Nick McCullar v. Does, et al.

District Court, E.D. Arkansas·Decided July 7, 2026·No. 3:26-cv-00165·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS NORTHERN DIVISION

NICK McCULLAR, PLAINTIFF

v. 3:26CV00165-BSM-JTK

DOES, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER Nick McCullar (“Plaintiff”) is in custody at the Mississippi County, Arkansas, Detention Center (“Detention Center”). (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff submitted a one-page document that was filed as a Complaint to initiate a civil rights action. (Id.). Because Plaintiff’s Complaint did not name a defendant or contain other information required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court gave Plaintiff the chance to file a superseding Amended Complaint. Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 4). The Court must Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). I. Screening The PLRA requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(b). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1918(e) (screening requirements). An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Whether a plaintiff is represented by counsel or is appearing pro se, his complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F .2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.1985). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing a pro se complaint under ' 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). II. Facts and Analysis In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sued Jailer Jacob Sloan and Captain Bo McCullom in their personal and official capacities. (Doc. No. 4). Plaintiff alleges unlawful conditions of confinement and due process violations. (Id. at 4-6). Another individual, Mitchell Carruth, is listed as a plaintiff in the Complaint. (Id. at 1). Mr. Carruth also signed the Complaint. (Id. at 7). The Clerk of the Court opened a separate action for the additional plaintiff. The related case is: Carruth v. Sloan, et al., 3:26-cv-00186-BSM-JTK (E.D. Ark.). A. Plaintiff May Not Represent Others

“[F]or a federal court to have authority under the Constitution to settle a dispute, the party before it must seek a remedy for a personal and tangible harm.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (establishing liability “to the party injured). To the extent a plaintiff alleges that a defendant’s actions harmed others, the plaintiff generally lacks standing to bring that claim. Hodak v. City of St. Peters, 535 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 2008) (“As a general rule, a plaintiff may only assert his own injury in fact and ‘cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” (internal citation omitted)). Further, pro se litigants are not authorized to represent the rights, claims, and interests of other parties in any cause of action. Fymbo v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A litigant may bring his own claims to federal court without counsel, but not the claims of others”); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975); cf. Knoefler v. United Bank of Bismarck, 20 F.3d 347, 348 (8th Cir. 1994) (“A nonlawyer . . . has no right to represent another entity.”).

To the extent Plaintiff alleged harm to another, those claims fail. B. Personal Capacity Claims Plaintiff brought his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). Bare allegations void of factual enhancement are insufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because all allegations in the Amended Complaint are written in the first person—“I”—it

is not possible for the Court to determine which allegations are being made by Plaintiff. Plaintiff will be given the chance to file a superseding Second Amended Complaint to cure the defects in his pleading. C. Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff sued Defendants in their personal and official capacities. “A suit against a government officer in his official capacity is functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must prove that an official municipal policy, deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise, or unofficial custom caused the constitutional injury. Corwin v. City of Independence, Missouri, 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). Plaintiff has made no allegations to support an official capacity claim.

D. Superseding Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff may amend his Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 4) to cure the defects explained above. If Plaintiff decides to amend, Plaintiff should submit to the Court, within thirty (30) days of the entry date of this Order, a superseding Second Amended Complaint that contains in a single document his claims against all Defendants he is suing.

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Nick McCullar v. Does, et al., (E.D. Ark. 2026).

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
City of Canton v. Harris
489 U.S. 378 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
213 F.3d 1320 (Tenth Circuit, 2000)
Maxine Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home
627 F.3d 1254 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Oxendine v. Williams
509 F.2d 1405 (Fourth Circuit, 1975)
Madewell v. Roberts
909 F.2d 1203 (Eighth Circuit, 1990)
Hollingsworth v. Perry
133 S. Ct. 2652 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Hodak v. City of St. Peters
535 F.3d 899 (Eighth Circuit, 2008)
Parrish v. Ball
594 F.3d 993 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
Randall Corwin v. City of Independence, MO.
829 F.3d 695 (Eighth Circuit, 2016)
Knoefler v. United Bank of Bismarck
20 F.3d 347 (Eighth Circuit, 1994)