Nicolas J. Fredeluces v. Office of Personnel Management

16 F.3d 421
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedFebruary 9, 1994
Docket93-3435
StatusPublished

This text of 16 F.3d 421 (Nicolas J. Fredeluces v. Office of Personnel Management) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nicolas J. Fredeluces v. Office of Personnel Management, 16 F.3d 421 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

Opinion

16 F.3d 421
NOTICE: Federal Circuit Local Rule 47.6(b) states that opinions and orders which are designated as not citable as precedent shall not be employed or cited as precedent. This does not preclude assertion of issues of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, law of the case or the like based on a decision of the Court rendered in a nonprecedential opinion or order.

Nicolas J. FREDELUCES, Petitioner,
v.
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Respondent.

No. 93-3435.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Dec. 16, 1993.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 1994.

Before MICHEL and PLAGER, Circuit Judges, and MESKILL, Senior Circuit Judge.*

PER CURIAM.

Fredeluces appeals the June 8, 1993 decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board)1, Dkt. No. SE0831920311-I-1, affirming the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) denial of his application for Civil Service Retirement Act (CSRA) benefits. We affirm.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, our standard of review is narrow. Under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7703(c) (1988), we must affirm the decision of the Board unless we find it to be:

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

(2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or

(3) unsupported by substantial evidence.

Fredeluces argues that the Board's decision is in error because under applicable law he is in fact entitled to CSRA retirement benefits. According to Fredeluces, he served in a position covered by the CSRA for a year within the two-year period immediately prior to his separation in 1970. Thus, under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8333(b) (1988)2, he is entitled to an annuity.

We disagree. The Board concluded that Fredeluces' 1952 appointment was excepted from coverage of the CSRA pursuant to Sections 1 and 3 of Executive Order No. 101803. It further concluded that Fredeluces' position continued to be excepted from coverage after that order was revoked effective January 23, 19554 through the enactment of a regulation by the Civil Service Commission which became effective on October 30, 1956.5 21 Fed.Reg. 8262 (1956)

Fredeluces argues that these conclusions are in error because his 1952 appointment was in fact covered by the CSRA pursuant to the "continuity of service" provision set forth in Section 3 of Executive Order No. 10180. According to Fredeluces, through operation of this provision, his 1952-1970 period of federal service was covered because it was continuous with his 1941-1946 period of service (which the Board did not dispute was covered by the CSRA). Thus, the covered status of the 1941-1946 period of employment carried over to the 1952-1970 period of employment.

We are unpersuaded. First, there is no indication in the record that Fredeluces raised this issue before the Board. Therefore, it would not be proper for us to consider it on appeal. Second, even were we to consider this issue on the merits, Fredeluces would not be entitled to a carryover of covered status pursuant to 5 C.F.R. Sec. 29.2(b) (1959)6. According to that section, there can not be a carryover of covered status if there was a break in service of more than 3 days between the two periods of service. The record shows that the break between Fredeluces' two periods of federal employment was more than 6 years. Thus, he would not be entitled to a carryover of status.

Fredeluces next argues that his position throughout the 1952-1970 period of employment was of indefinite duration, and that the Civil Service Commission, under Section 2(e) of the Civil Service Retirement Act Amendments of 19567, lacked the authority to except such a position from coverage of the CSRA because an indefinite position is neither "intermittent" nor "temporary". Thus, according to Fredeluces, 5 C.F.R. Sec. 29.2(a)(13) was of no force and effect, and Fredeluces' position became covered when Executive Order No. 10180 was revoked effective January 23, 1955.

Again, we are unpersuaded. The Commission (and OPM, the Commission's successor) have consistently interpreted for over 30 years these terms as encompassing non-permanent appointments, such as Fredeluces', made pursuant to Executive Order No. 10180.8 Moreover, Congress plainly delegated to the Commission the authority to implement the statutory provision. Thus, we are bound to follow this interpretation unless there are compelling reasons that it is wrong. Chevron U.S.A. v. National Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984); Money v. Office of Personnel Management, 811 F.2d 1474, 1477 (Fed.Cir.1987).

Fredeluces argues that the interpretation is plainly erroneous based on a statement in the legislative history accompanying section 2(e). According to that statement, the Commission's authority under that section is "subject to the restriction that no employee shall be excluded from coverage who has had more than 12 months continuous service." S.Rep. No. 2642, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 2(e) (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3725, 3729.

We cannot agree. The statement in question related to a sentence added by the Senate to section 2(e) of the House bill, H.R. 7619. 102 Cong.Rec. 13661, 13664 (1956).9 That sentence was deleted before passage by the Conference Committee. H.Rep.No. 2935, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1956). Thus, the statement is irrelevant to the proper interpretation of the statute as enacted.

We have considered all the remaining arguments made by Fredeluces, and find them to be either unpersuasive or not dispositive. For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

*

Honorable Thomas J. Meskill, Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation

1

The Administrative Judge (AJ) rendered an initial decision on October 9, 1992. That decision became final on June 8, 1993, when the Board reopened the case on its own motion and affirmed the initial decision as modified

2

That section provides in relevant part:

An employee or Member must complete, within the last 2 years before any separation from service, ... at least 1 year of creditable civilian service during which he is covered by this subchapter before he or his survivors are eligible for annuity under this subchapter based on the separation.

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