25CA0721 Nicholson v ICAO 01-22-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0721 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 5090-2025
LaTasha Nicholson,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,
Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE KUHN J. Jones and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 22, 2026
LaTasha Nicholson, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent ¶1 LaTasha Nicholson appeals an Industrial Claim Appeals Office
(Panel) order upholding a hearing officer’s decision to dismiss her
action as untimely. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After Comcast Cablevision of Willow Grove terminated
Nicholson’s employment in March 2024, she applied for benefits
with the Division of Unemployment Insurance. On May 31, a
deputy with the Division issued a written determination on
Nicholson’s application, “postpon[ing]” her benefits because she
elected to cash out her 401(k) account and did not reinvest the
funds in another qualifying retirement account. Effectively, the
deputy explained, Nicholson’s 401(k) funds substituted for
unemployment benefits she would have otherwise received between
April 28, 2024, and December 14, 2024. The deputy further
advised that the determination would be final unless Nicholson
appealed it to the Division hearing office within twenty calendar
days “from the mail date.”
¶3 Nicholson appealed the determination 263 days later, on
February 18, 2025. A Division hearing officer dismissed the appeal
as untimely. Citing Division of Unemployment Insurance
1 Regulation 12.1.3.2, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2, the hearing officer
concluded that the deputy’s determination could not be reviewed
because Nicholson “appealed [it] more than 180 days late.”
¶4 Nicholson appealed the hearing officer’s order to the Panel,
contending that the Division failed to inform her regarding the time
limitation. The Panel found that Nicholson “timely received the
deputy’s decision” that was “delivered to her address of record or
uploaded to her MyUI+ account.” The Panel also noted that her
appeal was due June 20, 2024. Based on these findings, the Panel
upheld the hearing officer’s order that because Nicholson appealed
the deputy’s determination over 180 days past the deadline, her
appeal must be dismissed under Regulation 12.1.3.2.
II. Analysis
¶5 Representing herself in this appeal, Nicholson contests the
Panel’s finding that she received the deputy’s notice of
determination and accompanying appeal instructions. She explains
that, on the date the deputy issued the determination (May 31,
2024), she lacked a physical mailing address. Specifically,
according to Nicholson, she sold her residence on May 28, 2024,
without having secured new housing. She acknowledges that the
2 Division mailed the notice and appeal instructions on May 31,
2024, but, because she was “in the process” of having her mail
forwarded, she received nothing from the Division via physical mail
on or around that date.1 Nicholson contends that in addition to not
receiving the notice and appeal instructions, someone at the
Division verbally told her she would need to appeal but neglected to
advise her of the timeframe. Moreover, Nicholson was “unaware”
she should check her MyUI+ account for the notice of
determination. We discern no basis for setting aside the Panel’s
order.
A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
¶6 We defer to the Panel’s factual findings and reasonable
inferences to the extent substantial evidence in the record supports
them. § 8-74-107(4), C.R.S. 2025; Tilley v. Indus. Claim Appeals
Off., 924 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Colo. App. 1996). We may only set aside
the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in excess of its
1 We note that Nicholson included with her opening brief
documentation ostensibly supporting her argument. However, this court does not consider evidence outside the record on appeal. Sosa v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 259 P.3d 558, 560 (Colo. App. 2011).
3 powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the factual
findings do not support its decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous
as a matter of law. § 8-74-107(6). Substantial evidence is
“probative, credible, and competent, of a character which would
warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a
particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory
testimony or contrary inferences.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566
P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). Thus, mere conclusions do not
suffice. Wecker v. TBL Excavating, Inc., 908 P.2d 1186, 1188 (Colo.
App. 1995) (“[E]vidence is not substantial if it . . . constitutes a
mere conclusion.”). We decide as a matter of law whether
substantial evidence exists. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, 26 P.3d 1198, 1205 (Colo. 2001). And we may set aside
the Panel’s decision if the factual findings do not support the legal
conclusion. § 8-74-107(6)(c).
¶7 A claimant must appeal a deputy’s determination “within
twenty calendar days after the date of notification.”
§ 8-74-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. “The date of notification shall be . . .
the date of transmission as recorded by the [D]ivision, if notification
4 is made by electronic means, or the date of mailing of a decision.”
Id.
