agreement

¶ 8. The Town granted Nicolet the right to mine in Article 2C of the local agreement, contingent upon Nicolet's receipt of state and federal permits. Further, Article 2F provides that Nicolet must comply with the agreement, the mining permit and all applicable state and federal laws. The parties express in Article 2F that the agreement was drafted to provide for "all matters required for Mining under the Nashville Zoning Ordinance and all other Nashville laws and regulations. . . ." In Article 2F, the Town granted to Nicolet all conditional use, planned development and other permits, and all other approvals, variances or amendments that are or may be required for mining. Under that Article, Nicolet's compliance with the agreement constitutes compliance with all applicable Town ordinances and regulations.

¶ 9. In exchange for entering into the agreement and waiving the need to pursue individual permits and regulations at each step of the mining process, Nicolet agreed in Articles 3 and 4 to pay the Town (1) a $100,000 permitting fee, (2) past and future legal expenses incurred in negotiating the agreement, (3) $120,000 a year for five years, minus setoffs, (4) property taxes levied for Town expenses, (5) tax equalization *842 payments, and (6) payments under provisions of Wisconsin law intended to share taxes on mining operations with local governments affected by mining.

¶ 10. Nicolet agreed in Article 5 to give hiring preference to local residents to the extent permitted by law. Article 6 of the agreement contains a "reopener" clause that allows the Town to renegotiate terms "if it would otherwise suffer an additional substantial unmitigated negative impact" from Nicolet's change in operations. Also, either party may, under Article 6, "reopen for negotiation" specific terms if Nicolet "proposes a Substantial Modification of the Mining Plan or the Reclamation Plan."

II. Wisconsin Stat. § 293.41

¶ 11. We begin by considering Wis. Stat. §

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Bluebook (online)
2002 WI App 50, 641 N.W.2d 497, 250 Wis. 2d 831, 2002 Wisc. App. LEXIS 81, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nicolet-minerals-co-v-town-of-nashville-wisctapp-2002.