NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-880
NICOLA A. DICIENZO & another1
vs.
ANGELA A. PIZZIFERRI.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Angela Pizziferri, appeals from a
declaratory judgment of the Land Court stating that the deed
from Antonietta DiCienzo, trustee of the DiCienzo Realty Trust
(Trust), to Angela Pizziferri dated November 1, 2016, and
recorded on July 23, 2018, in the Norfolk County registry of
deeds, is void and that the Trust holds legal title to the
subject property. On appeal, Pizziferri claims that the judge
erred in granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, Nicola
DiCienzo and John Merenda.2 We affirm.
1 John Merenda.
2 Pizziferri also claims that the Land Court lacked jurisdiction in this matter because trusts are subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court under G. L. c. 203E, § 204. We disagree. Pursuant to G. L. c. 185, § 1 (a), the Land Court has exclusive original jurisdiction of "[c]omplaints . . . for the confirmation without registration of title to land." Here, the Discussion. We review the allowance of a motion for
summary judgment de novo. Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc., 492 Mass.
676, 680 (2023). "Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment entered,
. . . [s]ummary judgment is appropriate where there is no
material issue of fact in dispute and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (quotation and citation
omitted). Id. at 681.
Here, there are no material facts in dispute. On October
27, 1992, a certain property in Quincy was conveyed by recorded
deed to Antonietta and Felix DiCienzo,3 as trustees of the Trust.
On the same date, Antonietta and Felix, as trustees, executed
and recorded a declaration of trust, which provided that if all
original trustees (Felix and Antonietta) "shall fail to serve
because of death, resignation or incapacity, there shall serve
as Successor TRUSTEES, in the order named: NICOLA A. DiCIENZO,
declaratory judgment did not affect the validity or terms of the Trust itself. Rather, the title of the land was affected, as the declaratory judgment stated that the recorded deed to Pizziferri is void and that the Trust holds legal title to the property by operation of G. L. c. 203E, § 704 (a) (6). This places this case squarely within the Land Court's exclusive original jurisdiction. Contrast O'Donnell v. O'Donnell, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 409, 411 (2009) (no exclusive Land Court jurisdiction where judgment sought would not of its own force purport to modify title of land).
3 Because Antonietta, Felix, and Nicola DiCienzo all share the same surname, they will be referred to by their respective first names for clarity.
2 JOHN MERENDA." The declaration also named Nicola and Merenda as
beneficiaries of the Trust, pursuant to a schedule of beneficial
interests dated and executed on the same date. In 2002, Felix
died, leaving Antonietta as sole trustee.
On August 28, 2013, Pizziferri and Anne Marie Lara, both of
whom were maternal great nieces of Antonietta, filed a petition
in the Probate and Family Court seeking to be appointed as
coguardians for Antonietta, because she "is unable to make
decisions for herself due to her mental incapacity." The
petition was accompanied by a medical certificate, which
Antonietta's primary care physician completed and signed. The
certificate stated, among other things, that Antonietta had
progressive Alzheimer's dementia and could not manage financial,
legal, or medical decision making.
On November 20, 2013, the Probate and Family Court judge
found that the requirements of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (b) (1)-
(8) were met; found that a basis existed for the guardianship;
and issued a decree appointing Lara and Pizziferri as
coguardians of Antonietta.4 Between 2015 and 2018, Lara and
Pizziferri submitted to the Probate and Family Court annual
4 The record reflects that Antonietta was also the subject of a conservatorship between 2012 and 2016, but the record lacks a formal decree and order from the Probate and Family Court to that effect. However, we need not address the impact of the purported conservatorship on our decision, for the reasons discussed infra.
3 reports, all of which generally described how Antonietta was not
able to participate in decision making about personal and health
care matters and required the guardianship due to her
progressive Alzheimer's dementia.
On November 1, 2016, Antonietta executed a quitclaim deed,
which purported to convey the Quincy property on behalf of the
Trust to Pizziferri for the consideration of one dollar. On
July 14, 2018, Antonietta died; at that time, the guardianship
was still in effect. Just days later, Pizziferri recorded the
2016 deed from Antonietta in the Norfolk County registry of
deeds.
