Nicklin v. Henderson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: December 19, 2003
• Docket: 02-5183
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Nicklin v. Henderson No. 02-5183 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0450P (6th Cir.) File Name: 03a0450p.06 Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James M. Morris, Sharon K. Morris, MORRIS & MORRIS, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Thomas Lee Gentry, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee. FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ _________________

RAYMOND NICKLIN , X OPINION Plaintiff-Appellant, - _________________ - - No. 02-5183 SILER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Raymond Nicklin petitions v. - this court for review of his disability discrimination action > against the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). The , district court denied Nicklin enforcement of a favorable final WILLIAM J. HENDERSON , - Postmaster General, United order of the EEOC Office of Federal Operations (“OFO”). It - found that a settlement agreement, entered into before the States Postal Service, - OFO order, barred Nicklin’s discrimination claim. Nicklin Defendant-Appellee. - argues that the USPS waived the settlement issue by not - raising it at the OFO level, and, therefore, the district court N should have simply enforced the order. Because we find the Appeal from the United States District Court settlement agreement provides a separate legal bar at the for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington. district court level, regardless of what happened at the OFO No. 99-00443—Karl S. Forester, Chief District Judge. agency level, we AFFIRM.

Argued: September 18, 2003 I. BACKGROUND

Decided and Filed: December 19, 2003 In 1989, Nicklin sustained an on-the-job injury to his left knee as a letter carrier for the USPS in Ormond Beach, Before: SILER, BATCHELDER, and COOK, Circuit Florida. Due to this impairment, Nicklin was placed on Judges. medical restriction and assigned to a distribution clerk position. In 1994 the Lexington, Kentucky Post Office _________________ denied him a transfer, and subsequently denied his request for reconsideration even after his medical restrictions had been COUNSEL removed. Prior to this denial Nicklin had over 200 Florida claims decided by, or pending in front of, the EEOC. ARGUED: James M. Morris, MORRIS & MORRIS, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Thomas Lee Gentry, Nicklin challenged the denial based on disability ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Lexington, discrimination, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

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29 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq. When the USPS found no evidence in the light most favorable to Nicklin, Anderson v. discrimination, Nicklin appealed to the EEOC OFO in 1995. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), we will uphold the On January 13, 1997, the USPS Florida branch and Nicklin grant of summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to entered a settlement agreement for $12,500 releasing “any any material fact such that the USPS is entitled to judgment and all cases in any and all forms or forums at any stage of as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. appeal or processing.” Subsequently on March 26, 1998, the 317, 322 (1986). OFO reversed the earlier USPS decision on appeal, finding that Nicklin was discriminated against by the Kentucky II. DISCUSSION branch of the USPS. Apparently, the Florida USPS had not notified the Kentucky USPS of the settlement; consequently, The Validity of the Settlement Agreement the settlement was never raised by the USPS or considered by the OFO. We start with the validity of the settlement agreement itself, because if it does not apply to Nicklin’s Kentucky transfer In July 1998, after the expiration of the thirty-day time limit claim, whether the USPS has waived its application is for an internal OFO appeal, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407 (1998), irrelevant. Nicklin argues he did not knowingly and the USPS realized the error and forwarded a copy of the voluntarily assent to the agreement, and that it did not cover settlement to the OFO. The settlement reached the OFO his Kentucky claim. within thirty days of a different OFO decision on one of Nicklin’s Florida claims, and the OFO honored the settlement Federal common law controls the validity of a release of a sua sponte even though it found the USPS had waived the federal cause of action. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 agreement by not asserting it earlier. However, before the F.2d 1472, 1481 (6th Cir. 1989). For discrimination cases, OFO could consider the settlement’s effect on his Kentucky the Sixth Circuit uses a balancing test to determine whether claim, Nicklin filed this action in the district court to enforce a settlement agreement was entered into knowingly and the OFO’s decision. voluntarily. We consider the following factors: (1) Nicklin’s experience, background, and education; (2) the amount of Nicklin asserted that since it was a simple enforcement time Nicklin had to consider the release, including whether he action the district court should not question the merits of the had the opportunity to consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of OFO award. He argued that the USPS had waived its right to the release; (4) the consideration for the release; and (5) the assert the settlement by not raising it in the OFO proceeding. totality of the circumstances. See Adams v. Philip Morris, The district court nonetheless found that the USPS could Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995). assert the settlement claim, that Nicklin had ratified any problems with the agreement by failing to “tender back” the The district court properly granted summary judgment $12,500 consideration, and granted summary judgment for against Nicklin. Nicklin contests the time he was given to the USPS. consider the agreement and argues that he was not offered counsel. According to him, he was given the agreement and Nicklin then appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction told to sign it and return it “as soon as possible.” Nicklin pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the district court’s claims that this only gave him one day to read, consider, and grant of summary judgment de novo. Kennedy v. Superior sign the agreement. However, the district court found it Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 655 (6th Cir. 2000). Taking the “undisputed” that Nicklin never requested additional time to No. 02-5183 Nicklin v. Henderson 5 6 Nicklin v. Henderson No. 02-5183

