Nicole O'Neill v. Pst Services LLC

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 3, 2025
Docket23-15973
StatusUnpublished

This text of Nicole O'Neill v. Pst Services LLC (Nicole O'Neill v. Pst Services LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nicole O'Neill v. Pst Services LLC, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 3 2025

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; STATE No. 23-15973 OF CALIFORNIA EX REL.; NICOLE O’NEILL, D.C. No. 1:15-cv-00433-LHR-EPG

Plaintiff-Appellant, MEMORANDUM* v. PST SERVICES LLC, Defendant-Appellee, and SOMNIA, INC.; PRIMARY ANESTHESIA SERVICES; MCKESSON CORPORATION; ROBERT GOLDSTEIN, M.D.; ROY WINSTON, M.D.; BYRON MENDENHALL, M.D.; QUINN GEE, M.D.; MARGARET VASSILEV, M.D., Defendants,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Lee H. Rosenthal, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted December 5, 2024 San Francisco, California

Before: COLLINS, VANDYKE, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Relator Nicole O’Neill appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. qui tam action against Defendant PST Services LLC (“PST”), which she brought

on behalf of the United States and the State of California under, respectively, the

False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., and the California False Claims Act,

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12650 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we affirm.

1. In her operative Second Amended Complaint, O’Neill alleged that, in

billing for anesthesia care at Kaweah Hospital in Visalia, California, PST used a

“QZ modifier” to describe care provided by a Certified Registered Nurse

Anesthetist (“CRNA”) under medical supervision of a Medical Doctor of

Anesthesiology (“MDA”), even though this code represented to the government

“that a CRNA, alone and without any supervision by an anesthesiologist,

performed the services in question.” According to O’Neill, such care should have

been billed using a “QX” code for the CRNA and an “AD” code for the MDA.

Instead, PST “would drop the MDA’s modifier entirely” and list only the QZ

modifier. O’Neill alleged that, by using the QZ modifier to falsely certify that the

CRNA acted without medical supervision, PST submitted false claims and made

false statements material to such claims. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B). We

conclude that O’Neill failed to allege sufficient facts to support this theory of

falsity. And because falsity is an essential element of all of her claims against

PST, United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 899, 902 (9th

2 Cir. 2017); State of California v. Altus Fin., 116 P.3d 1175, 1184 (Cal. 2005), the

district court correctly dismissed those claims.

The Medicare Claims Processing Manual (“Claims Manual”) published by

the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) lists two payment

modifiers that “are used by qualified nonphysician anesthetists”—which includes

CRNAs—“when billing for anesthesia services.” See Claims Manual, ch. 12,

§ 140.3.3; see also id. § 140.1. The first modifier is “QX,” which the manual

describes as “Qualified nonphysician anesthetist service: With medical direction by

a physician.” Id. § 140.3.3. The second modifier is “QZ,” which the manual

describes as “CRNA service: Without medical direction by a physician.” Id. As

relevant here, “medical direction” is defined in the regulations to mean that the

MDA performs certain tasks and “directs qualified individuals” in no more than

“four concurrent cases.” 42 C.F.R. § 414.46(d)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). “If the

physician medically supervises more than four concurrent anesthesia services,” or

does not otherwise meet the criteria for medical direction, he or she is said to

“medically supervise[] anesthesia services,” rather than to medically direct them.

Id. § 414.46(f) (emphasis added).

On its face, the Claims Manual appears to contradict O’Neill’s assertions

that the “QX” modifier should be used for medically supervised CRNA services

and that the QZ modifier should not be used for such services. As O’Neill herself

3 agrees, a CRNA who is “medically supervised” is not being “medically directed”

within the meaning of the regulations. Accordingly, the service performed by a

medically supervised CRNA is literally “CRNA service: Without medical direction

by a physician,” which would seemingly make it eligible for the QZ modifier

under the Claims Manual. And because, under the manual, the QX modifier

applies when the CRNA service is performed “With medical direction,” it would

arguably be inappropriate to use that modifier for medically supervised CRNA

services, which by definition lack the requisite medical direction.

O’Neill argues that, because the Claims Manual lacks the binding force of a

statute or regulation, its use of particular language to describe the QZ and QX

modifiers does not preclude a conclusion that PST and other industry participants

nonetheless understood, as a factual matter, that the QZ modifier was not to be

used for medically supervised CRNA services. According to O’Neill, it is

understood among the relevant industry participants that, notwithstanding the

literal wording used in the Claims Manual, the QZ modifier is reserved for

situations in which the CRNA “works independently.” The problem with this

theory is that the SAC wholly fails to plead sufficient facts to support it under the

standards of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), much less those of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). On this point, the SAC’s allegations are

largely conclusory and lacking in supporting factual detail.

4 O’Neill also contends that it was “legally false” to “omit the anesthesiologist

from the bill and instead list only the CRNA involved in the care along with the

QZ modifier.” But she has pointed to no law or regulation that supports the view

that an otherwise properly coded charge for a CRNA’s anesthesia service is

somehow false merely because an MDA who supervised, but did not direct, the

procedure does not also submit a claim for payment. See Universal Health Servs.,

Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 186–87 (2016) (stating that a

theory of express or implied false certification of compliance with payment

requirements must identify a violation of “statutory, regulatory, or contractual

requirements”). O’Neill points to § 140.3.4 of the Claims Manual as supporting

such a requirement, but that provision by its terms only addresses “medical

direction,” not medical supervision. She also cites § 50.D of the Claims Manual,

but that merely refers to what payment “may” be allowed to an MDA who

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Related

Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
State v. Altus Finance, S.A.
116 P.3d 1175 (California Supreme Court, 2005)

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