Nickesha Reid v. Tachita Saunders

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Nickesha Reid v. Tachita Saunders

230 So. 3d 1288

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedDecember 19, 2017

DocketCASE NO. 1D16-4732

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 230 So. 3d 1288 (Nickesha Reid v. Tachita Saunders) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Nickesha Reid v. Tachita Saunders, 230 So. 3d 1288 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Nickesha Reid, appeals a permanent .injunction for protection against stalking that was. entered against her. Appellant argues, and we agree, that the injunction is not supported by competent, substantial evidence and must be . reversed. See § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2016) (providing that stalking occurs when someone “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person”); Touhey v. Seda, 133 So.3d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (noting that incidents of stalking must be proyen by competent, substantial evidence). While Appellee, Tachita Saunders, claimed to have documentation of numerous phone calls, emails, and texts made and sent by Appellant, the record contains no such documentation, and .the hearing transcript provides no indication that Appellee provided any documentation to the trial court. See Murphy v. Reynolds, 55 So.3d 716, 716-17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (noting that the appellee set out to prove cyberstalking as grounds for the injunction by alleging that the appellant sent her an offensive email, hacked into her email accounts, deleted all of her emails, and changed her email signature block to include disparaging remarks, “[b]ut [the ap-pellee] did not introduce evidence that linked [the appellant] to the cyberstalking incidents”). Without knowing what the alleged communications, were,- it was not possible for the trial court to determine whether Appellant engaged in stalking or whether the communications would have created substantial emotional distress under a reasonable person standard. See McMath v. Biernacki, 776 So.2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (noting that courts must use a reasonable person standard rather than a subjective standard in determining whether incidents create substantial emotional distress); see also Roach v. Brower, 180 So.3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (noting that “without competent, substantial evidence that Ms; Brow-er, the petitioner, suffered substantial emotional distress, the circuit court could not enter an injunction against [the appellant] based upon the stalking statute”).

Accordingly, the injunction is REVERSED. ' '

LEWIS, OSTERHÁUS, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Nickesha Reid, appeals a permanent .injunction for protection against stalking that was. entered against her. Appellant argues, and we agree, that the injunction is not supported by competent, substantial evidence and must be . reversed. See § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2016) (providing that stalking occurs when someone “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person”); Touhey v. Seda, 133 So.3d 1203, 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (noting that incidents of stalking must be proyen by competent, substantial evidence). While Appellee, Tachita Saunders, claimed to have documentation of numerous phone calls, emails, and texts made and sent by Appellant, the record contains no such documentation, and .the hearing transcript provides no indication that Appellee provided any documentation to the trial court. See Murphy v. Reynolds, 55 So.3d 716, 716-17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (noting that the appellee set out to prove cyberstalking as grounds for the injunction by alleging that the appellant sent her an offensive email, hacked into her email accounts, deleted all of her emails, and changed her email signature block to include disparaging remarks, “[b]ut [the ap-pellee] did not introduce evidence that linked [the appellant] to the cyberstalking incidents”). Without knowing what the alleged communications, were,- it was not possible for the trial court to determine whether Appellant engaged in stalking or whether the communications would have created substantial emotional distress under a reasonable person standard. See McMath v. Biernacki, 776 So.2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (noting that courts must use a reasonable person standard rather than a subjective standard in determining whether incidents create substantial emotional distress); see also Roach v. Brower, 180 So.3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (noting that “without competent, substantial evidence that Ms; Brow-er, the petitioner, suffered substantial emotional distress, the circuit court could not enter an injunction against [the appellant] based upon the stalking statute”).

Accordingly, the injunction is REVERSED. ' '

LEWIS, OSTERHÁUS, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.

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