consider the agreement, had negotiated it for several days filed in any forum or location” and further did not intend or prior, securing a favorable term excluding his workers indicate any claims, besides the workers compensation compensation claim, and was well aware of his right to claims, to be excluded. Thus, at most Nicklin made a counsel from his numerous prior discrimination claims. unilateral mistake that the Kentucky claim was excluded. Given that Nicklin does not seriously challenge the other four Since unilateral mistakes are insufficient to set aside the factors, we uphold the district court’s finding that he agreement, Nicklin’s mistake claim fails. Brown, 872 F.2d at knowingly and voluntarily entered into the settlement 174-175. agreement. Nicklin also asserts fraud. He swore out an affidavit that This court can also set aside the agreement for mistake or “Hopper specifically told me” the settlement only released the fraud. See Brown v. County of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169, 174- Florida claims. If this were true, a triable issue of fact might 75 (6th Cir. 1989). Nicklin bears the burden of showing that exist. However, Nicklin subsequently backed off this the settlement he made was invalid because of fraud or a assertion in his deposition, testifying that they “only mutual mistake under which both parties acted; a unilateral discussed the Florida ones” and not that Hopper made any mistake on his part will not invalidate the agreement. Id. affirmative statement that the Kentucky claim was excluded. Nicklin argues that the agreement covers only his Florida Thus, without any affirmative fraudulent statement to induce discrimination claims, asserting both mistake and fraud. his reliance, Nicklin’s fraud claim fails. The settlement was a general release of all Nicklin’s claims, In sum, the district court properly found Nicklin knowingly clearly covering his Kentucky transfer claim. The agreement and voluntarily entered the agreement, and that there was no reads that it is: voidable mistake or fraud. [i]n complete and final settlement of any and all cases in Failure to Assert the Settlement at the Agency Level any and all forms or forums at any stage of appeal or processing including but not limited to EEOC, NLRB, Having found a valid settlement, we next consider the MSPB, and any court or courts and without prejudice to effect of the USPS’s inadvertent failure to raise the settlement the position of the Postal Service in this or any other case at the EEOC OFO administrative decision stage. The OFO .... found the USPS had discriminated against Nicklin and awarded him back pay, interest, and other benefits. The Nicklin claims he understood the agreement to only cover USPS failed to raise the settlement, and subsequently failed the Florida claims, leaving the Kentucky claim intact. to move to reconsider within the thirty-day time limit. See 29 However, the plain language of the agreement unambiguously C.F.R. § 1614.407 (1998). Nicklin claims that the district covers all his claims, and specifically references “all EEOC” court was required to blindly enforce the OFO decision or “EEO” actions six times in the one-and-a-half page without considering the settlement. He further argues that the document. Nor does the agreement differentiate between the doctrine of res judicata prevents the USPS from raising the USPS branches; it covers all claims in any forum “concerning settlement at the district court level because the USPS waived the United States Postal Service.” The USPS negotiator, the settlement argument by not raising it in the earlier OFO Thomas Hopper, testified that he intended the release to cover proceeding. “any and all of [Nicklin’s] claims against the Postal Service, No. 02-5183 Nicklin v. Henderson 7 8 Nicklin v. Henderson No. 02-5183

Nicklin’s argument has some support. Courts have applied We further note our decision prevents a windfall to Nicklin. res judicata to administrative law decisions employing a trial He received $12,500 in settlement of all his claims. If we type hearing. See Drummond v. Commissioner of Social were to ignore the settlement and enforce the OFO order, Security, 126 F.3d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 1997). Additionally, he Nicklin would receive additional compensation in the form of correctly asserts that a federal employee is entitled to have the back pay, interest, and other benefits for a claim he already district court enforce a favorable administrative determination settled. It “goes without saying that courts can and should without having the court delve into the merits de novo. See preclude double recovery.” EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. Haskins v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 808 F.2d 1192, 279, 297 (2002). 1199 n.4 (6th Cir. 1987). Nicklin’s main support is Girard v. Rubin, 62 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 1995), where the Ninth We find Nicklin’s remaining arguments without merit. Circuit found the IRS could not relitigate in the district court the EEOC’s specific determination that Girard timely filed his AFFIRMED. complaint with the agency. Although the USPS may have waived the settlement at the administrative level, the agreement poses a separate legal bar at the enforcement stage. The settlement agreement applied to all future actions, and forbade him to file any future “appeal, complaint, charge, grievance, etc. of any kind” in “the Federal Courts.” Therefore, the USPS properly asserted the settlement as a separate bar at the district court enforcement action level, independent of what happened at the administrative level. The district court alluded to this, finding that the USPS was not requesting a merits review of the underlying OFO judgment, but merely asserting a legal bar to the enforcement. Under this reasoning, we uphold the district court’s summary judgment dismissing Nicklin’s enforcement action. Girard is distinguishable because there the government was trying to relitigate the timeliness of a complaint filed with the agency. If the USPS were only trying to assert that the OFO should have considered the settlement, we might consider Girard persuasive. In the instant case, however, the USPS is instead asserting the settlement as an independent bar to the enforcement action at the district court level, not that the OFO should have honored the settlement at the agency level.