Viewing these undisputed material facts in the light most
favorable to Pizziferri, the plaintiffs were entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law. Pursuant to G. L. c. 203E, § 704
(a) (6), "[a] vacancy in a trusteeship shall occur if . . . a
guardian or conservator is appointed for an individual serving
as trustee." Accordingly, once Lara and Pizziferri were
appointed as coguardians of Antonietta, her trusteeship
terminated by operation of law. The terms of the Trust, itself,
also provided that in the event of Antonietta's incapacity,
which the Probate and Family Court judge found as fact in
4 placing her under a guardianship, Nicola and Merenda shall serve
as successor trustees in the order named.5
As she was no longer trustee of the Trust, Antonietta
lacked the legal authority to convey the property to Pizziferri
on behalf of the Trust. Therefore, the deed is void as a matter
of law, and title to the property remains in the Trust. It is
irrelevant whether Antonietta actually regained mental capacity
during any point during the guardianship, as the mere
appointment of coguardians for Antonietta on November 20, 2013,
operated to effectively terminate her trusteeship and all legal
authority that follows from it.6 It is similarly irrelevant
whether the conveyance was made in good faith. See Bongaards v.
5 While the record does not reflect that Nicola and Merenda had accepted the successor trusteeship in accordance with the terms of the Trust or that a successor trustee was appointed by the Probate and Family Court, it is a fundamental rule of law that "a trust shall not be allowed to fail for want of a trustee." Sells v. Delgado, 186 Mass. 25, 28 (1904).
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-880
NICOLA A. DICIENZO & another1
vs.
ANGELA A. PIZZIFERRI.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Angela Pizziferri, appeals from a
declaratory judgment of the Land Court stating that the deed
from Antonietta DiCienzo, trustee of the DiCienzo Realty Trust
(Trust), to Angela Pizziferri dated November 1, 2016, and
recorded on July 23, 2018, in the Norfolk County registry of
deeds, is void and that the Trust holds legal title to the
subject property. On appeal, Pizziferri claims that the judge
erred in granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, Nicola
DiCienzo and John Merenda.2 We affirm.
1 John Merenda.
2 Pizziferri also claims that the Land Court lacked jurisdiction in this matter because trusts are subject to the jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court under G. L. c. 203E, § 204. We disagree. Pursuant to G. L. c. 185, § 1 (a), the Land Court has exclusive original jurisdiction of "[c]omplaints . . . for the confirmation without registration of title to land." Here, the Discussion. We review the allowance of a motion for
summary judgment de novo. Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc., 492 Mass.
676, 680 (2023). "Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment entered,
. . . [s]ummary judgment is appropriate where there is no
material issue of fact in dispute and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (quotation and citation
omitted). Id. at 681.
Here, there are no material facts in dispute. On October
27, 1992, a certain property in Quincy was conveyed by recorded
deed to Antonietta and Felix DiCienzo,3 as trustees of the Trust.
On the same date, Antonietta and Felix, as trustees, executed
and recorded a declaration of trust, which provided that if all
original trustees (Felix and Antonietta) "shall fail to serve
because of death, resignation or incapacity, there shall serve
as Successor TRUSTEES, in the order named: NICOLA A. DiCIENZO,
declaratory judgment did not affect the validity or terms of the Trust itself. Rather, the title of the land was affected, as the declaratory judgment stated that the recorded deed to Pizziferri is void and that the Trust holds legal title to the property by operation of G. L. c. 203E, § 704 (a) (6). This places this case squarely within the Land Court's exclusive original jurisdiction. Contrast O'Donnell v. O'Donnell, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 409, 411 (2009) (no exclusive Land Court jurisdiction where judgment sought would not of its own force purport to modify title of land).
3 Because Antonietta, Felix, and Nicola DiCienzo all share the same surname, they will be referred to by their respective first names for clarity.
2 JOHN MERENDA." The declaration also named Nicola and Merenda as
beneficiaries of the Trust, pursuant to a schedule of beneficial
interests dated and executed on the same date. In 2002, Felix
died, leaving Antonietta as sole trustee.