¶8 The end of the twenty-day statutory filing period triggers the
start of a 180-day grace period during which claimants may still
file, with a rebuttable presumption of good cause for their
untimeliness. Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 12.1.3.1, 7 Code
Colo. Regs. 1101-2. However, where the Division receives a
claimant’s appeal “more than 180 days beyond the expiration of the
timely filing period [as established in section 8-74-106(1)(a)], good
cause may not be established, a hearing shall not be scheduled, the
appeal shall be dismissed, and the deputy’s decision shall become
final.” Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 12.1.3.1-2, 7 Code Colo.
Regs. 1101-2.
B. The Incorrect Mailing Address Does Not Justify Setting Aside the Order
¶9 As discussed above, the date the Division mailed the notice, or
transmitted it electronically — not the date the claimant receives
the notice — triggers the appeal timeframe. § 8-74-106(1)(a); see
Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 12.1.3.1, 7 Code Colo. Regs.
1101-2. Here, the Panel expressly found that Nicholson’s appeal
5 was “due by June 20, 2024.” Thus, it necessarily also found that
the Division mailed the notice twenty days prior — on May 31.
Substantial evidence supports this finding.
¶ 10 Page three of the notice and appeal information states, “We
must receive your appeal no later than 20 calendar days from the
mailing date listed on the front of this form.” The date shown at the
top of the first page is May 31, 2024. Moreover, the first page also
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25CA0721 Nicholson v ICAO 01-22-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0721 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 5090-2025
LaTasha Nicholson,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,
Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE KUHN J. Jones and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 22, 2026
LaTasha Nicholson, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent ¶1 LaTasha Nicholson appeals an Industrial Claim Appeals Office
(Panel) order upholding a hearing officer’s decision to dismiss her
action as untimely. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After Comcast Cablevision of Willow Grove terminated
Nicholson’s employment in March 2024, she applied for benefits
with the Division of Unemployment Insurance. On May 31, a
deputy with the Division issued a written determination on
Nicholson’s application, “postpon[ing]” her benefits because she
elected to cash out her 401(k) account and did not reinvest the
funds in another qualifying retirement account. Effectively, the
deputy explained, Nicholson’s 401(k) funds substituted for
unemployment benefits she would have otherwise received between
April 28, 2024, and December 14, 2024. The deputy further
advised that the determination would be final unless Nicholson
appealed it to the Division hearing office within twenty calendar
days “from the mail date.”
¶3 Nicholson appealed the determination 263 days later, on
February 18, 2025. A Division hearing officer dismissed the appeal
as untimely. Citing Division of Unemployment Insurance
1 Regulation 12.1.3.2, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2, the hearing officer
concluded that the deputy’s determination could not be reviewed
because Nicholson “appealed [it] more than 180 days late.”
¶4 Nicholson appealed the hearing officer’s order to the Panel,
contending that the Division failed to inform her regarding the time
limitation. The Panel found that Nicholson “timely received the
deputy’s decision” that was “delivered to her address of record or
uploaded to her MyUI+ account.” The Panel also noted that her
appeal was due June 20, 2024. Based on these findings, the Panel
upheld the hearing officer’s order that because Nicholson appealed
the deputy’s determination over 180 days past the deadline, her
appeal must be dismissed under Regulation 12.1.3.2.
II. Analysis
¶5 Representing herself in this appeal, Nicholson contests the
Panel’s finding that she received the deputy’s notice of
determination and accompanying appeal instructions. She explains
that, on the date the deputy issued the determination (May 31,
2024), she lacked a physical mailing address. Specifically,
according to Nicholson, she sold her residence on May 28, 2024,
without having secured new housing. She acknowledges that the
2 Division mailed the notice and appeal instructions on May 31,
2024, but, because she was “in the process” of having her mail
forwarded, she received nothing from the Division via physical mail
on or around that date.1 Nicholson contends that in addition to not
receiving the notice and appeal instructions, someone at the
Division verbally told her she would need to appeal but neglected to
advise her of the timeframe. Moreover, Nicholson was “unaware”
she should check her MyUI+ account for the notice of
determination. We discern no basis for setting aside the Panel’s
order.
A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
¶6 We defer to the Panel’s factual findings and reasonable
inferences to the extent substantial evidence in the record supports
them. § 8-74-107(4), C.R.S. 2025; Tilley v. Indus. Claim Appeals
Off., 924 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Colo. App. 1996). We may only set aside
the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in excess of its
1 We note that Nicholson included with her opening brief
documentation ostensibly supporting her argument. However, this court does not consider evidence outside the record on appeal. Sosa v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 259 P.3d 558, 560 (Colo. App. 2011).
