Nichols v. O'Brien

149 Misc. 280, 267 N.Y.S. 7, 1933 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1360
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 12, 1933
StatusPublished

This text of 149 Misc. 280 (Nichols v. O'Brien) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nichols v. O'Brien, 149 Misc. 280, 267 N.Y.S. 7, 1933 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1360 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1933).

Opinion

Lockwood, J.

Avenue J is a broad highway laid out through one of the high class home districts of the borough of Brooklyn. [281]*281Business on it has been limited to the blocks between the New York Rapid Transit Company (B. M. T.) railroad embankment at East Fifteenth street and Coney Island avenue. Values of the store property on these blocks rose to substantial figures with the result that they were reflected in the values of properties on the blocks to the east where, due to this rise in value and to the lessened demand for large private homes and to the increased traffic on the street, a number of the old residences were turned into club houses or restaurants or places of business, all resulting in an agitation to have restrictions lifted by zone changes so that business would be lawfully permitted on both sides of Avenue J on the blocks between the railroad embankment and Ocean avenue.

The efforts to bring about a change resulted in an application to the board of estimate and apportionment which came up early in 1933. The owners of all the lots fronting on Avenue J, between the railroad embankment at Sixteenth street and Ocean avenue, favored the change to business. Owners of plots in the rear, whose properties were deemed affected by the engineers in the board of estimate, opposed the change.

On February 17, 1933, the board of estimate and apportionment adopted a resolution amending the district maps to bring about said changes by a vote of, affirmative 13; negative 3.

The plaintiff, Catherine Nichols, on behalf of herself and other objecting property owners, promptly obtained an order to show cause and a stay of all proceedings pending a court of review.

The petitioner and the other objectors contend that the board of estimate and apportionment was without authority to adopt said resolutions without a unanimous vote because protests and objections were filed by the owners of more than twenty per cent of the frontage immediately in the rear of the frontage proposed to be altered.

The engineers of the board of estimate figured that the protesting frontage in the rear was less than twenty per cent and, therefore, the resolutions did not require a unanimous vote for adoption.

The all-important question here involved is the interpretation of section 242-b of the Greater New York Charter and section 24 of the Amended Building Zone Resolutions.

The pertinent portions are as follows: Section 242-b of the Greater New York Charter: The board may from time to time, after public notice and hearing amend, supplement or change said regulations or districts, but in case a protest against a proposed amendment, supplement or change be presented, duly signed and acknowledged by the owners of twenty per centum or more of the [282]*282frontage proposed to be altered, or by the owners of twenty per centum of the frontage immediately in the rear thereof, or by the owners of twenty per centum of the frontage directly opposite the frontage proposed to be altered, such amendment shall not be passed except by a unanimous vote of the board.”

Section 24 of the Amended Building Zone Resolution: “If, however, a protest against such amendment, supplement or change be presented, duly signed and acknowledged by the owners of twenty per cent or more of any frontage proposed to be altered, or by the owners of twenty per cent of the frontage immediately in the rear thereof, or by the owners of twenty per cent of the frontage directly opposite the frontage proposed to be altered, such amendment shall not be passed except by the unanimous vote of the Board.”

The contentions of the city’s representatives who seek to show that less than twenty per cent of affected owners filed protests in this case, are set forth in the affidavit filed on this motion by Vernon S. Moon, deputy chief engineer, board of estimate and apportionment.

“ The method of calculating the percentages of owners ‘ immediately in the rear ’ opposed to the passage of any proposed amendment to the zoning resolutions which our department has adopted in view of the serious ambiguity of the statute is as follows: ‘ Percentage: Percentage equals the sum of the street frontages of protesting adjacent lots immediately in the rear, divided by the total frontage to be changed. The method of calculating protests is the same for use or area change.’

“ By way of illustration, we will take the instant case for the change of use: We add up the entire frontage of the streets proposed to be changed, including the frontage on the side streets to a depth of 100 feet. This constitutes the frontage proposed to be changed. We then totaled the frontage of all the protesting lots immediately abutting in the rear of the frontage proposed to be altered. This total was divided by the frontage proposed to be changed, thereby arriving at the percentage of those who were opposed.

“ This method of calculation has been used by the office of the chief engineer with the approval of the board of estimate and apportionment since shortly after the date when the zoning resolution was first enacted down to the present time, except that since May 15, 1931, as the result of an opinion by the corporation counsel. * * * Upon the rendering of this opinion by the corporation counsel, we changed the method of calculation in accordance with his opinion. Prior to that opinion, in figuring protestants of the owners of property 1 immediately in the rear ’ we included the [283]*283entire side line of the lots of such protesting property instead of the frontage on the streets.

“ On May 15, 1931, we received the above opinion from the corporation counsel, advising us that the term ‘ frontage ’ meant frontage on a public street, and that therefore, in calculating the frontage immediately in the rear, we should include only the street frontage of such property, and accordingly, from and after such date, we considered only the street frontage of the property immediately in the rear in fixing our percentages, but the method of calculation has not changed.

“ Since the adoption of the zoning laws in this city, approximately 1,200 amendments have been approved and a considerable number have failed of adoption. In all of them without exception, where protests had been filed, we adopted the same formula for computing percentages under our construction and interpretation. To the best of my knowledge, in none of them was exception taken, except in the case of Smidt v. McKee.”

The case of Smidt v. McKee (262 N. Y. 373), thus referred to, has meanwhile reached the Court of Appeals, which court rendered an opinion therein on July 11, 1933, unanimously reversing the Appellate Division and Special Term, and granting the petition for peremptory mandamus, requiring the board of estimate and apportionment to correct its minutes. In its opinion, the court says, by Lehman, J: There is, apparently, no dispute in regard to the number of protests which were presented. The only dispute is as to the meaning of the words frontage immediately in the rear ’ of the frontage proposed to be altered. The language of the statute, at least when applied to a situation where the proposed amendment is restricted to one end of a long block, is inexact; but the intention of the Legislature to create a single, exact standard by which the per centum of protests shall in all cases be measured is clear.

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Related

Matter of Smidt v. McKee
186 N.E. 869 (New York Court of Appeals, 1933)

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Bluebook (online)
149 Misc. 280, 267 N.Y.S. 7, 1933 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1360, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nichols-v-obrien-nysupct-1933.