On August 28, 2013, Pizziferri and Anne Marie Lara, both of
whom were maternal great nieces of Antonietta, filed a petition
in the Probate and Family Court seeking to be appointed as
coguardians for Antonietta, because she "is unable to make
decisions for herself due to her mental incapacity." The
petition was accompanied by a medical certificate, which
Antonietta's primary care physician completed and signed. The
certificate stated, among other things, that Antonietta had
progressive Alzheimer's dementia and could not manage financial,
legal, or medical decision making.
On November 20, 2013, the Probate and Family Court judge
found that the requirements of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (b) (1)-
(8) were met; found that a basis existed for the guardianship;
and issued a decree appointing Lara and Pizziferri as
coguardians of Antonietta.4 Between 2015 and 2018, Lara and
Pizziferri submitted to the Probate and Family Court annual
4 The record reflects that Antonietta was also the subject of a conservatorship between 2012 and 2016, but the record lacks a formal decree and order from the Probate and Family Court to that effect. However, we need not address the impact of the purported conservatorship on our decision, for the reasons discussed infra.
3 reports, all of which generally described how Antonietta was not
able to participate in decision making about personal and health
care matters and required the guardianship due to her
progressive Alzheimer's dementia.
On November 1, 2016, Antonietta executed a quitclaim deed,
which purported to convey the Quincy property on behalf of the
Trust to Pizziferri for the consideration of one dollar. On
July 14, 2018, Antonietta died; at that time, the guardianship
was still in effect. Just days later, Pizziferri recorded the
2016 deed from Antonietta in the Norfolk County registry of
deeds.
Viewing these undisputed material facts in the light most
favorable to Pizziferri, the plaintiffs were entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law. Pursuant to G. L. c. 203E, § 704
(a) (6), "[a] vacancy in a trusteeship shall occur if . . . a
guardian or conservator is appointed for an individual serving
as trustee." Accordingly, once Lara and Pizziferri were
appointed as coguardians of Antonietta, her trusteeship
terminated by operation of law. The terms of the Trust, itself,
also provided that in the event of Antonietta's incapacity,
which the Probate and Family Court judge found as fact in
4 placing her under a guardianship, Nicola and Merenda shall serve
as successor trustees in the order named.5
As she was no longer trustee of the Trust, Antonietta
lacked the legal authority to convey the property to Pizziferri
on behalf of the Trust. Therefore, the deed is void as a matter
of law, and title to the property remains in the Trust. It is
irrelevant whether Antonietta actually regained mental capacity
during any point during the guardianship, as the mere
appointment of coguardians for Antonietta on November 20, 2013,
operated to effectively terminate her trusteeship and all legal
authority that follows from it.6 It is similarly irrelevant
whether the conveyance was made in good faith. See Bongaards v.
5 While the record does not reflect that Nicola and Merenda had accepted the successor trusteeship in accordance with the terms of the Trust or that a successor trustee was appointed by the Probate and Family Court, it is a fundamental rule of law that "a trust shall not be allowed to fail for want of a trustee." Sells v. Delgado, 186 Mass. 25, 28 (1904). For this reason, as well as the irrelevance to the issues before the Land Court on summary judgment of both the plaintiffs' failure to assume their roles as successor trustees and their alleged actions of abuse or neglect of Antonietta, we reject Pizziferri's claim that the Land Court abused its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing.
6 For this reason, as well as the fact that Pizziferri attested to Antonietta's incapacity annually in the Probate and Family Court and is thus barred by judicial estoppel from asserting the contrary, see Otis v. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co. 443 Mass. 634, 639- 640 (2005), Pizziferri's claim that the judge erred by relying on certain reports to determine Antonietta's mental capacity fails.
5 Millen, 440 Mass. 10, 15 (2003) ("Where, as here, the grantor
has nothing to convey, . . . [t]he purported conveyance is a
nullity, notwithstanding the parties' intent"). Summary
judgment was properly granted to the plaintiffs.7
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Meade, Blake & Desmond, JJ.8),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: February 15, 2024.
7 Pizziferri had also filed two motions for reconsideration, although she did not properly appeal the judge's denial of those motions. Regardless, we would affirm the judge's denial of the motions for the same reasons expressed herein given that the motions did not provide any new evidence or legal arguments that would affect the outcome of this case.
8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.