Nichols v. Williams
Opinion
By the 9th section of the statute of frauds, (1 R. L. 78,) all leases, &c., of land created by parol, shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will only. The payment of rent proves a tenancy. And as nothing appears in relation to the terms of holding, the defendant cannot be presumed to have a greater estate than a tenancy at will. In an action of ejectment, possibly this might be considered a tenancy from year to year, for the purpose of a notice to quit. (4 Cowen, 350.) For every other purpose, tenancies at will retain their true character. Nichols, then, for the purposes of the present question, was a tenant at will; and the proceedings of the landlord were regular. The three «months notice are required in tenancies at will and sufferance only. A tenant from year to year, though,' in- ejectment, he is entitled to six months notice, yet, in this proceeding, is not entitled to any notice. Had the landlord, therefore, stated his complaint so as td embrace the case of a tenancy from year to year, he showed enough to.obtain possession.
*But the testimony is, perhaps, unnecessarily before us. A certiorari, except toa justice’s court,
I am inclined to think the judge decided correctly; and that the proceedings must be affirmed.
Proceedings affirmed.
A certiorari to a justice’s court brought up the facts in evidence, by virtue of the statute, (1 R. L. 397.) This being repealed, whether a certio[16]*16rari will now have the effect stated by the chief justice ? Quere, And gee Wheeler v. Roberts, (7 Cowen, 636,) Finch v. M'Dowall, (id. 537,) and Williams v. Quin, (id. 539.)
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8 Cow. 13 (Nichols v. Williams) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.