3 powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the factual
findings do not support its decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous
as a matter of law. § 8-74-107(6). Substantial evidence is
“probative, credible, and competent, of a character which would
warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a
particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory
testimony or contrary inferences.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566
P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App. 1977). Thus, mere conclusions do not
suffice. Wecker v. TBL Excavating, Inc., 908 P.2d 1186, 1188 (Colo.
App. 1995) (“[E]vidence is not substantial if it . . . constitutes a
mere conclusion.”). We decide as a matter of law whether
substantial evidence exists. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, 26 P.3d 1198, 1205 (Colo. 2001). And we may set aside
the Panel’s decision if the factual findings do not support the legal
conclusion. § 8-74-107(6)(c).
¶7 A claimant must appeal a deputy’s determination “within
twenty calendar days after the date of notification.”
§ 8-74-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. “The date of notification shall be . . .
the date of transmission as recorded by the [D]ivision, if notification
4 is made by electronic means, or the date of mailing of a decision.”
Id.
¶8 The end of the twenty-day statutory filing period triggers the
start of a 180-day grace period during which claimants may still
file, with a rebuttable presumption of good cause for their
untimeliness. Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 12.1.3.1, 7 Code
Colo. Regs. 1101-2. However, where the Division receives a
claimant’s appeal “more than 180 days beyond the expiration of the
timely filing period [as established in section 8-74-106(1)(a)], good
cause may not be established, a hearing shall not be scheduled, the
appeal shall be dismissed, and the deputy’s decision shall become
final.” Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 12.1.3.1-2, 7 Code Colo.
Regs. 1101-2.
B. The Incorrect Mailing Address Does Not Justify Setting Aside the Order
¶9 As discussed above, the date the Division mailed the notice, or
transmitted it electronically — not the date the claimant receives
the notice — triggers the appeal timeframe. § 8-74-106(1)(a); see
Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 12.1.3.1, 7 Code Colo. Regs.
1101-2. Here, the Panel expressly found that Nicholson’s appeal
5 was “due by June 20, 2024.” Thus, it necessarily also found that
the Division mailed the notice twenty days prior — on May 31.
Substantial evidence supports this finding.
¶ 10 Page three of the notice and appeal information states, “We
must receive your appeal no later than 20 calendar days from the
mailing date listed on the front of this form.” The date shown at the
top of the first page is May 31, 2024. Moreover, the first page also
shows an appeal deadline of June 20, 2024. The Panel reasonably
inferred from this evidence that the Division mailed the notice and
appeal information on May 31, 2024. Because substantial evidence
supports the Panel’s reasonable inference, we have no basis to
disturb it. See Tilley, 924 P.2d at 1177.
¶ 11 The fact that Nicholson had no forwarding address on or
around May 31, 2024, does not allow us to set aside the Panel’s
order. Though she may have lacked a permanent address at that
time, she nonetheless bore responsibility for “keep[ing] the
[D]ivision promptly and directly informed” of an address where she
could receive mail. Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 1.11, 7 Code
Colo. Regs. 1101-2.
6 ¶ 12 Nor can we set aside the Panel’s order because a Division
employee failed to notify Nicholson of the appeal timeframe. The
law presumes that a claimant pursuing unemployment benefits is
familiar with the relevant statutes’ content, including the twenty-
day appeal window set forth in section 8-74-106(1)(a). Paul v.
Indus. Comm’n, 632 P.2d 638, 639 (Colo. App. 1981).
¶ 13 Similarly, Nicholson’s unfamiliarity with the Division’s MyUI+
electronic platform does not merit setting aside the Panel’s order.
Section 8-74-106(1)(a) does not mandate electronic service. Rather,
that section makes clear that the appeal timeframe is triggered
upon either the mailing date or the date of electronic transmission.
§ 8-74-106(1)(a). Here, as discussed above, substantial evidence
supports the Panel’s finding that the Division mailed the notice and
appeals information on May 31, 2024. And Nicholson doesn’t
contend otherwise, only arguing that she didn’t receive it. Given
these circumstances, no electronic transmission was required.
III. Disposition
¶ 14 The Panel’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.