Nickelson v. Budnik

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedMay 22, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-00110
StatusUnknown

This text of Nickelson v. Budnik (Nickelson v. Budnik) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nickelson v. Budnik, (E.D. Ark. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS DELTA DIVISION

KENDALL C. NICKELSON PLAINTIFF ADC #150640

v. No: 2:23-cv-00110-LPR-PSH

CHRISTOPHER BUDNIK, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge Lee P. Rudofsky. You may file written objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of fact. DISPOSITION Plaintiff Kendall C. Nickelson, an inmate confined at the Grimes Unit of the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”), filed this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on April 26, 2023 (Doc. No. 2). Nickelson was subsequently granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. No. 6). After screening Nickelson’s amended complaint (Doc. No. 27), this Court allowed him to proceed with Eighth Amendment excessive force and deliberate indifference claims against Sergeant Anterio Matthews and Lieutenant Daryl Brown in their individual capacities and a

First Amendment retaliation claim against Warden Christopher Budnik in his individual capacity. See Doc. Nos. 28 & 51. His other claims have been dismissed. Id.

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment, a brief in support, and a statement of undisputed material facts (Doc. Nos. 41-43) filed by Matthews, Brown, and Budnik (the “Defendants”), claiming that Nickelson did not exhaust available administrative remedies with respect to his claims against them before he filed this

lawsuit. Nickelson filed a brief in response to the Defendants’ motion (Doc. No. 49). He was also allowed more time to conduct discovery on the issue of exhaustion and to file an amended response. See Doc. Nos. 50 & 53. His amended response

was due May 5, 2024, but nothing has been filed. For the reasons described below, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted. II. Legal Standard Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but instead must

demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in

his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations omitted). An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must be supported by materials in the record such as “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including

those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials . . .”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact is disputed or undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the

absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case.

Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude summary judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th

Cir. 2010). III. Analysis The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on

Nickelson’s claims because Nickelson failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies against them before he filed this lawsuit. In support of their motion, the Defendants submitted the declaration of Terri Grigsby Brown, the ADC’s inmate

grievance coordinator (Doc. No. 43-1 at 1-5); the applicable ADC grievance policy (id. at 6-36); a list of grievances filed by Nickelson (id. at 37); and a copy of Grievance DR-42-00471 (id. at 38-42). A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires an inmate to exhaust prison grievance procedures before filing suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007); Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 2014). Exhaustion under the PLRA is mandatory. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 211; Hammett v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 2012). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege

excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The PLRA does not prescribe the manner in which exhaustion occurs. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 218. It merely requires compliance with prison grievance

procedures to properly exhaust. See id. Thus, the question as to whether an inmate has properly exhausted administrative remedies will depend on the specifics of that particular prison’s grievance policy. See id.

Pursuant to the ADC’s grievance policy, Administrative Directive 19-34, inmates are provided Unit Level Grievance Forms as part of the Inmate Grievance Procedure. See Doc. No. 43-1 at 10. To resolve a problem, an inmate must first

seek informal resolution by submitting a Step One Unit Level Grievance Form (Attachment I) within 15 days after the occurrence of the incident. Id. at 11. Inmates are to “specifically name each individual involved for a proper investigation and response to be completed by the ADC.” Id. at 10. Only one problem or issue may

be grieved per grievance form. Id.

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Related

Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Sitzes v. City of West Memphis Arkansas
606 F.3d 461 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Conseco Life Insurance v. Williams
620 F.3d 902 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Nidal Othman v. City of Country Club Hills
671 F.3d 672 (Eighth Circuit, 2012)
Miller v. Norris
247 F.3d 736 (Eighth Circuit, 2001)
Gibson v. Weber
431 F.3d 339 (Eighth Circuit, 2005)
Mark Hammett v. J. Cofield
681 F.3d 945 (Eighth Circuit, 2012)
Mann v. Yarnell
497 F.3d 822 (Eighth Circuit, 2007)
Flentje v. First Nat. Bank of Wynne
11 S.W.3d 531 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2000)
Roy Burns v. Edward Eaton
752 F.3d 1136 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Ross v. Blake
578 U.S. 632 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Donald East v. Minnehaha County
986 F.3d 816 (Eighth Circuit, 2021)

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Nickelson v. Budnik, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nickelson-v-budnik-ared-2024.